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THE 


ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 


BY 

ALFRED L. P. DENNIS 


University of California Publications 
Bureau of International Relations 
Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-111 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS 
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 
1923 




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• > 













THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 


BY 


ALFRED L. P. DENNIS 


University of California Publications 
Bureau of International Relations 
Yol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-111 
Issued May 19, ,1923 




CONTENTS 


Chapter I. The Alliance of 1902 page 

1. Present Status of the Alliance.•... 1 

2. Negotiations of the Treaty of 1902. 3 

3. Standing of the Alliance. 7 

4. The Treaty and European Politics. 13 

Chapter II. The Alliance at Work, 1902-10 

1. The Russo-Japanese War and Japanese Policies.. 19 

2. The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe and the Stakes in the Great Game— 

Morocco and Korea. 21 

3. The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Alliance of 1905. 22 

4. The Anglo-Russian Entente and Russo-Japanese Treaties. 28 

Chaper III. The Present Treaty of 1911 and the World war 

1. Circumstances and Terms of the Renewed Alliance, 1911. 32 

2. The Imperial Conference of 1911 and the Renewal of the Alliance. 34 

3. Reception of the Treaty. 37 

4. The Dominions and Japan... 38 

5. The Allies and the Chinese Revolutions, 1911-13. 41 

6. Japan’s Entry into the War, 1914...' 43 4* 

7. Entry of China into the War, 1917. 46 

8. Japanese Agreements with Russia and the United States. 50 * 

9. Japan in Siberia... 52 

Chapter IV. The Alliance Today, 1919-1921 

1. American Opinion and the Alliance. 55 x 

2. Great Britain and War with the United States. 58 v 

3. The Alliance and Opinion in China. 62 

4. Japan and the Alliance... 64 

5. The British Empire in Asia and the Alliance. 68 

6. ‘‘The Imperial Conference” of 1921 and the Washington Conference. 71 V 

Chapter V. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan 

1. The Alliance and the Problem of the Pacific. 81 

2. The Alliance and England....*. 87 

3. Japanese Alarms and Uncertainties.•.. 91 

4. Criticism of the Alliance. 93 

Appendix I. The Anglo-Japanese Treaties 

A. Treaty of 1902...'..* 99 

B. Treaty of 1905. 101 

C. Treaty of 1922.. 103 

Appendix II. The Four Power Pact. 105 

Declaration accompanying the above Four-Power Treaty. 107 

A Treaty between the same Four Powers, supplementary to the above, 

signed February 6, 1922. 108 

Senate Reservation. 109 

Appendix III. Reading List. 110 









































NOTE 


Originally I was asked to prepare this short history of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance for publication prior to the meeting of the Conference on Limitation 
of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. Its publication was then 
held in abeyance for reasons which were apparently sufficient last November, 
but which no longer exist. 

It appears now just as it was written in October, 1921; but to the appendix 
is added the final text of the Four Power Treaty which was signed during the 
Washington Conference and which itself provides for the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

Such a brief historical survey of the origin and development of that alliance 
leads directly to the heart of world politics during a crowded and tumultuous 
period. The three successive treaties which formed that unusual combination 
were essential parts in the history of politics and of international relations in 
the Far East for twenty years. The ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will 
therefore mark the conclusion of a definite stage in modern diplomatic history. 
It has lasted during two great wars, and the arrangements for its termination 
came to a head as the danger of a third great war was absorbed by a strong and 
significant endeavor to preserve the peace of the world. 

Although the alliance was not directed against the United States, its history 
became a part of our foreign relations, and its disappearance is an important 
event in American diplomatic history, whose full meaning none of us can fore¬ 
tell. In this sense, therefore, this essay is a brief summary of documents and 
o 2 events which touch vitally the course of American foreign policy. 

During the last six months we have watched the success of that policy in 
promoting better international relations. Particularly the changes in Japanese 
diplomatic methods which have been already apparent may be welcome evidence 
that Japan is finding by international cooperation a clearer way to peace and 
security. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has had an unwholesome biography, and 
its disappearance will make for healthier relations between the United States, 
Great Britain, and Japan. 

The world is sick of the old diplomacy of which the alliance was such a 
marked example. If I have written an indictment of that diplomacy, I hope 
that it is also an obituary. 


WlLLIAMSTOWN, MASS., 

August 23, 1922. 


A. L. P. D. 




































. 




































. 


















THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 

BY 

ALFRED L. P. DENNIS 


CHAPTER I 

THE ALLIANCE OF 1902 

1. Present Status of the Alliance 

The first treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan was 
signed in London on January 30, 1902, by Lord Lansdowne, British 
Foreign Secretary, and Count Ilayashi, the Japanese Minister. The 
alliance was renewed with several important changes on August 12, 
1905; and on July 13, 1911, the third and present version of this 
agreement was concluded. This treaty of 1911 is now in effect,* and 
the question of its renewal or modification has become of immense im¬ 
portance in connection with the agenda of the forthcoming Conference 
at Washington on the Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far 
Eastern Questions. The particular reason why the matter of renewal 
is now before the British Empire and Japan is to be found in the 
language of Article VI of the treaty of 1911, which reads as follows: 

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the 
date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. 

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have 
notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the 
intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expira¬ 
tion of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting 
Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its 
expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance 
shall, ipso facto , continue until peace is concluded. * 1 

This article is based exactly on Article VIII of the treaty of 1905 2 
and both of these articles are in large part repetition of Article VI of 
the first treaty of 1902, with the exception that in the first document 

* Written October, 1921. 

1 J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and agreements with and concerning China, 
1894-1919 (New York, 1921), I, 901, 2 vols. 

2 MacMurray, I, 516-518. 




2 


University of California Publications, International Eolations [\ r ol. 1 


the agreement was to remain in force for at least five years from the 
date of signature, instead of for at least ten years as in the two later 
treaties. 

But there has been some confusion in the mind of the public as to 
the date at which a renewal or denunciation of the alliance might be 
necessary. This was due chiefly to the fact that, on July 8, 1920, 
Great Britain and Japan jointly notified the League of Nations that 
they wished to bring their agreement of 1911 to a form which would 
be not inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations as 
embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. This notification was in no sense 
a denunciation of the treaty of alliance which remained effective. A 
year later the two governments, on July 7, 1921, called attention to 
this continuation of the treaty by a second note to the League, adding: 

Pending further action, that they are agreed that if any situation 
arises whilst the Agreement remains in force in which the procedure 
prescribed by the terms of the Agreement is inconsistent with the 
procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League of Nations then 
the procedure prescribed by the said Covenant shall be adopted and 
shall prevail over that prescribed b} 7 the Agreement. 

Further to clear the matter, the Lord Chancellor gave a legal 
opinion last July, at the time of the Imperial Conference in London, 
when the renewal of the treaty was under discussion. He said that, 
any opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, the alliance was still in 
being. Only to this extent and in this fashion has there been any 
official comment on the exact terms of the treaty of 1911. 

The duration of the treaty is therefore now indefinite. It may 
run in perpetuity until one year from some future date on which 
it may be denounced by either Great Britain or Japan. Otherwise it 
is self-continuing till it may be superseded by some other agreement, 
or be modified in view of the provisions of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, or be renewed in a fourth document. In connection with 
this whole matter of renewal or expiration of the treaty, as originally 
suggested for July, 1921, the fact that a British Imperial Conference 
was to be held in London in the same month is of importance. At this 
conference representatives of the Dominions and of India were to 
consult with representatives of the British Cabinet on matters of 
Imperial interest. Undoubtedly this fact had considerable influence 
in delaying the settlement of the question of the treaty; and the joint 
action of the two governments, by this note of July 7, 1921, indicated 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


3 


still further postponement of any formal decision to denounce or 
renew the treaty. The conference of last July adjourned without 
announcement regarding the matter. In view of this situation and in 
view of the Washington Conference, the whole question of renewal 
(has become a matter of interest to the world at large. The United 
States, however, was not at any time a party to the negotiation of this 
treaty or of its two predecessors, and the coincidence of interest here 
involved does not arise because of any formal action on the part of 
the United States. 

In any discussion of the present treaty it is first necessary to con¬ 
sider the occasions and provisions of the two prior treaties, and in 
particular to review briefly the general conditions which prevailed at 
the time when the three successive agreements were concluded. Treaties 
are living things subject in interpretation and enforcement to inevita¬ 
ble alteration due to facts and events which are not necessarily em¬ 
bodied in any written document. This is particularly true in connec¬ 
tion with the treaty of alliance, for, as Mr. Ozaki, lately Japanese 
Minister of Justice, in defending the Anglo-Japanese agreement, said 
in 1916: “The Alliance should not be left inactive and unchanged 
with changing conditions; and politicians and leaders of thought must 
at all times endeavor to maintain and keep the usefulness of the 
Alliance abreast of the times.” The written word of the treaty re¬ 
mains ; but in any case its application, whether direct or indirect, and 
its significance may have vastly altered as political conditions and 
policies have altered with the course of events. Certainly such changes 
have effect when we come to consider the complicated and entangled 
question of armaments. For in the main, armaments are determined 
by political and economic policies. In view of the immense and world¬ 
wide issues which are now involved in the field of international rela¬ 
tions, the Conference on the Limitation of Armament must inevitably 
consider, almost as a primary duty, the scope and significance of poli¬ 
cies, which may or may not be embodied in solemn treaties, yet which 
are themselves responsible for present problems of armament. 

2. Negotiation of the Treaty of 1902 

The alliance is scarcely twenty years old; but so many things have 

•. * * 

happened in that time that it is important first to note circumstances 
connected with the negotiation of the treaty of 1902. The good rela¬ 
tions of England and Japan had already been strengthened by the 


4 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


negotiation, in 1894, of a new commercial treaty. This gave equality 
of treatment for the subjects of each of the two powers and provided 
that, in 1899, British extraterritoriality should end in Japan. The 
United States had recognized these ideas in principle as far back as 
1878, but England was the first European country to recognize by an 
effective treaty Japan’s position in the comity of nations. * 3 Further¬ 
more, in 1894-95, England did not join Russia, France, and Germany 
in forcing Japan to revise her terms of peace after the victorious war 
against China. This attitude was entirely negative, for England did 
not, on the other hand, take any steps to assist Japan against this 
coalition and, indeed, advised submission to the demands for the 
revision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which ended the Chinese war. 
Nevertheless, Japan had learned the lesson of isolation and the penal¬ 
ties of success. It was therefore only natural that Japanese official 
circles should, almost at once, begin discussion as to the wisdom of 
closer relations with Great Britain. Thus, in the summer of 1895, 
Count Hayashi inspired articles in Jiji Shimpo dealing with general 
international problems and the foreign policy of Japan. It was pointed 
out that: 

If the continental powers, (i.e., Russia, France, and Germany) are 
going to continue the Alliance against her [Japan] in order to curb 
her just aspirations f to fulfill which we have poured out life and 
money—then we too must endeavor to ourselves make an Alliance 
which shall counteract their machinations. ... If, however, 
England and Japan should make an Alliance the problems of the Far 
East would all be settled. 4 

Three years later, in March, 1898, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who 
was then head of the Colonial Office, told the Japanese Minister in 
London, in personal and informal fashion, that England .was ready to 
enter into an agreement with Japan as to Far Eastern questions. In 
1899, Count Hayashi, in common with Baron Kato, urged on the gov¬ 
ernment the necessity of an alliance with Great Britain; and it was 
with this knowledge of his views that the Japanese Government sent 
Hayashi to London. 5 The project of the alliance was therefore already 
in the air, though the discussion of it was more common in the East 

3‘‘Japan, No. 1” (1894), Parliamentary Papers, XCYI; Hishida, The interna¬ 

tional position of Japan as a great power (New York, 1905), pp. 137 et seq. 

4 Pooley (editor), The secret memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi (London 
1915), pp. 107-108. Cited as Hayashi.) 

5 Hayashi, pp. 83-84. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


o 


than in London. 0 Shortly after Baron Hayashi took up his post in 
London, the suggestion was renewed from an unexpected source, for 
in the spring of 1901, Baron von Eckardstein, the German charge d’ 
affaires in London, told the Japanese Minister of his personal view 
“that nothing would prove more effective for the maintenance of 
peace in the Far East than the conclusion of a triple alliance between 
Japan, Great Britain and Germany. ” Apparently von Eckardstein 
had frequent conversations on this same subject with members of the 
British Cabinet until the latter part of 1901, by which time the Anglo- 
Japanese negotiations had become more detailed and the possibility of 
the inclusion of Germanv in the alliance had become decidedlv less 
likely. 7 

In this varied fashion the way was prepared for Count Hayashi, on . 
his own responsibility, to sound the British Government regarding the 
possibility of an alliance. This he did on April 17, 1901, with Lord 
Lansdowne. While preliminary discussions were thus taking place 
along these lines, Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at 
Tokyo, who was then in London, told Hayashi that King Edward VII 
had expressed himself favorably as to an Anglo-Japanese understand¬ 
ing. At this time the danger had been suggested to the British Gov¬ 
ernment that, Japan might take up the idea of making an alliance with 
Russia. Indeed Hayashi had already told his government that they 
might use the possibility of a Russo-Japanese combination to stimulate 
the British toward an agreement with Japan. This threat of a possible 
Russian alliance was used on more than one occasion; and in this 
respect Prince Ito was unexpectedly useful, for while on his way 
around the world in 1901, he was ordered to St. Petersburg to discuss 
the situation with the Russian authorities. The news of this move 
disturbed the British and also caused great anxiety to Count Hayashi. 

Originally Prince Ito had favored an Anglo-Japanese combination, 
but apparently, under the influence of conditions in St. Petersburg, 
he had changed his mind. In Tokyo there was much discussion as to 
the relative advantages of the two alliances; but in a Council of the 
Elder Statesmen before the Throne the decision was finally given in 
favor of continuing the negotiations at London and of signing an 
Anglo-Japanese treaty. These negotiations progressed much more 
rapidly after November; though it was not until January 28, 1902, 
that agreement was at last reached as to the troublesome article on 


6 Hayashi, p. 111. 


7 Hayashi, pp. 314 et seq. 



6 


University of California Publications, International Belations [Yol. 1 


Korea. During these weeks the main points of discussion were the 
language of the preamble, the article of Korea, the question of the 
possible inclusion of India as a field for cooperation, and the general 
scope of the treaty as a whole. 8 9 

The British Government was particularly anxious to avoid binding 
England to support any Japanese aggression in Korea, and it was 
necessary on December 19, for Hayashi to give a formal assurance 
that “even if Japan should have free action in Korea the British 
Government might rest assured that the Japanese Government has no 
intention of using that freedom as a means of aggression.” 0 In the 
course of these conversations, Lord Lansdowne also wished to enlarge 
the scope of the alliance so as to include the protection of British inter¬ 
ests in India. This proposal the Japanese were unwilling to accept 
and, indeed, secured the modification of the first British draft of the 
treaty to substitute the words “Extreme East” for “Far East,” in 
order that there might be no doubt as to the limitation of the field 
of the treaty. 10 On the other hand, in the first British draft of Article 
V there was a phrase providing that without mutual consent no other 
agreement should be made by either power with reference to Korea. 
The Japanese, however, amended the draft so as to provide that no 
agreement should be made with any other power which might be 
prejudicial to the interests of the other ally. The reason for this, 
as Count Hayashi points out, was that Japan did not wish to be 
compelled in the future to inform Great Britain at the time of nego¬ 
tiating with any other country in respect to China or Korea. Curi¬ 
ously, the British Government did not offer any objection to this 
amendment. 11 

In general the agreement declared that both Great Britain and 
Japan were anxious to maintain the status quo and general peace in 
the Extreme East, to uphold the independence and territorial integ¬ 
rity of China and Korea, and to secure “equal opportunities in those 
countries for the commerce and industry of all nations.” The new 
allies denied any “aggressive tendencies” as to either China or Korea; 
but they declared the special interests of England in China and the 
peculiar political as well as commercial and industrial interests of 
Japan in Korea in addition to Japanese interests in China. Either 
of the allies could therefore take measures to safeguard those interests 

8 Hayashi, Chap. IY. “Hayashi, p. 182. 

9 Hayashi, p. 168. “Hayashi, pp. 180-81. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


if threatened by a foreign power or by internal disturbances in either 
China or Korea. If, as a result, war should ensue between one of the 
allies and a third power the other ally was to be neutral and to try to 
restrain the entry of any other hostile power. If, however, a second 
foreign enemy should engage in the war, the two allies were to wage 
war together to protect their mutual interests and to make peace in 
common. Furthermore, neither ally was to enter into separate arrange¬ 
ments with another power to the prejudice of interests included in the 
treaty except after consultation with the other ally; and, in case of 
danger to these interests, the two governments were to communicate 
with each other fully and frankly. As we have already seen, the 
treaty was to remain in force for five years with the provision that 
in case neither power should have given notice a year before 1907 of 
the termination of the treaty, it was to remain in force until a year 
after such a notice of expiration had been given. In case the date of 
this expiration should fall at a time when either ally was at war, the 
alliance should endure until the conclusion of peace. 12 

3. Standing of the Alliance 

We must now turn to the reception of the treaty and in general to 
the political circumstances which served as a background both to its 
negotiation and effect. The British Government, in notifying its 
ambassadors abroad of the signature of the treaty, declared that the 
alliance was “ purely a measure of precaution to be invoked should 
occasion arise in the defense of important British interests. 7,13 In the 
House of Commons, Lord Cranborne, in response to criticisms, de¬ 
clared that the agreement had not been conceived in an aggressive 
spirit; and in the House of Lords both Lord Lansdowne and Lord 
Rosebery spoke strongly in its support. But both outside of Parlia¬ 
ment and within, the fear was expressed that the agreement was one¬ 
sided, that “the risks involved would be serious and that British policy 
had been placed too much at the mercy of Japan.” 14 On the whole the 

12 MacMurray, I, 324-25. For the full text of the three treaties, see Appen¬ 
dix 1. 

13 il Japan, No. 1” (1902), Parliamentary Papers, XCVI. 

14 Annual Register, 1902, p. 59; for further contemporary notice, see H. N. G. 
Bushby, The agreement between Great Britain and Japan , in The Nineteenth Cen¬ 
tury and after , LI, pp. 369-382, March, 1902; A. P. Dolliver, Significance of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in the North American Review, CLXXIV, 594- 
605 (May, 1902) ; A. Maurice Low, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in The Forum 
XXXIII, 196-206 (April, 1902); A. Stead, The Anglo-Japanese agreement from 
the Japanese point of view, in the Contemporary Review, LXXXI, 437-445 (March, 
1902). 



8 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


secret of the negotiations had been well kept and there was therefore 
great surprise at the news of the treaty, whose full possibilities were 
then scarcely appreciated by an unprepared public. Even the London 
Times devoted most of its comments to China and delivered a weighty 
lecture on the opportunity which the alliance now afforded to China to 
set her house in order. The treaty was in accord with American pur¬ 
poses in the Far East and these ideas as to China’s integrity and 
independence and the peaceful development of equal economic oppor¬ 
tunity now received a ‘ ‘ solemn consecration. ’ ’ It was not a threat to 
any other power for “by giving precision to the conservative aims 
of British and Japanese policy and by combining and enhancing the 
influence of the two powers in Peking,” the alliance made for “the 
preservation of peace in the Far East and all over the w T orld. ” 15 

In Japan the general sense of satisfaction was voiced by the Japan 
Times of February 13, which said that every thinking Japanese felt 
as “one who has suddenly awakened from dreams of youthful ambi¬ 
tions and vague aspirations to the consciousness of the fact that he 
has become a grown-up person of high position, of great reputation, 
and with a consequential burden of onerous responsibilities.” The 
treaty might provide material advantage to Japan, but above all it 
Was flattering to national aspirations and added greatly to Japanese 
\ international prestige. 

There was practically no official comment from Germany; but a 
summary of the Berlin press shows that it was generally assumed that 
the treaty was directed against Russia and as such was of exceptional 
political significance. The gain lay rather with England than with 
Japan; but Germany could afford to be indifferent at the time. In 
line with these comments was the action of Russia and France, who 
felt it necessary to issue, on March 16, a special note which clearly 
I showed that Russia at least felt that the alliance was primarily directed 
against her. They declared that while the treaty upheld their own 
ideas as to the independence of China and Korea and Far Eastern 
affairs in general— 

Nevertheless, being obliged themselves also to take into considera¬ 
tion the case in which either the aggressive action of third Powers, or 
the recurrence of disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity 
and free development of that Power, might become a menace to their 
own interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the 

“London Times, Feb. 12, 1902. 




1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


9 


right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted for 
safeguarding those interests. 

And Russia, in a further communique of March 20, stated that 
The principles that have guided Russian policy have remained and 
still remain invariable; Russia insists on the independence and in¬ 
tegrity of China—a friendly neighboring country—as well as on that 
of Korea; Russia desires the maintenance of the status quo and the 
general pacification of the Par East. By the construction of the great 
Siberian Railway, with a branch running through Manchuria to a 
port always free of ice, Russia is favoring the extension, in those 
regions, of the commerce and industry of the whole world. Would it 
be in her interests actually to set up obstacles to that? 16 

On receipt of this note, Secretary Hay, for the United States, took 
occasion to comment both on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and on the 
Franco-Russian note, stating that the United States regarded both of 
these as confirmatory of the assurances which it had already received 
from these and other powers as to the independence and integrity of 
the Chinese Empire and of Korea and “the maintenance of complete 
liberty of intercourse between those countries and all nations in the 
matter of trade and of industry. ’ ’ But Mr. Hay added: 

With regard to the concluding paragraph of the Russian memoran¬ 
dum the government of the United States, while sharing the views 
therein expressed as to the continuance of the “open-door” policy 
against possible encroachment from whatever quarter, and while 
equally solicitous for the unfettered development of independent 
China, reserves for itself entire liberty of action should circumstances 
unexpectedly arise whereby the policy and interests of the United 
States in China and Korea might be disturbed or impaired. 17 

Indeed at this period there were frequent occasions when the United 
States protested at St. Petersburg regarding Russian plans in Man¬ 
churia as being opposed to the rights of American citizens. However, 
in 1902 the United States had already taken pains to inform the 
Russian Government that it was totally ignorant of the Anglo-Japanese 
treaty until after its signature, and, furthermore, that the United 
States had not consulted Great Britain and Japan in connection with 

y.**» 

the American protest to Russia as to a pending convention regarding 
the Russo-Chinese Bank—an agreement which Mr. Hlay had viewed 
with concern. The coincidence of dates between that protest in Febru¬ 
ary and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was therefore 
entirely accidental. 


16 MacMurray, I, 325-26. 

17 Foreign relations of the United States, 1902, p. 931. 



10 


University of California Publications, International Relations ["V ol. 1 


On the whole, American public opinion was rather favorable to the 
treaty of alliance, though highly placed diplomats differed radically as 
to its ultimate bearing on peace and war in the Far East. It was a 
period of cordiality with England; the Hay-Pauncefote Canal Treaty 
had been signed; and there was substantial agreement between the two 
governments in their endeavors to protect China from Russian aggres¬ 
sion. But inevitably the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was likely to affect 
in one way or another the American policy of the “Open Door” as it 
had grown to formulation and as it was destined to develop in the 
future. From a very early period in the history of our relations with 
the Far East, the United States has maintained the principles of coop¬ 
eration and fair play. The Hay doctrine, as laid down in 1899, was 
therefore founded on the consistent purposes of the United States, 
namely, “reciprocity, integrity of Chinese territory, and cooperation 
with other treaty powers.” 18 As is well known, on September 6, 
1899, Mr. Hay asked assurances from Germany and other powers that 
each power within its ‘ ‘ respective sphere of whatever influence ’ ? — 

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested 
interest within any so-called “sphere of interest” or leased territory it 
may have in China. 

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall 
apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are 
within said “sphere of interest” (unless they be “free ports”), no 
matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable 
shall be collected by the Chinese Government. 

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another 
nationality frequenting any port in such “sphere” than shall be levied 
on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over 
lines built, controlled, or operated within its “sphere” on merchandise 
belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported 
through such “sphere” than shall be levied on similar merchandise 
belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances. 19 

In view of the Boxer uprising in 1900, Mr. Hay took a step further 
and declared that it was the intention of the United States in coopera¬ 
tion with the other powers to restore order in China, to seek for a 
policy of peace in order to secure her territorial and administrative 
entity, to ‘ ‘ protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty, 
and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial 

18 Anderson and Hershey, Handbook of the diplomatic history of Europe, Asia 
and Africa, 1870-1914 (Washington, 1918), p. 244. 

10 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, p. 129. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


11 


trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 7 ’ 20 This policy was defined 
in a circular note to the powers on July 3, 1900, and is therefore the 
basis of future discussion and definition on the part of the United 
States. 21 The occasion was particular but the appeal and the authority 
were general. 

The Open Door was scarcely a doctr ine o f internatio nal law nor 
was it embodied in any formal treaty at that time. Rather was it a 
notice to the world to prevent further extensions of ownership or7 
control on the part of foreign powers in China; and as such it has 
not lost in value and importance. Equality of economic opportunity 
in the Far east and the integrity of China are part and parcel of 
American Far Eastern policies. These principles are entirely in line 
with the traditional international conceptions of the United States. 
Their foundation is to be found in the earliest records of our diplo¬ 
matic policy, whether with China or with other governments. There is 
therefore clear insight and special significance in the words of Ad¬ 
miral Mahan: 

Just how far the maintenance of the Open Door may carry the 
interested nations to decisive action, in support of the integrity of 
* the Chinese Empire, remains to be seen. Overt action, as distinct 
from latent power to act, will be necessary only in case some among 

20 Idem, 1900, p. 319. 

21 11 In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to 
define the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit 
this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857, of peace with 
the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of 
lives and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial 
treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we 
propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. We 
regard the condition at Pekin as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and 
responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. 
So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power 
to protect foreign life and property we regard them as representing the Chinese 
people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose of 
the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other 
powers, first, in opening up communication with Pekin and rescuing the Ameri¬ 
can officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in 
affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and 
property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; 
and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other 
provinces of the empire and recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too 
early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of 
the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring 
about permanent safety and.peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and 
administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by 
treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of 
equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.’’ Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1900, p. 299. 





12 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


the countries concerned obtain, by positions, by predominant force, 
by intrigue, or by the negligence of rivals, a preponderance, destroying 
that balance which the Open Door requires. Equilibrium will ensure 
quiet. Thus the Open Door, which in principle has received the adhes¬ 
ion of the Western community of nations, does not stand isolated, 
as an unrelated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude 
affecting, however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of 
contact between the East and the West. 22 

The last restatement of the whole matter comes from Secretary 
Hughes himself in his pregnant note of July 1, 1921, to the Chinese 
Minister in Washington: 

Your reference to the principle of the open door affords me the 
opportunity to assure you of this Government’s continuance in its 
whole-hearted support of that principle, which it has traditionally 
regarded as fundamental both to the interests of China itself and to 
the common interests of all powers in China, and indispensable to the 
free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 

The Government of the United States has never associated itself 
with any arrangement which sought to establish any special rights 
or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects 
or citizens of other friendly States; and I am happy to assure you 
that it is the purpose of this Government neither to participate nor 
to acquiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish 
in favor of foreign interests any superiority of rights with respect 
to commercial or economic development in designated regions of the 
territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly 
or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any 
legitimate trade or industry, or from participating with the Chinese 
Government in any category of public enterprise. 23 

Unfortunately the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
1902 and its renewal in 1905 and 1911 did not tend to give additional 
support to the definitions and statements which have just been quoted, 
for the application of those three treaties was destined to be different 
from and far more important than the mere declaration of intentions 
therein contained. In any case a wider view is necessary if we are to 
gain a just perspective. Thus the statement of the policy of the Open 
Door and the consummation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were 
themselves incident to the general course of events which, since 1894, 

22 A. T. Mahan, The interest of America in international conditions (Boston, 
1915), pp. 184-85. For further discussion of the Open Door, see Hornbeck, 
Contemporary politics in the Far East (New York, 1916), pp. 231 et seq.; 
Hershey, International law and diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war (New York 
1906), pp. 328 et seq. 

23 Neiv Yorlc Times, July 9, 1921. 



3 923 j 


Dennis: The Anglo Japanese Alliance 


13 


has made the Far East a battle-ground for world policies. The old 
struggle between East and West was now, in the Extreme Orient, to 
be affected vitally by the transfer to this oriental terrain of intense 
European rivalries. The entire continent of Asia thus became a fieldj 
on which remote and ancient European problems clamored for solu¬ 
tion amid alien surroundings. The exact expressions of these contests 
were in turn themselves clearly affected by the internal Oriental 
factors which prevailed. In this fashion the Far Eastern question 
finally took its place as one of the vital economic and political prob^k 
lems of the world at large. 

4. The Treaty and European Politics 

The Japanese clearly realized this connection between the East 
and the West at the conclusion of their successful war against China, 
for, as we have seen, Russia, Germany, and France compelled Japan 
in 1895 to give up the Liaotung Peninsula, which had been acquired 
from China as a result of the war. This blow to Japanese ambitions 
was not only material and strategic but convinced the Japanese Gov¬ 
ernment that sooner or later it would be necessary to return to the 
attempt to secure a foothold on the Asiatic continent. Thus Japanese 
leaders realized their problem and saw that Japan must seek an 
alliance with a European power and at the same time prepare for aV 
second war. A further result of the war between China and Japan 
was the revelation to the world of the weakness of China. There was 
much talk of the so-called break-up of China; plans of partition 
were discussed and spheres of influence were plotted by European 
rivals in the East. Out of this welter of international greed the lease 

of Kioachow by Germany in March, 1898, was quickly followed by 

v 

the lease of Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula by Russia, while 
Great Britain secured Weil^iwei. * Such events served to convince the** 
Japanese that these acquisitions, which after all were gained by^ 
threat or force, had endangered her ultimate ambitions to be the 
leading power in eastern Asia. In addition to these territorial changes 
there were a horde of commercial concessions extracted from the 
Chinese Government by representatives of European countries en¬ 
joying the political support of their own governments. In the Far 
East, therefore, at the close ofythe century, there was fought a great 
“ Battle of Concessions, ” which naturally made an impression on the 
minds of Oriental leaders. 


14 


University of California Publications, International Eelations [Vol. 1 


Such exploitation of the commercial resources of China by foreign¬ 
ers was therefore one of the direct causes of the Boxer uprising in 
1900. This for a time tended to obscure the main issues; but it also 
opened a way for further demands on the part of some of the gov¬ 
ernments which had intervened in China to protect the lives and 
interests of their own citizens. It was under these circumstances that 
Secretary Hay had determined that, as far as possible, the settlement 
of the claims arising out of the Boxer disturbances should not be 
utilized to invade further the proper rights and interests of China 
or of Americans in China. The United States was partially success¬ 
ful; but both in Manchuria and in Korea the Russian Government 
showed no intention of materially checking either its economic or its 
military advance. 

Concession after concession and convention after convention soon 
showed to Japan that, despite protests and despite professions of 
innocence, the Russian Government was pursuing a fixed policy of 
aggrandizement at the expense of both China and Korea in such 
fashion as to block completely the major Japanese designs for the 
future. The treaty of alliance with England was therefore of supreme 
importance to Japan. Though the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese 
War in 1904 was not a direct and inevitable result of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance, the treaty of 1902 gave Japan an insurance policy 
against hostile interference by any other alliance which aimed at her 
isolation and defeat. If war with two hostile powers came, Japan 
would have the necessary aid. In any case the alliance tended to 
localize any such conflict in the Far East. 

On the other hand, there were conditions and considerations in 
Europe and in other parts of Asia which give further reason and 
broader setting for the treaty of 1902. Indeed it is impossible to iso¬ 
late the alliance; from the outset it is an affair of world-wide impor¬ 
tance. To this view the situation of European international politics 
brings strong evidence. For, during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, old forces were still at work, and the long rivalry between 
England and Russia continued. It was interwoven with the whole 
course of modern European diplomatic history from the days of 
Catherine II and of William Pitt; and during the second half of the 
last century the menace of Russian expansion in Asia was continually 
in the minds of British statesmen. In 1856, the Russian advance 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


15 


toward Constantinople had been checked by England, France, Turkey, 
and Sardinia. Twenty years of mingled diplomacy and war won 
great success for Russia yet, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Eng¬ 
land was again a moving factor in blocking the way southward to 
an ice-free port. During the seventies and eighties Central Asia 
therefore became an alternative field for Russian penetration. This 
rapid advance provoked much alarm regarding the safety of India; 
and it soon became a cardinal tenet of British foreign policy to 
safeguard the Indian frontier, as far as possible, by using Afghanistan 
both as a buffer state and as a protectorate. These checks to Russia in 
the Near East and in Central Asia made it perhaps only more natural 
that the government of the Czar should turn with greater energy 
and by more modern methods, such as the construction of the Siberian 
railway, to seek in the Far East what it had failed to secure elsewhere. 

In the meantime, coincident with this later stage of Anglo-Russian 
relations, British policy, as shown in the occupation of Egypt, had 
aroused the jealousy of France. For more than twenty years the 
possibility of an Anglo-French conflict was also one of the major 
elements in world politics. Furthermore the dual alliance of France 
and Russia came as an added factor after 1893. Thus by the close of 
the century the British had to reckon with the enmity of two Euro¬ 
pean powers which were also Asiatic powers. 

On the other hand, Anglo-German relations during the period 
1878-98 had on the whole been rather friendly; threatening questions 
both in Asia and in Africa had been amicably settled; and at times 
there had been cooperation and cordiality between the two govern¬ 
ments. At the same time, Germany was developing a Near Eastern policy 
which involved the support of Turkish misrule in return for pros¬ 
pective railway concessions by the Sultan. In the Far East the Ger¬ 
man flag was hoisted in 1898 at Kiaochow. Thus Germany began her 
diplomatic ventures at the two extremities of Asia, in regions where 
other European powers were already involved. During these years 
there were various, more or less informal, conversations regarding the 
possibility of an Anglo-German accord; and, in spite of the German 
Imperial telegram of congratulation to President Kruger in 1895, the 
outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 saw England and Germany on fairly 
good terms. 


16 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


Nevertheless one great result of the South African War was the 
revelation of the comparative isolation of England in Europe. It is 
true that the German Government pursued a correct attitude during 
the war and that various ill-defined plans for European intervention 
in behalf of the Boers came to naught; but the opinion of continental 
countries generally and in particular the bitter tone pursued by both 
the German and French press served as a warning to England. Under 
these circumstances the German Government sought to profit by the 
troubled situation, and, deeming the occasion proper, suggested an 
Anglo-German combination, which Mr. Chamberlain, as Colonial 
Secretary, was quite ready to extend to include the United States 
in order to form a triple combination which would dominate the 
world. Such talk, however, was deadened by the reality of events. 
In 1895 the Kaiser at the Isle of Wight had talked of alliances but 
failed to see that in the Near East he must choose between English 
cooperation and the support of the Sultan, the author of the Armen¬ 
ian massacres. Likewise in the Far East, Anglo-German accord was 
to receive a sharp blow. For in 1900 England and Germany had 
signed an agreement relative to China which stated that both powers 
would “direct their policies towards maintaining undiminished the 
territorial conditions of the Chinese Empire.” 24 In spite of this, only 
a few months later, the German government declared that Manchuria 
was not included within this treaty and this, although the British 
Government had repeatedly declared that it understood Manchuria 
always to be included in the term “Chinese Empire.” 25 Such a de¬ 
cision by Germany showed England that the Kaiser was not ready to 
support British views against Russia in China. At the same time, 
England discovered the possibilities of the new German navy bill 
of 1900. This program of naval expansion was alarming to England, 
but it did not in itself block the further discussion of an Anglo-Ger¬ 
man understanding. Only at the end of the previous year Lord Salis¬ 
bury had spoken of Germany as England’s “closest continental 
friend.” Chamberlain and von Biilow had friendly talks and finally, 

24 MacMurray, I, 263. 

25 Reventlow, Deutschlands answartige PolitiJc, 1888-1914 (Berlin, 1916), pp. 
167-173, where the view is rightly taken that this Anglo-German agreement 
as to China and the subsequent differences as to Manchuria constitute a turn¬ 
ing point in the history of Anglo-German relations. Prince von Biilow was 
blunt enough in March, 1901, as he said emphatically: “ Auf die Mandschurei 
bezielit sich das deutschenglische Ablcommen nicht.” 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


17 


as we have seen, von Eckarclstein, early in 1901, returned to the whole 
matter by his personal suggestions to Count Hayashi of a triple 
alliance of England, Germany, and Japan. This was perhaps the 
fourth attempt to bring England and Germany together on the 
basis of a world-wide understanding. Toward the end of 1901, as 
the secret negotiations between Lansdowne and Hayashi were nearing 
a conclusion, the question came up as to whether Germany should be 
a third partner in the alliance. It was decided to keep the whole 
matter of the treaty private till it had been signed. At this stage, 
in November and December, the question of Anglo-German relations 
took new form, for Berlin was ready for an agreement with London 
provided it did not extend to Asiatic matters or include Tokyo. Thus 
such an Anglo-German alliance would scarcely assist England in 
Asia and would bind her to the support of Germany in other direc¬ 
tions. Furthermore, trade competition between the two countries 
was increasing, and the press on both sides was indulging in bitter 
attacks. Nevertheless, Germany was by no means opposed to the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, for she saw in it a possibility that both 
countries might become embroiled with Kussia. This rejection of the 
secret German offer by England was a different matter, however, 
and, almost over-night, a wave of reciprocal vituperation swept over 
the press in England and Germany. The ostensible occasion was a 
sharp verbal encounter between Mr. Chamberlain and Prince von 
Billow, who had publicly resented Mr. Chamberlain’s alleged deroga¬ 
tory remarks on the conduct of the German armies in 1870. This 
tempest in a teapot had arisen through charges and countercharges 
as to the behavior of British troops in the Boer War. Its real signi¬ 
ficance lay in the fact that in January, 1902, England alone signed 
the treaty with Japan and that the proposal for an Anglo-German 
agreement had fallen to the ground. Later German authorities have 
tried to' impugn the validity of some of Hayashi’s statements. They 
have also accused both the British and Japanese governments of 
giving Germany the cold shoulder and preventing her from partici¬ 
pating in the alliance. Such a version, however, is not borne out by 
the facts. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
of 1902 was not primarily based on Anglo-German rivalry but indeed 

20 Hayashi, p. 206; Reventlow, op. cit., pp. 178-180; Sir Valentine Chirol, in 
the London Times, September 11 and 13, 1920. 



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University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


might have been at one time a possible step toward Anglo-German 
accord. The treaty was signed in that year because of Russian and of 
Japanese policies and because of the Asiatic interests of England at a 
time when, in Europe and elsewhere, England was isolated and 
needed support. Furthermore, this alliance with an Asiatic state 
was not foreign to British diplomatic traditions. The treaty of 1902 
was by no means the first of this sort concluded by England with an 
Oriental government. Great Britain had at times been an ally of 
Turkey during the Napoleonic wars and for the Crimean War. We 
have only to recall the long series of previous Asiatic alliances on 
the part of England to realize that in the Anglo-Japanese agreement 
there was in 1902 no fundamental break with an historical foreign 
policy. For, during more than a hundred years, British safety, 
power, and final expansion in India have been based on the policy 
of alliance with Oriental states. This was also true to a limited 
extent as to Persia and even in Central Asia. It was largely by such 
means that the foundation of British rule was laid in India. 27 

27 Aitchison, Collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India 
and neighboring countries (Calcutta, 1892), passim, but note in particular VIII 
280; IX, 433; X, 37, 48; XI, 54. 11 vols. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


19 


CHAPTER II 

THE ALLIANCE AT WORK, 1902-1910 

1. The Russo-Japanese War and Japanese Policies 

The application of the treaty of 1902 to Far Eastern affairs, its 
renewal in 1905, and the fashion in which it received a new orienta¬ 
tion as the result of changes outside of Asia all combine to mark a 
further stage in the development of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It 
is significant that the connection between that alliance and the politics 
and policies of Europe should receive special attention during the 
crowded years 1902-1907. In the Far East was fought the Russo- 
Japanese War which led to changes vital for Korea, China, Russia, 
and Japan. At the same time, an entirely new combination of cir¬ 
cumstances had altered the diplomatic map of Europe. Taken together, 
war and diplomacy had brought about changes in international affairs 
and world politics that were practically revolutionary. Signs which 
pointed the way toward a greater and world-wide war were becoming 
clearer, and in the Far East their portent was noted. 

It is not possible to review here the negotiations which, during 
1903, had preceded the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 
February, 1904; nor do questions of international law arising in 
connection with the war require attention. It is enough to note that 
throughout the struggle Great Britain maintained the role of neutral-* 
ity which had been assigned by the treaty of alliance. British sympa¬ 
thies naturally were strongly with Japan; but in spite of various 
violations of international law and practice by Russia and in spite 
of the Dogger Bank dispute, it was not necessary for Great Britain 
to assume an active part in the war. 

It is time, however, to inquire as to Japanese ideas and policies 
which were so carefully protected by the treaty of alliance with 
England. The fact that England did not actually take part in the 
Russo-Japanese War does not by any means completely divorce her 
from the motives and results of her ally’s policies. The significance 


20 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


of these policies today becomes clearer because of their demonstration 
at the time of the first treaty, for they were based on fundamental 
factors involving elements of geographical location, of race, and of 
national life. The island position of Japan, her high birth rate, her 
immense pride, and her political ambitions have given special im¬ 
portance to her desire for economic development on the mainland and 
coastal islands of Asia. Formerly self-supporting, Japan, thanks to 
contact with the western world, is becoming dependent on outside 
« sources of supply of raw materials essential to the economic life of a 
growing people. Changes in government have not destroyed the 
power of autocracy; national decision g,nd direction remain in the 
hands of a very small group of leaders. The traditions and experience 
of Japan when added to modern military and naval power have given 
driving force and effect to these national policies, which, in turn, 
have been sheltered and assisted by her diplomacy. The result is 
seen dramatically in her speedy rise to the rank of a first-class power. 
The advance in Korea and the acquisition of Port Arthur, which were 
made immediately possible by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, were but 
first steps toward the domination of southern Manchuria and of 
eastern Mongolia. Formosa, in the south, suggested the growth of a 
Japanese sphere of influence on the Chinese mainland opposite, in the 
province of Fukien, and the recovery of the southern half of the 
island of Sakhalin, in the north, was to give a convenient post off 
the rich coast of eastern Siberia. Still later, as we shall see, came the 
opportunity to extend Japanese economic influence from the port of 
Tsingtao to the territory of Kiaochow and thus along the railway 
and main routes into the interior of the entire province of Shantung. 

The methods of a military conqueror cleared the way for com¬ 
mercial penetration and, to a very limited extent, for immigration. 
Throughout there has been a thoroughness that is 'Prussian,’ and a 
roughness of administration that has fostered local hatred and unrest 
in the new regions. These conditions have also encouraged the Jap¬ 
anese to extend political control and to continue military government 
together with the extreme evils of bureaucracy. Japan has copied 
some of the worst faults of the western world and fostered them by 
her own diplomatic methods. The process came clearly to the front 
• as the result of the Russo-Japanese War. Today the game is played 
for economic supplies, vital to the industrial and military strength 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


21 


of a country which can scarcely endure the full heat and burden of 
open international economic competition with western rivals. At 
home Japanese liberalism is struggling in its cradle; the ideals and 
aims of her ruling military and naval directorate are largely in con¬ 
trol. To these Japanese diplomacy and financial interests have 
hitherto given valuable support. Meanwhile, the disorder, the cor¬ 
ruption, and the wealth of China and of eastern Siberia are patent to 
the world. Japan is the immediate neighbor of both regions, and, 
whether directly for herself or as broker and commission agent for 
western interests, she has deeply bestirred herself to win enormous 
stakes. 

4 

2. The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe and the Stakes .in the 

U,i— 1 ” 

Great Game—Morocco and Korea 

Such events and policies in the Far East were not clearly foreseen 
by English diplomatists in Europe when the first Japanese alliance 
was concluded; more immediate and nearer matters were then to the 
front in London and in Paris. Unfortunately, France, at the begin¬ 
ning of this century, was in rough water. Serious domestic contro¬ 
versies lessened her weight in foreign affairs at a time when the 
increasingly aggressive economic and military policies of Russia in 
the Far East were naturally affecting the vigor of Russia in Europe, 
and thus lowering the value of the Russian alliance to France. Added 
to this was the overshadowing Anglo-French rivalry at a time when 
England’s official relations with Germany still remained friendly. 
Thus France was in an awkward position in 1902 on the eve of the 
signature of the Japanese treaty. Then came a rapid revolution in 
western diplomatic relations, for England and France became friends. 
An Anglo-French arbitration treaty was signed in 1903 to be followed 
by the famous agreement concluded in April, 1904. The two rivals 
wiped the slate clean and the Entente Cordiale became the point of 
departure for increasingly friendly relations between England and 
France. To counterbalance the loss of Egypt as a field for French 
economic and military penetration, England now recognized claims 
and desires of France in Morocco. Because of these developments 
and because she had not been consulted by the other powers, Germany 
protested against such settlement of north African affairs. Thus 


22 University of California Publications, International Eelations [Vol. 1 

came the first Moroccan crisis in 1905-06 where Germany, by threat 
of war, compelled an international conference at Algeciras. It was at 
the height of tension on these matters in Europe that Far Eastern 
affairs, in the summer of 1905, also reached a critical stage. The 
Russo-Japanese war was coming to an end; peace negotiations were 
imminent; and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to receive a test 
which it had not encountered during the course of the fighting on 
land and sea. This was at a time when both Japanese victories and 
internal unrest in Russia relieved Germany from the danger of 
Russian pressure in Europe. As we have since learned by the “ Willy- 
Nicky” correspondence, Germany had in fact encouraged Russia to 
press on in the face of discouragement in Asia. Indeed during 1904- 
1905 the Kaiser had pursued a policy of secret intrigue and negotia¬ 
tion with the Czar, seeking to weaken Russia in her French alliance, 
and later had suggested a secret and separate alliance between Ger¬ 
many and Russia, which would have paralyzed France and might 
have given Germany an opportunity to intervene in a diplomatic 
sense in the settlement of peace between Russia and Japan. These 
secret negotiations came to naught and, in connection with English 
support of France against German protests as to Morocco, served 
to demonstrate that the Anglo-French entente was a new and vital 
force in western Europe. At the same time this German secret sup¬ 
port of Russia introduced the Kaiser as a possible and dangerous 
opponent of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 1 All this was taking place 
in spite of the fact that in 1904 there had been cooperation between 
England and Germany in the Venezuelan blockade. But this action 
had aroused our just resentment in America and fortunately had 
proved to be both awkward and unpopular in England. Consequently 
any suggestions as to an Anglo-German alliance, which now would 
have included agreement as to both European and extra-European 
matters, were bound to fail. France had won her foothold in Morocco 
and Japan was astride Korea. 

3. The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Alliance in 1905 

The outside world at large apparently did not appreciate in 1905 
as the Russo-Japanese War had progressed that, though the Japanese 
had won spectacular successes, the advantage of time was nevertheless 


1 Cf. Handbook of Diplomatic History, pp. 288 et seq. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


23 


largely with Russia. How far this aspect of the matter was apparent 
to the authorities in the United States it is impossible to say; but 
in June, 1905, President Roosevelt made a second proposal of friendly 
mediation which was accepted by both of the belligerent powers. On 
June 26, the Japanese Minister at Washington indicated the following 
basis of a proposed peace with Russia: he declared that it would be 
necessary to place Korea entirely within the sphere of Japanese in¬ 
fluence and for Japan to assume complete control and direction of 
the destiny of Korea. Manchuria was to be restored to China, as 
nearly as the circumstances would permit, subject to guaranties of 
Chinese administrative reform and good government. Port Arthur 
was to go to Japan in any case. The Russian Government, on the 
other hand, did not immediately put forward any distinct terms, but 
objected strenuously to the surrender of the whole of the island of Sak¬ 
halin, and absolutely refused to surrender Russian ships interned in the 
Far East or to pay any indemnity. The treaty of peace was signed at 
Portsmouth on September 5; but this fact was largely determined 
by events and circumstances remote from the scene of diplomatic 
conflict in New Hampshire. 

As the summer advanced, it became evident to the Japanese dele¬ 
gates that it would be decidedly to their disadvantage to renew the 
ywar or to stand the strain, financial and military, which would be 
involved in a war of endurance. In order to avoid a deadlock it 
became necessary to compromise on the division of the island of 
Sakhalin, to forego any hope of an indemnity, and thus to avoid the 
appearance of fighting for money. To balance this disappointment 
and to preserve Japan against a war of revenge on the part of Russia, 
a second treaty of alliance with England was negotiated and signed 
at London on August 12. In other words, this second treaty of alliance 
between England and Japan in a sense indemnified Japan for her dis¬ 
appointments in conne c tion with th e negotiation of the Portsmouth 
treaty, and thus cleared the way for the conclusion of the war. 

Both the Portsmouth and the London treaties recognized the 
results of the war as jo Kor ea. By Article II of the Portsmouth 
treaty, the Russian authorities acknowledging “that Japan possesses 
in Corea paramount political, military and economical interests, en¬ 
gage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, 
protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may 






24 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


find it necessary to take in Corea. ’ ’ 2 In corresponding fashion Article 
III of the Treaty of London reads as follows: 

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic 
interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take 
such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she 
may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those 
interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the 
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of 
all nations. 3 

The treaty of alliance had been kept secret until after the con¬ 
clusion of peace; but in a dispatch to the British ambassadors at St. 
Petersburg and Paris, Lord Lansdowne, on September 6, called 
particular attention to Article III, saying: “The new treaty no 
doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, 
however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close proximity to 
the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone, must fall under 
the control and tutelage of Japan.” 4 He also reviewed the provisions 
of the Treaty of Portsmouth with regard to Korea and significantly 
added: ‘ ‘ England has every reason to believe that similar views 
are held by other powers with regard to the relations wdiich should 
subsist between Japan and Corea.” 5 

Under these circumstances and because of these diplomatic and 
emphatic statements, the recognition by other countries of the future 
position of Japan as regards Korea became almost inevitable. On 
November 22, the Japanese Government declared “relations of pro¬ 
pinquity have made it necessary for Japan to take and exercise, for 
reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount 
interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea. ’ ’ e 
In view of such statements, the Korean Government, under pressure 
from Japan, recognized the change which was here indicated; and 

consequently the United States withdrew its minister at Seoul, the 
« 

diplomatic representation of the United States in Korea being trans¬ 
ferred to the American legation at Tokyo. 

2 MacMurray, I, 522-23. 

3 Ibid., p. 517. 

4 MacMurray, I, 518-9. 

5 Ibid., p. 519. 

0 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, p. 613. 



1923] 


Dermis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


25 


With the passing of Korea were linked other changes in the 
second Anglo-Japanese treaty. The preamble was entirely recast and 
the objects of the new treaty were stated as follows: 

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in 
the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; 

(&) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in 
China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese 
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China; 

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Con¬ 
tracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the 
defence of their special interests in the said regions. 7 

Article I arranged for free communication between the two powers 
in case the rights or interests of either were endangered. Article II 
involved still another change, for instead of two opponents only one 
was now required to bring both allies together for armed and active 
mutual assistance, thus: 

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever 
arising, on the part of any other power or powers either Contracting 
Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or 
special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the 
other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its 
ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual 
agreement with it. 

Here may be seen the reaction of events in western Europe for, as 
we have seen, while this treaty was in negotiation Germany was at¬ 
tempting to humiliate Prance and was forcing a general conference 
on Morocco at Algeciras. It was impossible to tell what direction 
German policy might next take. It is necessary, therefore, to add to 
any further consideration of Anglo-Japanese relations the conclusion 
that Anglo-German relations were now rapidly displacing in impor¬ 
tance Anglo-Russian rivalry as a major factor in world politics. In 
any event this new form of alliance might well check Russia from 
entering on a second war, a war of revenge. 

We have already noted Article III as to Korea. In Article IV, as 
in the preamble, the change takes place which the British had pre¬ 
viously urged in the negotiation of the treaty of 1902; the security 
of the Indian frontier is mentioned specifically as a special interest 


7 MacMurray, I, 517. 



26 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


within the scope of the alliance of 1905. In this connection Lord 
Roberts took occasion to warn the British public that “it would be a 
fatal blow to British prestige if India ever regarded her defence as 
dependent upon the strength of Japan.” 8 The importance of this 
truthful warning seems even greater today than in 1905. The other 
articles in the treaty provided means for the better fulfillment of 
the principal objects of the alliance; and the date of expiration was 
fixed for 1915 with the self-extending provision already noted in the 
first treaty. Lord Lansdowne shortly after the publication of the 
treaty took pains to state that there were no secret clauses in the 
document. 9 This, however, makes it seem all the more likely that 
military and naval plans for cooperation were included in separate 
agreements which have not been published. Indeed, it is almost 
inconceivable that such documents (outside of the treaty) do not 
exist. They are usual corollaries to any treaty of alliance. 

The treaty, when published at the end of September, received 
praise from all parties in England. Sir Edward Grey, for the opposi¬ 
tion, gave it his complete approval and in a nicely calculated speech 
declared that the three cardinal features of British foreign policy 
were growing friendship and good feeling for the United States, the 
extended alliance with Japan “in all its aspects,” and friendship 

with France. 10 And before the vear was out Sir Edward Grev was 

^ «/ 

to become the new foreign secretary in the Campbell-Bannerman 
ministry. In general and quite rightly the renewed alliance and the 
peace with Russia were taken together in the mind of the public. 
“An integral part of our policy in the Far East,” “emphatically a 
bulwark of peace,” against the renewal of the alliance now “no one 
in England has a word to say, ’ ’—such were the phrases of the day. * 11 

In Japan there was considerable disappointment on the part of the 
public as to the failure of Japan to secure more favorable terms in 
the Treaty of Portsmouth. The public at large was by no means 
aware of the extremely serious position in which Japan was involved 
in mid-summer of 1905; and not even the announcement of the re¬ 
newal of the alliance could remove the general impression that, by 

8 Annual Register, 1905, p. 229. 

9 Ibid., p. 228. 

10 Annual Register, 1905, p. 221. 

11 London Times, September 27, 1905; Paul, “The New Alliance” The 
Nineteenth Century, October, 1905. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


27 


accepting the good offices of the United States, Japan had sacrificed 
her opportunity for a glorious victory. The news of peace had brought 
on rioting in Tokyo and in Japanese homes the picture of President 
Roosevelt was turned to the wall or torn down; but when the treaty 
of alliance was published, many large business houses and public 
buildings were illuminated. Some elements, nevertheless, objected 
to the inclusion of India in the scope of the agreement though all 
welcomed the exclusion of Korea. 12 The comment in the United States 
was in the main favorable. But in Russia there was much chagrin 
both over the outcome of the war and the renewal of the alliance. 
This, however, soon wore off in the internal crisis which led to the 
calling of the first Duma. Because of the concentration of public 
attention on these domestic matters, Russian opinion was given an 
opportunity to moderate its disappointment; and it was commonly 
said that, after all, the Japanese victories had secured for Russia her 
first constitutional legislature. 

Curiously it was the defeat of Russia in the war that also gave 
strength to the idea of better Anglo-Russian relations. The idea had 
been in the air for some time and within two weeks after the conclusion 
of the Japanese alliance the London press renewed discussion of the 
project. It gained ground as the conference on Moroccan matters gave 
Sir Arthur Nicolson (now Lord Carnock), the British representative 
at Algeciras, opportunity to develop friendly relations with the 
Russians at the conference. Later he was to be British ambassador at 
St. Petersburg. This of course fitted in with French desires, for, 
though the Kaiser had been able seriously to threaten France and to 
compel an international meeting on Morocco, this general conference 
did not secure for Germany any very material advantages in 1906; 
and France still had to face the possibility of further German pro¬ 
tests as to her activities in northern Africa. Under these circum¬ 
stances various forces were also at work to promote better relations 
between Japan, the ally of England, and Russia, the ally of France. 
Thus both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Anglo-French entente' 
provided a convenient starting point for a Russo-Japanese under¬ 
standing and an Anglo-Russian entente. 


12 London Times, September 28, 1905. 



28 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


4. The Anglo-Russian Entente and the Russo-Japanese Treaties 

It was clearly the duty of the Japanese to consider whether it was 
to their interests now to prepare for a second struggle with Russia 
during the course of the next decade or to attempt by diplomacy to 
find, if possible, a satisfactory line of approach which would provide 
both powers with opportunity for further development in the Far 
East without having recourse to arms. However, preliminary to this, 
came an understanding between Japan and France, the ally of Russia 
and the friend of England. On June 10, 1907, the two governments 
signed an agreement of mutual support for the preservation of peace 
and security in the “regions” of China and “with a view to maintain¬ 
ing the respective situation and the territorial rights of the two Con¬ 
tracting Parties in the continent of Asia.” 13 This treaty promoted 
the next development in better Russo-Japanese relations. The first 
important step taken in this direction was the signature of the open 
convention of July 30, 1907, which clearly proclaimed the inauguration 
of more friendly relations between the two countries. 14 

Each recognized the actual territorial integrity of the other and 
also all rights accruing to one and the other party from the treaties, 
conventions, and contracts enforced between them and China. By 
Article II of this treaty both governments recognized the independ¬ 
ence and territorial integrity of China and the principle of equal 
economic opportunity for all nations. Much more important than the 
open treaty was the secret agreement of the same date, which, in 
the first, place, apparently recognized in a more distinct fashion the 
special interests of Japan in Korea; secondly, drew a line of demarca¬ 
tion in Manchuria whereby, in self-denying fashion, Japan promised 
not to seek railway or telegraph concessions north of a line approxi¬ 
mate to the course of the River Nonni as it flowed east, and Russia, 
on the other hand, agreed to refrain from seeking railway or telegraph 
concessions south of that line; and thirdly, in vague fashion, Japan 
recognized that Russia had interests in Mongolia. The text of this 
treaty has never been published; but in view of subsequent references 
to this treaty and from other sources of information it seems highly 
probable that these were its chief provisions. 

We can see the local significance of such a secret treaty in the 
very fact that, only two years after the war, Japan and Russia were 


13 MacMurray, I, 640. 


14 Ibid., p. 657. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


29 


already apparently agreeing to a delimitation of areas for their respec¬ 
tive economic penetration of Chinese territory. A wider political 
view may be that the treaty was in accord with the spirit of relations 
which were developing between London and St. Petersburg during 
1906-07. Certainly the treaty was in accord with the general desire 
to bury the hatchet which led to the formation of the Anglo-Russian 
entente in 1907. This convention was signed on August 31, a month 
after the Russo-Japanese agreement. It was of course also in some 
sense a complement to the Anglo-French entente of 1904. The main 
provisions of this Anglo-Russian convention were: (1) the delimita¬ 
tion of spheres of influence in Persia—an arrangement which, from a 
territorial point of view, was decidedly to the advantage of Russia; 
(2) Russia recognized that Afghanistan was outside her sphere of 
interest and that the foreign relations of Afghanistan were to be 
conducted through British authorities and thus the political interest 
of England in Afghanistan was recognized as a protection to the 
Indian frontier; (3) both governments recognized the suzerainty of 
China in Tibet; and the territorial integrity of Tibet and the right 
of the Chinese Government to direct Tibetan foreign relations marked 
a self-denying position on the part of both England and Russia. 15 
It was in this fashion that England agreed to Russian compensation 
in Persia for the gains of Japan in Manchuria and that, as Japan 
acquired control of Korea, England also gained in a sense of greater 
security along the Indian frontier by her direction of Afghan foreign 
policy. 

Only three years later Japan concluded a second convention with 
Russia which was also a cover for a second secret treaty. The open 
document merely confirmed the mutual maintenance of the status quo 
in Manchuria. 10 But it is obvious by the terms of the secret treaty 
of 1910 that, despite Chinese protest, the two powers were guaran¬ 
teeing to each other the exercise of further special powers and the 
protection of increasing special interests in the areas in Manchuria 
which had been set apart by the secret treaty of June 30, 1907. The 
essential provisions of this treaty of 1910 are given in a document 
published in the New York American , April 17, 1921. There is 
strong reason to believe that they are authentic and their intent 
accords with the policies of both countries at that time. Taken with 


15 MacMurray, I, 674. 


16 MacMurray, I, 803. 



30 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


the treaty of 1907 they both appear as separate agreements but as 
emerging under the influence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 17 

As though to make the matter even plainer, a third secret treaty 
between Japan and Russia on June 25, 1912, further confirmed the 
previous agreements. It also recognized certain special interests of 
Japan in Inner Mongolia east of a line running north and south 
not far from the meridian of Peking. This treaty followed the 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1911 much as the Russo- 
Japanese secret treaty of 1907 followed the renewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance in 1905. The text of the third secret convention 
is not as yet available, but, as though to underscore the entire matter, 
there is the Russian report of British approval of such agreements. 
For Sir Edward Grey, on learning of the political convention of 1910, 
was reported by the Russian ambassador in London as saying that 
he was “very satisfied with the step taken by the Russian govern¬ 
ment. . . . He has watched with satisfaction the development 
of good relations between Russia and Japan within the last three 
years. . . . England’s political interests in the Far East consist 


11 The text of the secret treaty of July 4, 1910, is printed as a part of 
material dealing with Russian “secret diplomacy” collated from documents 
in the possession of and translated by Count B. von Siebert, formerly of the 
Russian diplomatic service. They are very badly edited by Capt. G. A. 
Schreiner for the New Yorlc American, but the essential terms of the treaty 
appear to be intact. These documents are not Bolshevist “revelations.” 

To conform and further develop the provisions of the Secret Treaty of 
June 17-30, 1907, the Russian and the Japanese governments agree to the 
following provisions. 

Article 1 . Russia and Japan recognize as the boundary of their specific 
spheres of interest in Manchuria the line of demarcation as defined in the 
supplementary article of the Secret Treaty of 1907. 

Article 2. The two contracting parties agree mutually to recognize their 
special interests in the areas set forth above. Each "of them may also, 
each within its own sphere of interest, take such measures as shall be 
deemed necessary for the maintenance and protection of these interests. 

Article 3. Each party undertakes to place no obstacle of any kind in 
the way of the confirmation and future development of the special interests 
of the other party within the boundary lines of such spheres of interest. 

Article 4. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to refrain from all 
political action within the sphere of interest of the other party in Man¬ 
churia. Furthermore, it has been decided that Russia shall seek no privil¬ 
eges and concessions in the Japanese zone, and Japan none in the Russian 
7 one, that might be injurious to the special interests of either party and that 
both governments are to recognize the rights acquired in their spheres of 
interest, as defined in Article 2 of the Public Treaty of today’s date. 

Article 5. To ensure the working of the mutual stipulations, both 
parties will enter into an open and friendly exchange of opinions on all matters 
concerning their special interests in Manchuria. In case these special inter¬ 
ests should be threatened, the two governments will agree on the measures 
that may become necessary for common action or mutual support in order 
to protect these interests. 

Article 6. The present treaty will be kept strictly secret bv both govern¬ 
ments. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


31 


in the maintenance of peace, just as her trade interests are based 
on the principle of the open door.” 18 In such connection it is also 
important to recall that these were the days when Japan was also 
consolidating her position in Manchuria by additional treaties with 
China; and we must not forget that the Russo-Japanese treaty of 
1910, of which Sir Edward Grey spoke, was almost in reply to the 
proposed neutralization of Manchurian railways as advocated by 
Secretary Knox for the United States. The rejection of that plan 
matches with the policies indicated in this brief review. 

Meanwhile, the attention of Europe had been directed particularly 
to the course of events in the Near East where the Turkish revolution 
of 1908 was quickly followed by the proclamation of Bulgarian inde¬ 
pendence, the annexation of Crete to Greece, and the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria. In connection with the Bosnian 
crisis Germany demonstrated her readiness to support Austria-Hun¬ 
gary against Russian interference in Balkan affairs. The check 
which Russia thereby endured, together with the inability of England 
effectively to pursue a continental policy at this time, suggested to 
both Germany and Russia that, at least for the time being, mutual 
friendly relations might develop. Consequently, the Czar and his 
Foreign Secretary Sazonov agreed to an amicable adjustment as to 
Russian interests and German commercial plans in northern Persia, 
while Russia also promised not to hinder German railway plans in 
Turkey. On the whole, therefore, German policy had assisted in 
temporarily diverting Russian policies from the Balkans to Persia, 
and had in part wiped out the disagreeable impressions that had 
been created in Russia by the Bosnian crisis in the previous year. 
English opposition to the development of the Bagdad railway and to 
the far-reaching German plans for economic penetration in Turkey 
had also received a rebuff. Russia, on the other hand, was on in¬ 
creasingly good terms with Japan, and in Europe had once more 
shaken hands with the Kaiser. Under the circumstances, the formal 
annexation of Korea by Japan was scarcely noticed. England in 
particular, suffering from domestic, political, and economic crises, 
was soon also to face with France an international situation of great 
portent. For in 1911 came the second Moroccan crisis and the danger 
of war with Germany became serious. At this critical stage in world 
politics came the second renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 


18 Quoted in Russian documents printed in New York American , April, 17, 1921. 



32 


University of California Publications , International Eelations [Yol. 1 


CHAPTER III 

THE PRESENT TREATY OF 1911 AND THE 

WORLD WAR 

1. Circumstances and Terms of the Renewed Alliance, 1911 

In 1911 it was on the whole only natural that the Moroccan situa¬ 
tion should again become acute. The Conference of Algeciras in 
1906 had marked a victory for France as supported by England. 
However, the very fact that it had been necessary to treat the 
question of Morocco as an international, rather than as a French or 
Spanish, or even English question, had shown that Germany was able 
to compel the submission of the matter to general discussion. Never¬ 
theless, Germany, in 1909, had recognized more clearly the political 
interests of France in Morocco, though obtaining recognition of the 
right of Germans to associate with Frenchmen in securing concessions 
in Morocco. Between 1909 and 1911 the Germans consistently pursued 
this matter until the so-called Agadir crisis threatened the peace of 
the world. Yet it was not the intention of Germany actually to force 
a war in 1911, but rather, through the Moroccan question, to threaten 
war so as to alarm England and if possible to drive a wedge between 
the partners of the Entente Cordiale. Furthermore, if not in Morocco, 
certainly in the Congo region Germany sought compensation from 
France. It was only with great difficulty and owing to the British 
accord with France in Morocco that war was averted. Germany 
secured certain compensation in the French Congo; but the Entente 
Cordiale had stood the test. 

In connection, however, with all this turmoil and uncertainty 
regarding peace in Europe, the British Government was becoming in¬ 
creasingly alarmed as to German intentions. The policy of concen¬ 
trating a greater part of British naval strength in home waters be¬ 
came essential; and, in anticipation of such possibilities, it had been 
decided to undertake a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


33 


order that the British Government might feel more completely at 
rest, at least with regard to the Far Eastern situation, even though 
the European situation might become more difficult and threatening. 
A second but far less important element was that with the renewal 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia would not be so likely to 
continue on such friendly relations with Germany as had followed 
the conference between the Kaiser and the Czar at Potsdam, in 1910. 
Still a third element lay in the fact that both Russia and Japan had 
shown intense opposition to American proposals as to the neutraliza¬ 
tion of Manchurian railways. The British had approved in principle 
these suggestions of Secretary Knox but, as we have seen, the plan 
as a whole had been finally rejected. It might be advisable, therefore, 
in connection with the renewal of the alliance with Japan to reaffirm 
the right of England to consult with Japan regarding Far Eastern 
affairs, if occasion should arise. Thus Great Britain might exercise a 
certain restraining influence on Japanese foreign policy in case of 
difficulties developing between Japan and the United States. For 
English public opinion in general, irrespective of the foreign office, 
was quoted strongly in favor of the maintenance of cordial relations 
with the United States; and in 1911 the negotiations were proceeding 
for a treaty of general arbitration between the two countries. On the 
whole, then, the course of European events from 1905 to 1911 had 
brought out the increasing danger of an aggressive German policy 
as directed against England and her associates. Hence, the third 
edition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in many respects an in¬ 
surance policy on the part of England against trouble in the Far East 
in case of an Anglo-German war. 

The present treaty was therefore signed in London on July 13, 
1911. Its language follows closely that of the treaty of 1905, with 
certain notable exceptions. In the preamble the reason given for the 
revision of the earlier agreement was that important changes had 
taken place in the situation since 1905, and that the new agreement 
was to respond to those changes in order to contribute to general 
stability and repose. As in 1905, the attack of any one power was 
to be the occasion of the operation of the alliance by the joint conduct 
of war on the part of England and Japan. The repetition of this 
article made even clearer the fact that a possible attack by Germany 
was more definitely in mind, for in 1902 an attack by two powers had 


34 University of California Publications, International Belations [Vol. 1 

been required to bring the alliance into effect as to active military 
operations. Of course the hostile alliance of which England and 
Japan were then thinking was that of Russia and France. In the 
new treaty, furthermore, there was again no reference to Korea, for 
as noted above, Japan had annexed Korea in 1910. Thus from the 
point of view of international law, the long process of expansion of 
Japanese interests in Korea was finally completed. Specific reference 
to the Indian frontier was also omitted because of the Anglo-Russian 
entente of 1907, though in a statement of the general objects of the 
alliance, the maintenance of peace in India, as well as in eastern 
Asia, was included as in the treaty of 1905. 19 Reference to the Russian 
war also disappeared. Otherwise the provisions of the treaty of 1905 
were repeated. Article IV, however, brought an entirely new element 
into the situation; the United States and Great Britain were negotiat¬ 
ing a treaty of general arbitration; and the language of Article IV 
was intended to exclude the possibility that, in the event of war 
between the United States and Japan, England or the British Empire 
might be compelled by other terms of the treaty of alliance to come 
to the assistance of Japan against the United States. The exact 
language of Article IV is as follows: 

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general 
arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this 
Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation 
to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration 
is in force. 

The intent on the part of both England and Japan was plain. No 
one in 1911 could foresee that the United States would reject the arbi¬ 
tration treaty and in so doing nullify, for the time being at least, 
the purpose of this article. Later, as we shall see, this particular 
matter assumes a special significance in connection with the proposed 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921. 

2. The Imperial Conference of 1911 and the Renewal of the 

Alliance 

The signature of the treaty came at a time when the European 
international situation was grave; actually it preceded by only a week 
the famous “Mansion House Speech” by Lloyd George which gave 
warning to Germany that England w T as prepared to stand by France 


10 MacMurray, I, 901. 



1923] 


Dennis: Ilie Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


35 


and to maintain the efficiency of the Entente Cordiale. A further 
element in the negotiation of the treaty of 1911 was the fact that since 
May the Imperial Conference had been in session in London. To this 
had come representatives of the self-governing Dominions for discus¬ 
sion and action on many important Imperial questions. The published 
records of this conference by no means indicate its significance, for, 
during the month of June, both at the regular sessions and in con¬ 
fidential meetings, the entire range of British foreign policy was 
explained to the Dominion representatives practically for the first 
time. The British Government took the other self-governing partners 
of the Empire into its confidence, and the reasons for the renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were fully explained to the ministers of 
the Dominions. In connection with these private conferences, the 
feeling of the Dominions with reference to Asiatic immigration was 
considered, and their acceptance and support of the alliance was 
therefore based on a full appreciation of the various reasons which 
made the alliance particularly useful and important to the empire 
at large. Naturally the fact that the immigration question had been 
also a subject of difficulty between the LTnited States and Japan made 
the support of the Dominions of peculiar significance. But the 
expectation then was that by Article IV the United States would be 
practically excluded as a possible opponent to the British Empire 
under the scope of the treaty. Certainly in the United States there 
was appreciation of the fact that by the inclusion of this article a j 
serious endeavor had been made to accommodate the purposes and I 
necessities of the British Empire, as shown in the treaty, to the cause 
of Anglo-American friendship. 

If we consider further the bearing of these events of June and 
July, 1911, we can see that the renewal of the alliance has a special 
quality and character reaching across the events of the last decade. 
This becomes even clearer and more real as the United States in this 
November, 1921, welcomes, as members of the British delegation to 
the present international conference at Washington, representatives 
of self-governing Dominions of the British Empire including India. 
The great fact of the World War is of course in part responsible for 
this historic event. The precedent set by the negotiations at Paris 
in 1919 is before us; but as far as the Anglo-Japanese treaty is con¬ 
cerned, the precedent for the nations of the British Empire was 


36 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


set in 1911. The renewal of the alliance then became an Imperial 
event. For that treaty was the first British treaty of alliance on 
which the opinion of the Dominions was desired and their view taken. 
The impression then given by the frank statements of Sir Edward 
Grey (now Lord Grey of Falloden) remains on record, for Mr. Asquith 
addressing the conference reminded the Dominion premiers that they 
had been “ admitted as it were into the interior, into the innermost 
parts of the Imperial household.” He continued: 

You will all, I am sure, remember our meeting in the Committee of 
Defence, when Sir Edward Grey presented his survey of the foreign 
policy of the Empire. That is a thing which will be stamped upon 
all our recollections, and I do not suppose there is one of us—I speak 
for myself, as I am sure you will speak for yourselves—who did not 
feel when that exposition of our foreign relations had been concluded 
that we realized in a much more intimate and comprehensive sense 
than we had ever done before the international position and its bear¬ 
ings upon the problems of Government in the different parts of the 
Empire itself. 20 

Nevertheless this Imperial conference did not ask for the right to 
consider all treaties nor to have a guiding hand in foreign policy. A 
proposal which might have added a permanent Imperial advisory 
council to the executive machinery of the British constitution was 
then rejected, and this largely because it was said that such a council 
acting in the field of international relations and defence, 

Would impair, if not altogether destroy the authority of the Govern¬ 
ment of the United Kingdom, in such grave matters, as the conduct of 
foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the maintenance of peace, or 
the declaration of war and, indeed, all those relations with foreign 
powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in 
the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to 
the Imperial Parliament. 21 

In other words, London was not ‘'turning over” foreign affairs to 
Ottawa or Wellington; though, in point of fact, by the very frankness 
and liberality of the information offered to the Dominion governments 
it had quickened understanding within the empire and enlisted sup¬ 
port for the problems and policies of Downing Street. The whole 
matter, however, was by no means finished. 22 

20 Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911 (Dominions, No. 7), p. 440. 

21 Ibid., p. 71. 

22 Hall, The British Commomvealth of Nations (London, 1920), pp. 148 et seq. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


37 


3. Reception of the Treaty 

With this digression on an important subject, to which we must 
return later, the treaty of alliance once more claims direct attention. 
We have analyzed its terms. What of its reception and the tests it 
was destined to receive in the crowded years of 1911-14 ? In the United * 
States there was practically no hostility to the treaty. Rather the 
friends of arbitration and opponents of international war promptly 
welcomed the agreement chiefly because of the inclusion of Article IY. 
There was “gratification” in high circles on this ground because of 
the aims of the allies as asserted in the treaty and because the possi-i 
bility of a German-Japanese combination was averted. In Russia the 
press generally welcomed the treaty because of the omission of special 
reference to the Indian frontier and because, taken in connection with 
the previous treaty arrangements between Russia and Japan, it would 
make for better relations between those two powers, and consequently 
between Russia and England. In other words, the treaty was no 
longer directly aimed at Russia and had become a guaranty of assur- * 
ance against general contingencies. These were by no means con¬ 
fined to the Far East and on July 17, the Peking Daily News pointed 
out that German policy as to Morocco had hastened the signature of 
the fresh treaty. In view of the stimulus of the renewed alliance, 
China was fearful of even more vigorous extension of Japanese in¬ 
terests in Manchuria and tried again to secure a definition of Man¬ 
churia as being clearly included by the term “Chinese Empire.” 
Bl^tish opinion in China was also alarmed and was by no means 
favorable to the treaty, for in India, Malaya, and in the Far East 
generally, Japanese economic competition was beginning to disturb 
British commercial interests. In Japan the treaty was received with 
mixed feelings; and all early comment on it was based on the assump¬ 
tion that the pending arbitration treaty between England and the 
United States would become effective. The leading editorial in the 
Japan Times of July 16 was entitled “All is well with the world.’V 
On the other hand, Hochi Shimbun, at the other end of the scale of 
opinion, remarked that Japan was now “America’s slave and India’s^ 
policeman.” The leaders of the Popular Party declared that war 
between the United States and Japan was inevitable, and that the 
inclusion of Article IV indicated that this was also the opinion of 


4t 


38 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


the British Government, which had taken this means to avoid being 
drawn into the struggle. The Japanese jingo press went further and 
in Tokio Asahi of July 16, it was proposed that the United States, in 
order to secure an arbitration treaty with Japan, should actually 
guarantee Manchuria to Japan. More sober opinion in Japanese 
financial circles pointed out that the treaty, as renewed, should 
minimize the danger caused by irresponsible talk of war between the 
United States and Japan; and Count Hayashi favored closer relations 
between the two countries. 23 

The situation in England was on the whole quite different. The 
country was much occupied during the summer of 1911 by the fes¬ 
tivities in connection with the coronation of George Y; the bitter 
controversy as to the powers of the House of Lords as embodied in 
the Parliament bill of that year and the possibility of labor troubles 
figured largely in the public mind. The result was that compara¬ 
tively little attention was paid to the renewal of the treaty at this 
time. The Times, however, sought to magnify the importance of 
the agreement, for it declared that: 

Its revision and renewal in the present summer have been carried out 
only after the fullest consultation with the Dominion Ministers, recently 
in London, who are understood to have given it their unreserved 
support. It carries, therefore, a new authority and a new moral force, 
and represents the first fruits of the great departure in regard to 
foreign policy taken by the British Government at the recent Imperial 
Conference. 24 

4. The Dominions and Japan 

This treaty of 1911, like its predecessors, was - of course a political 
and military instrument. But, side by side with it, there were the 
Anglo-Japanese treaties of commerce and navigation of 1894 and 1911. 

23 Japan Times, July 18, 1911, Cf. Japan Daily Mail, July 17, for a useful 
summary of the press. 

24 London Times, July 14, 1911. On the next day there was fuller comment 
as follows: 

We have reason to congratulate ourselves not only upon the conclusion of 
the new Treaty, but also upon the conditions in which it has been effected. 
When the first unofficial report that it had been accomplished reached us from 
New York we drew attention to its significance in relation to the new Imperial 
foreign policy happily inaugurated at the Imperial Conference. It is indeed 
gratifying that within a few brief weeks of its adoption this policy should 
afford us, and should afford the world, so signal a proof of the fresh strength 
it has added to our diplomacy. It is gratifying, we may perhaps say, above 
all to those who, like ourselves, have long insisted without visible response on 
the wisdom and on the necessity of the new departure taken by Mr. Asquith 
and Sir Edward Grey. They must know better than most of us, that, had they 
not taken it, the prolongation of the Japanese treaty would almost certainly 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


39 


Indeed, we have seen that, in 1899, the abandonment by England of 
extraterritorial rights in Japan, as provided by the treaty of 1894, 
was an important preliminary step in the development of the close 
political association of the two powers in 1902. In any case economics 
and politics are two sides of the same coin; and when fundamental 
questions of race equality and immigration come to the surface the 
political effect of such matters may well be extensive, if not decisive. 
Japan had . early adopted a policy of restriction as to aliens. The 
ownership of agricultural land by foreigners was prevented, and 
the immigration of foreign labor on any large scale was prohibited. 
Australia had repeatedly voiced an almost national fervor in opposi¬ 
tion to Asiatic immigration; and this slogan of a “White Australia” 
had found legal expression in one of the first general acts of the 
Commonwealth legislature in 1901. In South Africa, where there 
was already an almost overwhelming native African population, the 
issue of Oriental labor, chiefly Indian, Malayan, and Chinese, was 
9 a very touchstone of domestic and Imperial politics. New Zealand was 
not far behind in such controversies; and shortly after the signature 
of the political and commercial treaties of 1911, the problem of Japan- f 
ese immigration to the Dominion of Canada flared out in angry 
fashion in British Columbia. Local feeling along the Pacific shores 
of the United States had given example of sincere and bitter opposi¬ 
tion to Japanese immigration and British Columbia held similar 
views. Add to this, that throughout the Dominion a vigorous and 
calculated system of close direction and supervision of all immigration 
was already a settled Canadian policy. Inevitably such matters had 
their place in the field of political alliance. They gained in importance 
as success gave new life to ancient Japanese national pride. Inter- 

have given rise to discontent and to misgivings in the Dominions which need 
not now be apprehended. By admitting the Prime Ministers of the Dominions 
to complete confidence and by submitting to them the general foreign policy of 
the Empire, the government will have overcome many prejudices, smoothed 
many susceptibilities, and conjured many phantoms. It is notorious, to name but 
one of these phantoms, that large sections of opinion in the Dominions have 
looked askance at the Japanese Alliance, because they were haunted by the 
fear that one day it might entangle us in a contest with the United States. 
The renewed Alliance is the best answer to such fears. It has been approved, 
we have no doubt, by the most trusted statesmen of the Dominions. 

We welcome it in itself; we welcome it as a condition of the Arbitration 
Treaty; we welcome it because it is the common work of the responsible states¬ 
men of the Empire; we welcome it, not least, because it is a gage of continuity 
for the future as it is an example of continuity in the past—because it discloses, 
to all eyes that can see, an additional element of permanence in our foreign 
affairs. 



40 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


national prestige and consciousness of military and naval strength 
quickened an innate contempt for the mysterious yet despised white 
race which affected vast numbers of Asiatics. Such matters were in¬ 
flammable. The fact that they have not as yet prevented the con¬ 
tinuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is evidence of two things. 
On the one hand, stands out the importance of the alliance from a 
political point of view; and secondly, we can watch the way the Japan¬ 
ese Government uses and controls the immigration question as a 
political instrument whether as an apparent test of friendly relations, 
as a sort of “smoke screen” to hide other policies, as a basis for 
diplomatic trading, or as a matter of no special importance between 
hearty allies. 

Another aspect of the Anglo-Japanese treaties of commerce and 
navigation of 1894 and of 1911 appears in the special provision for the 
local interests and sentiments of the other portions of the British 
Empire. Thus, the treaty of 1894 did not apply to Canada, New¬ 
foundland, South African and Australian colonies, New r Zealand, or 
India unless within two years any of these should be specifically 
included. In the commercial treaty of 1911 the rest of the empire 
was also excluded unless notice of adhesion were given within two 
years. 25 Canada, in spite of warning from the London government, 
finally accepted, in 1906, the terms of the earlier treaty. Almost 
immediately there was trouble in British Columbia where there was 
local anti-Japanese legislation. Rioting followed and the whole issue 
of Canadian immigration statutes and the Japanese treaty came to 
the front; but in 1908 agreement was reached by which the Japanese 
government agreed to restrict. immigration to Canada. In 1911, 
Canada hesitated to accept the new treaty of commerce yet finally, in 
1913, acceded on condition that nothing in the treaty should affect 
the immigration act of Canada and that Japan should continue the 
limitation and control of emigrant labor as agreed in 19 08. 20 Australia 
and New Zealand remained outside the treaty; but special “most- 
favored-nation” conventions were signed for trade between Japan and 
India. Thus the influence of the political alliance has not avoided 

26 Hertslet, British Commercial Treaties, XIX, 698, Art. XIX (1894); and 
XXVI, 743, Art. XXVI (1811). 

20 Idem, XXVII, 909; Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (3 
vols., London, 1912), II, 1079; Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions (Oxford 
1916), p. 193. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


41 


difficulties in the Dominions; Japan has not broken through the bar¬ 
riers of ‘ ‘ White Australia ’ ’; and in the Straits Settlements there 
has been sharp local feeling shown against the extension of Japanese 
economic interests. Indeed, the anti-Japanese feeling in both India 
and Malaya has been increasing among the resident British. Under¬ 
lying the whole question of the present treaty and its renewal there 
are, therefore, the delicate matters of labor and of commercial rela¬ 
tions. As far as the British Empire may be concerned it is decidedly 
to the interest of Japan to avoid controversy and to let sleeping dogs 
lie, particularly as long as the alliance is profitable to Japan’s interests 
along other lines. Meanwhile race equality remains a difficult question 
even within the British Empire and barely quiescent in its foreign 
relations. 

5. The Allies and the Chinese Revolutions, 1911-13 

During 1911-13 Japanese interests in China were naturally affected 
by events nearer home. For a Chinese revolution started in October, 
1911, which led to the abolition of the old Empire and establishment 
of the Republic. Partly as an outgrowth of this movement two rival 
republican forces also developed. So that in 1913 civil war began 
between north and South China, and at Nanking a stubborn contest 
was waged by the opposing forces. Under the terms of the treaty of 
alliance the two allies were bound to act together against a hostile 
foreign power in the Far East. They were also concerned in the 
maintenance of general peace and were to consult with each other in 
case the interests of either power were menaced. Obviously the 
question of intervention in China was of great importance to Japan. 
At first the Japanese Foreign Office, while maintaining official neutral¬ 
ity, sent unofficial delegates to consult with the republican rebels in 
the south. The idea was to discover grounds of intervention or, at 
least, to have lines out in both directions to profit by the course of 
events. Opinion in Japan was alarmed at the prospect of a genuine 
anti-imperial movement in China which might affect Japanese politics; 
hence the pressure on the part of the military element to come to the 
aid of the Manchu dynasty and thus to secure a stronger foothold in 
the north. This movement the British opposed, believing that the 
republican rising was too strong a national movement to make it 
advisable to take an open stand against it. In turn, the Japanese also 


42 


University of California Publications, International Eelations [Vol. 1 


proposed close relations with the rebels; but they met on the whole 
with small encouragement, for they wished large concessions as guaran¬ 
ties from the republicans. In fact the question of concessions came up 
in the Diet, and in February, 1912, the government said it had given 
all possible help to Japanese who were seeking concessions in China, 
but that the representatives of other foreign powers had objected to 
such violations of neutrality and the government had been compelled 
to stop this policy. 27 

This, of course, was a hit at the failure of the British on this 
occasion to back up the Japanese. Indeed, there was a sharp outbreak 
of anti-British feeling in the Japanese press early in 1912. 

The Chinese Republic became a fact by the abdication of the 
ancient dynasty and, for a time, both northern and southern republi¬ 
cans were united under a provisional government. In view of these 
circumstances, after the disappointment of 1911, Japan turned once 
more to Russia, and, as we have seen, added to the third secret treaty 
with Russia in 1912. In other words, the policy of spheres of influence 
for Russia, in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and for 
Japan, in southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, was restated in 
1912 in much the same fashion that it had been stated in common dis¬ 
cussion at the beginning of the century, when there was so much talk 
of the “break-up” of China. But in 1912 the British were bound 
by the Anglo-Russian entente; the first Balkan war had begun; and 
Europe was nervous over the interests of the ‘great powers,’ in the 
Near East. Consequently, the events of that year worked to give 
fresh opportunities for Japanese expansion at the very time of the 
establishment of the Chinese Republic and without consideration of 
the principles embodied in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

Shortly after this a third stage was reached when Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 
the leader of the southern Chinese republicans, broke with the new 
republican authorities at Peking and fled to Tokyo. There he wished 
to thank, as he said, Japanese who had aided him in 1911, and to 
gain fresh assistance for a second revolutionary movement in China. 
The Japanese Government remained officially neutral; but help was 
forthcoming by promises of concessions and by the organization of a 
Chinese-Japanese corporation, of which Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Baron 
Shibusawa (the Japanese financial magnate) were made joint presi¬ 
dents, and Mr. Kurachi (till recently the Japanese Vice-Minister of 


27 Pooley, Japan’s Foreign Policy (London, 1920), p. 68. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


43 


Foreign Affairs) became vice-president. Under such circumstances 
the second rebellion in China broke out in 1913. The Peking view of 
the matter was given by the Vice-President of the Chinese Republic 
who said with reference to disorder in China alleged to be fostered 
from abroad: 

Japan does not want China to grow strong. That is her broad political 
object, and she adopts various means of keeping China back and 
retarding her development. One way to keep China weak is to split 
the country into two or several parts, each arrayed against the others. 
A way to retard and prevent our development is to put obstacles in the 
way of introduction of modern industrialism. 28 

The revolt failed at Nanking and the southern Chinese leaders 
again fled to Japan. AVhatever may have been the direct part of the 
Japanese in this attempt, the net results do not indicate any vigorous 
desire by the government at Tokyo to secure the “ general peace” to 
which they were pledged by their British alliance. Japanese policy 
was now to eschew revolutions for a time and to follow other methods 
at Peking. Yet there was no question that, with another opportunity 
given either by disorders in China or by external events, Japan would 
return to more active methods of increasing her power and position 
in China; this in spite of the fact that all three of her treaties with 
Great Britain had spoken of the “independence and integrity” of 
China. In the meantime there were the urgent needs of the new and 
struggling Chinese Republic for financial assistance. In the negotia¬ 
tions of the powers to provide funds and to secure satisfactory pledges 
for their repayment the Japanese took a lively part, and actually 
borrowed money to lend it in turn to China. These steps and other 
economic measures do not concern us in detail at present. For larger 
though remote events in 1913 were preparing the way in Europe for 
the catastrophe of 1914. 

6. Japan’s Entry Into the War, 1914 

The Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the general international situa¬ 
tion had naturally distracted public attention to a considerable degree 
from the state of affairs in the Far East; but with the outbreak of the 
World War came a more direct test of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
It is a question whether the exact terms of the treaty required the 

28 Pooley, p. 91. Quoted from an interview given to Mr. T. F. Millard on 
July 16, 1913. 



44 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


entry of Japan into the war as the ally of England. Viscount Ishii, 
in the United States in 1918, said that Japan did not come into the 
war because of any diplomatic engagements. On the other hand, we 
have the decision of the Japanese Government, as given in the ulti¬ 
matum to Germany on August 15, 1914, which refers to the interests 
“as contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and 
Great Britain.” The British official announcement on August 18 
naturally used the same words. Back of this, however, during the 
first fortnight of August, both in England and Japan, there was 
apparently a division of opinion on the matter. Certainty the Japan¬ 
ese military statesmen were not loath to declare war; but they wished 
the British to ask for their aid; and this the British Government was 
at first by no means anxious to do. It is quite probable that the neces¬ 
sities of the British Admiralty in the Far East carried the day and 
promoted the Japanese declaration of war. If that is so the British 
Foreign Office took a quick step to announce with Japan the limitation 
of the field of Japanese operations and the purposes of Japan in the 
war. Even before the time set for the expiration of the Japanese ulti¬ 
matum to Germany, notice was given that, though it would be neces¬ 
sary for the British and Japanese to act in the protection of their 
general interests in the Far East, as provided by the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, the independence and integrity of China were, nevertheless, 
one of the objects of that alliance. Japan did not then propose to 
act in the Pacific beyond the China Seas, except for the protection of 
Japanese shipping in the Pacific, nor were Japanese troops to be 
employed except against “territory in German occupation” on the 
mainland of eastern Asia. Following the declaration of war on 
August 23, the Japanese press began immediately to proclaim the 
fact that, since Germany had refused to accept the Japanese ultimatum 
Japan was no longer bound to the terms of that ultimatum, which 
had included a demand that Germany surrender, “without condition 
or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to 
the eventual restoration of the same to China.” 29 

By October 1, from a variety of sources it was evident that the 
•Japanese were claiming reversionary rights as to German railway 
concessions in the entire province of Shantung, and Japanese naval 
vessels were acting well beyond the area of the China Seas in their 


29 MacMurray, II, 1167. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


45 


seizure of the Marshall Islands and other German outposts in the 
Pacific. Assurance was given by Japan, however, that the occupation 
of the Marshall Islands was merely temporary and for military pur-^'/ 
poses only. The campaign in the Japanese press against restoration 
of any German interests to China became more vehement after the 
success of the Japanese expedition which secured the surrender of * 
Tsingtao on November 7. Undoubtedly this success was a sharp blow 
to German colonial interests and it excited in Berlin the greatest bitter-*' 
ness against Japan. There was corresponding joy in Tokyo, for the 
Japanese had never forgotten the fashion in which, in 1895, Germany 
had joined with Russia and France to rob them of part of the fruits 
of their successful war against China. Possibly the threat of the 
Japanese fleet in the Pacific had had effect in driving German cruisers 
to take refuge at Guam and in the Philippines; but the main ships of 
the German fleet had left Tsingtao before the Japanese ultimatum. 
They went southward to defeat Admiral Craddock off the coast of 
Chile, and then to their own destruction in the battle off the Falkland 
Islands. The Japanese in their cruises eastward were therefore not 
able to establish contact with German naval forces in the Pacific. To 
the westward the Japanese patrol along the Asiatic coast extended at 
first as far as Singapore, where Japanese marines were useful in 
aiding the suppression of a mutiny by a British Indian regiment in 
1915. With the fall of Tsingtao, Japanese naval forces went to Aus¬ 
tralian waters and acted as convoy for troop ships as far as. the Red 
Sea. Later, especially in 1917, the wfide southern maritime area be¬ 
tween Australia and South Africa was in their general, charge. The 
same year also saw the despatch of anti-submarine forces to the Medi¬ 
terranean. 

But no Japanese troops were sent either to the Near East or to 
Europe. Indeed, from a very early date Baron Kato opposed the 
sending of Japanese troops to the main fields of combat. Later, when 
the French were urgent ip their desire for reenforcements, l< the lack 
of shipping for this purpose prevented such cooperation. In the 
supply of munitions and the development of a mercantile marine the 
participation of Japan was useful and, as we will see later, troops 
were sent to Siberia in 1918. In the meantime, the military occupation 
of Tsingtao was completed and troops were finally sent to guard rail¬ 
way lines in northern Manchuria. In a military sense, therefore, the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a useful factor in the war. 


46 


University of California Publications, International delations [Vol. 1 


In the field of diplomacy the cooperation of Japan in the war was 
first marked by the adhesion of Japan, on October 19, 1914, to the 
London Agreement of September 5, between Great Britain, France 
and Russia, to which Italy later also adhered. 30 This London Agreement 
provided that peace was to be made in common by the Allies. There 
was considerable opposition in Japan to this adhesion. It was pointed 
out that the Anglo-Japanese treaty, by Article II, already provided 
directly for the making of peace in common by England and Japan. 
Furthermore, the claim was made that the Japanese Cabinet had dis¬ 
regarded constitutional rights of the Privy Council in binding Japan 
by this new treaty. 

All of this discussion, however, was in part due to the beginning, 
in 1916, of violent anti-British propaganda in Japan. Thus, the 
Japanese vernacular press refused to copy dispatches from the pro- 
British Japan Times and the opinion was general, particularly in the 
army, that the Central Powers were likely to win. This whole cam¬ 
paign became more vehement as British and American opposition to 
Japanese claims in China developed. As early as December, 1914, 
Baron Kato had declared in the Diet that it was impossible to say that 
Kiaochow was to be returned to China, that Japan was in nowise 
‘ committed on this point, and that the failure of Germany to accept 
.the original ultimatum had nullified the proposal of restitution of 
‘Kiaochow to China. 31 

7. Entry of China Into the War, 1917 

The uncertainties of the war and Japanese anxieties as to her 
eventual share of the spoils at the conclusion of peace were responsible 
for a further diplomatic move by Japan in February, 1917. This 
was apparently in general accord with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, providing for peace in common, and was, from a Japanese 
point of view, on a par with the various secret agreements of the 
Allies as to future terms of peace. But the Japanese demands came 
at a very serious moment for the Allied cause. The submarine cam¬ 
paign was reaching its height in European waters; conditions in 
Russia were becoming very critical; the United States had not as yet 
entered the war; and the Allied fortunes were desperately threatened. 

30 Hertslet, XXVII, 489-491. Japan signed the agreement, including Italy on 
November 30, 1915. 

31 Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question (New York, 1919), p. 82. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


47 


It was then that the Japanese Government secured from England, 
France, Italy, and Russia pledges in a secret exchange of notes, during 
February and March of 1917, that the Allies would support Japanese 
claims at a future peace conference. The British reply read as 
follows: 

His Britannic Majesty’s Government accede with pleasure to re¬ 
quest of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will 
support Japan’s claims in regard to the disposal of Germany’s rights 
in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on 
the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the 
Japanese Government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in 
the same spirit Great Britain’s claims to the German islands south of 
the equator. 32 

Three days after this, on February 19, the Japanese Government 
approched the French and Russian ambassadors stating that, in view 
of their particular arrangements concerning peace conditions, “such 
as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosphorous, Con¬ 
stantinople, and the Dardenelles, ” which were under discussion by 
the powers interested, the Japanese Government wished to demand 
from Germany the surrender of her territorial and special interests 
in the Far East, and wished the support of France and of Russia. The 
French acceded to this note, but demanded that Japan should support 
the plan to force China to break its diplomatic relations with Ger¬ 
many. Russia and Italy also gave formal adhesion. Thus, before 
the United States entered the war, Japan had secured by these secret 
agreements the support of the Allies for claims which were later 
successfully maintained by the Treaty of Versailles. It is particularly 
the Shantung agreement which has attracted most criticism in 
America, yet of all the Japanese diplomatic moves of this time it 
received the most direct support by England, in spite of its threat to 
China’s integrity. 

Another phase of this matter also appears in the entry of China 
into the war. In March, 1917, diplomatic relations with Germany 
were broken by China and the formal declaration of war followed 
on August 14. 33 But why did not China enter the war earlier? In 
fact, she made several attempts to do so and on each occasion was 
rebuffed. This appears first in the proposal by the Chinese to take 

32 MacMurray, II, 1168. 

33 MacMurray, II 1361 et seq., where the related documents are also printed. 



48 University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 

Tsingtao from the Germans in 1914. At this time British advice 
was effective and China was checked; Japan was already bound on 
her expedition to seize the German concession and the British were 
concerned that there should be no friction between their ally and 
China at this time. A year later a second discussion of the matter 
took place at Peking. By this time the Japanese were firmly en¬ 
trenched at Kiaochow and did not wish to have the matter of the 
ultimate disposal of the German settlement raised. They feared the 
entry of China would block their plans as to Shantung. Indeed, 
Article I of the “Twenty-one Demands” on China, which Japan had 
first made in January, 1915, was embodied in the treaty of May 25, 
1915, between the two governments. Article I of that treaty read: 

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to 
all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree 
with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, 
interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or 
otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung. 34 

The Japanese, therefore, apparently brought pressure to bear at 
Peking to hold China back from participation in the war at that 
time. This part of the Twenty-one Demands was consequently also 
an important preliminary step to the secret agreement between 
England and Japan in 1917, and to the support given to Japan by 
her ally in April, 1919. It cleared the way for the disposal of the 
former German interests in the territory of Kiaochow to Japan, as 
provided for in Section VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. 

Emboldened by this success in 1915, and in spite of vigorous for¬ 
eign criticism of Japanese policies in China, the Japanese Govern¬ 
ment successfully met still a third attempt to bring China into the 
war. This time, in 1916, the British, French, and Russian ambassa¬ 
dors at Tokyo took up the matter. But the Japanese Government 
was loath to move and pointed its objections by speaking of great 
dangers to civilization if the millions of China were to be armed and 
drilled into an effective fighting machine. So ended 1916, with 
England and Japan pursuing opposite methods as to China’s partici¬ 
pation in the war. Then early in 1917, came the rupture of diplo¬ 
matic relations between the United States and Germany; we invited 
China and other neutral states to follow our example; and on 
February 9, China gave a conditional promise to do so. Immediately 


34 Ibid., p. 1216. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


49 


after this Japan pressed on the Allies the signature of the secret 
agreements as to Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific. 
The British note on this matter, which has already been quoted, was 
dated February 16; there was now no further hitch; and the French 
npte to Japan was particularly clear in requiring Japan’s support at 
Peking. For as a condition of French diplomatic assistance for 
Japanese claims in the future, the government at Tokyo was now 
to unite with the Allies in their invitation to China to enter the war. 
The Chinese understood the bearing of the whole matter and in the 
final presidential declaration of war against Germany is the signifi¬ 
cant language of the last paragraph: 

I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of International 
Law should be impaired, or the position in the family of nations 
should be undermined or the restoration of the world peace and happi¬ 
ness should be retarded. It is, therefore, hoped that all of our people 
will exert their utmost in these hours of hardship, with a view to 
maintaining and strengthening the existence of the Chinese Republic, 
so that we may establish ourselves amidst the family of nations and 
share with them the happiness and benefits derived therefrom. 35 

The Allied Powers and the United States, now all at war with the 
Central Powers, greeted this statement with an identical note at 
Peking, each legation replying: 

In reply I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my gov¬ 
ernment is pleased to take this opportunity to give to the Chinese 
Government the assurance of its solidarity, of its friendship and of 
its support. It will do all that depends upon it in order that China 
may have the benefit in her international relations of the situation 
and the regards due to a great country. 36 

This language was of course quite contrary to the objects of the 
secret agreement of February, 1917, between Japan and the Allies; 
but Tokyo had made its bargain which in turn was opposed to the 
professed spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Thus the very entry 
of China into the war was marked, on the part of new associates, by 
the attempt to prevent her from recovering the concessions in Shan¬ 
tung w T hich, in 1898, she had been forced to yield to Germany, and 
which were now in Japanese hands. 


35 MacMurray, II, 1362. 


36 MacMurray, II, 1363. 



50 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


8. Japanese Agreements with Russia and the United States 

In the meantime, Japan had sought to consolidate her position in 
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia by pursuing a line of policy already 
indicated in the successive open and secret agreements with Russia 
which date from 1907. For, in 1916, there was signed on July 3 a 
secret treaty, practically of alliance, between Russia and Japan which 
was “revealed from the files of the Russian Foreign Office at Petro- 
grad by the Trotsky-Lenine government in 1918.” Both internal 
and external evidence are sufficient to make the document fairly 
trustworthy. By this treaty Japan and Russia engaged to safeguard 
Uliina from the political domination of any third hostile power and 
agreed to cooperate to this end. In the event of a declaration of 
war by such a third hostile power the two allies were to act together 
both in war and in the conclusion of peace. Article IV, however, is 
particularly important in that apparently it implied the necessity of 
cooperation and assistance to Russia and Japan by their other allies. 
Thus: 

It is requisite to have in view that neither one or the other of the 
high contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article II 
of this agreement (as to war and peace) to lend armed aid to its 
ally, unless it be given guarantees by its allies that the latter will 
give it assistance corresponding in character to the importance of 
the approaching conflict. 37 

This treaty was to run for five years with provision for continuation 
beyond that date. Article VI declared that this agreement “must 
remain profoundly secret except to both of the High Contracting 
Parties.” Of the same date, also, was the open convention between 
Russia and Japan providing for general cooperation of the two powers 
in the Far East. 38 Neither power was to be a party to any arrange¬ 
ment or political combination directed against the other. It is some¬ 
what difficult to determine the exact purposes of this secret alliance; 
and the interpretation of Article IV with its rather involved language 
may be made clearer by a revelation of another text of this treaty. 
Nevertheless, in its practical effect, apparently Japan was unwilling 
to depend on the assistance which Russia might give unless the other 
ally, France, should also give assistance in proportion to the interests 
involved, and Russia was unwilling to embark on a new war unless 
England or other allies joined in. 


37 Ibid., p. 1328. 


* s Ibid., p. 1327. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


51 


Naturally the question also arises, what third hostile power Japan 
may have had in mind. AYas it Germany? Or was it the United 
States, which in 1916 was still a neutral? AVere the words merely 
general in meaning used to link together Russian and Japanese poli¬ 
cies of expansion in the Far East? On these points we ma} r have to 
await further disclosures. It is plain, however, that throughout the 
war, the Japanese were engaged in a diplomatic campaign to secure 
all that they could for themselves in the Far East. This was either 
by means of their alliance with England or in spite of it and, often, 
without reference to its spirit and purpose as defined in the language 
of the treaty. The successive agreements with Russia which were 
crowned by the treaties of 1916 were themselves an outgrowth of 
this connection with England and were in part appendices to the 
growth of the Anglo-Russian entente. The Twenty-one Demands on 
China including those which were not finally accepted show an almost 
cynical disregard of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. Yet in all these 
moves and counter moves, even with regard to the entry of China 
into the war, the Japanese Government could depend on at least the 
tacit acquiescence of her ally. Indeed, she was almost “on the back 
of England” in 1916-17 and there was no governmental check, in 
those critical months, on the campaign in the Japanese press attack¬ 
ing the usefulness of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. These attacks 
fell under five main headings: (1) discrimination against Japanese 
in British colonies; (2) the obstruction of Japanese economic expan¬ 
sion in the South Sea Islands; (3) the efforts to exclude Japanese 
interests from south China; (4) the British share in the defeat of 
the fifth group of Japanese demands on China in 1915; and (5) the 
declaration that Russia and Germany need no longer be feared, while 
in any case the United States threatened to nullify the usefulness of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Taken together these assertions are a 
table of contents of Japanese policies. 

The war, therefore, was, from the Japanese point of view, a natural 
opportunity. The very necessities of the European allies gave to 
Japan special and unexpected chances; the situation in China and 
the relationship of China to the war were complicating factors; and 
Japan felt free to ignore the principles of the alliance with England 
while at the same time she made use of it and outwardly adhered to 
it. She supplemented her agreements with England and with the 


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allied powers to make peace in common with them by forcing the 
secret agreement of 1917. And, later in that year, Japan celebrated 
her position in the flourish of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. In this 
statement the United States recognized “that territorial propinquity 
creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the 
Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special 
interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions 
are contiguous. ’ ’ 39 This document employed the usual language 
as to the maintenance of the Open Door and the preservation of the 
independence and territorial integrity of China; it also adopted the 
very phraseology of the Japanese note on November 22, 1905, when 
Japan spoke of the “relations of propinquity” which compelled her 
to take direction of the political and military affairs of Korea. 40 The 
results of that “propinquity” are now a matter of history. It was 
in such fashion that Japan underscored her position and exposed 
her aims. 

9. Japan in Siberia 

Elsewhere in the Far East there was still another field of action, 
both diplomatic and military. Siberia was not specifically included 
in the words of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but was certainly Far 
Eastern and lay on the borders of China including Mongolia and 
Manchuria. The results of the Russian revolutions of 1917 and the 
internal condition of Siberia gave serious anxiety to the Allies in 
1918. There was a strong element in Japan that wished to intervene 
in Siberia, and, after long delays, the way was cleared for the exten¬ 
sion of Japanese military action in the war by the despatch of armed 
forces of the allied and associated powers to Vladivostok. The whole 
policy of these powers with reference to Russia, and more particularly 
in regard to Siberia, is much entangled and controversial; at this 
time we can deal only with the established facts in the case and point 
out the sequence of events. Certainly it seems unlikely that we would 
have seen by October, 1918, something over 72,000 Japanese troops 
despatched to Siberia, or to the frontier of Siberia, if it had not 
been for the fact of the original existence of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. Following the Russian revolutions. the Allies pursued a 
variety of policies as to Russia, no one of which was destined to 

30 MacMurray, II, 1394. 

40 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, p. 613. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


53 


be wholly successful. The desirability of some joint action in Siberia 
turned first chiefly on the problem of the Czechoslovak forces which 
were then endeavoring to make headway against armed German and 
Austrian prisoners in Russia. Consequently, the United States an¬ 
nounced on August 5, 1918, that in order to protect and help the 
Czechoslovak forces, “to steady any efforts at self-government or 
self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept 
assistance from Vladivostok, ’ ’ and to guard military stores which 
may be needed, the United States would cooperate with France and 
England. Japan acceded to this proposal and consequently flhere 
was organized a cooperative American-Japanese expedition to Siberia 
to which were joined smaller army units of the other allies. 

The original plan was that only a few thousand troops were to be 
sent by the United States and Japan. The United States also made 
it very clear that there were to be “no interference with the political 
sovereignty of Russia and no intervention in her internal affairs, 
not even in the local affairs of the limited area which her (American) 
military force may be obliged to occupy and no impairment of her 
(Russian) territorial integrity either now or hereafter. . . .” 

This declaration met with Japanese diplomatic support; but very 
early in the course of these operations it became evident that it might 
be necessary for the combined forces to jjress farther into the interior 
of Siberia than had been at first contemplated. The United States 
troops were in the main confined to the neighborhood of Vladivostok, 
but the Japanese went well beyond that point. The collapse of Rus¬ 
sian opposition to Bolshevik forces became so clear in 1919 that, early 
in 1920, the last American forces were withdrawn from Siberia. It 
was felt, with the repatriation of the Czechoslovak forces and in view 
of the political instability and grave uncertainties of the situation in 
eastern Siberia, that the main purposes for which American troops 
had been sent to Siberia no longer existed, and that it was necessary, 
with regret on the part of the United States, to withdraw from a 
cooperative effort by the United States and Japan to assist the Rus¬ 
sian people. 

Nevertheless, Japanese troops remain in Siberia to this date, in 
order, it is said, to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects 
and to prevent bolshevism from spreading to Japan. Whether these 
are the exact and complete reasons for the continued Japanese occu¬ 
pation is doubtful; for there are comparatively few Japanese to be 


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found in eastern Siberia and the Japanese certainly have not failed 
to occupy themselves with the internal disorders and feuds between 
rival Russian forces operating with devastating effect in Siberia. It is 
not entirely clear what purpose these Japanese policies may serve, but 
actually one of the rival Russian governments in eastern Siberia was 
undoubtedly supported by Japan. If maintained at Vladivostok this 
government w T ould be chiefly dependent on Japan at least for the imme¬ 
diate future. The expense of this Japanese occupation is considerable, 
and it may be that the Japanese supporters of the venture are hoping 
to see some more tangible results from their aggressive military policy 
and economic penetration. A recent press dispatch, however, reports 
that Japan intends to withdraw her troops. It is therefore impossible 
to say how far England is committed to Japanese policies as to Siberia; 
but, certainly as far as can be discovered, there has not been any 
protest with regard to Japanese plans in that region. In the main, 
therefore, this has given rise to the belief that Japan, with the appro¬ 
val of her ally, has received practically a free hand in northeastern 
Asia on the borders of China. The indirect and prospective results 
of this cooperative expedition of 1918 into Siberia seem to fit in with 
a plan of Japanese political and economic operations at variance 
with the policies which the United States has maintained. The whole 
entangled matter also serves to emphasize the extent and variety of 
questions which may arise within the scope of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance or which may be affected by it. The first treaty was largely 
directed against Russia in 1902. The present treaty seems to imply 
British approval of the extension of Japanese interests in eastern 
Siberia in 1921. Will a third renewal of the alliance ratifv such 
an arrangement and give ground for further changes? In any case 
w r e have to review the course of events up to the present and to 
appraise the issues and interests involved. 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


55 


CHAPTER IY 

THE ALLIANCE TODAY, 1919-1921 

1. American Opinion and the Alliance 

Yuan Shih-kai, the late President of China, said in September, 1914: 
‘'Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control in 
China. ” 1 Today Japan is not in control of China, though the various 
Chinese governments, both general and provincial, have not done 
much to prevent it; nor for that matter have other foreign powers. 
A long step has been taken in the direction of translating legitimate 
commercial enterprise on the part of Japanese economic interests 
into a dominating Japanese political, administrative, and military 
influence in Chinese affairs. This process has gone on without much 
consideration on the part of Japan of the terms of the English alliance 
and with still less anxiety as to the legitimate interests of the citizens 
of other foreign states including China. At the same time, the mili¬ 
tary and naval preparations of Japan have been hastened and enlarged. 
Other nations, including the United States, have become alarmed at 
the possible consequences of further competition in armaments; they 
dread the possibility of another costly war, and realize the world-wide 
demand for peace. A discussion of limitation of armament might 
have started from any basis which was of sufficient political impor¬ 
tance and which was also dangerous in a military or naval sense. The 
fact that at Washington negotiation as to Pacific and Far Eastern 
questions is “in connection with” discussion of plans for reduction 
in armament gives such a conference wider influence and may assist 
settlements and understandings which are essential to an agreement; 
for, fundamentally, this conference will not succeed unless it aims 
first and foremost at peace. The regulation and limitation of arma¬ 
ment may cause comparatively little trouble if the causes of misunder¬ 
standings and the spirit of hostility are once removed or subdued. 

1 Reinseh, Secret Diplomacy and the Twenty-one Demands in Asia (November, 

1921), p. 937. 



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University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


In this process public opinion has a vital part; and, in the case of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, American opinion has apparently con¬ 
cluded that, in some way or other, the Anglo-Japanese treaty is partly 
responsible for difficulties in the Far East and for this reason is a 
menace to American interests. Lord Bryce, after a recent visit to 
America, recognizes this fact and is quoted as writing on his return 
to England: 

It has been pointed out over and over again that there is nothing 
in that treaty to affect the United States. Nevertheless, nine men out 
of ten in the United States continue to repeat that England is the ally 
—the exclusive ally—of Japan, and that the effect of the treaty has 
been and is to make Japan think she has a comparatively free hand 
and may adopt policies of aggression on which she would otherwise 
fear to embark. No explanations seem likely to remove this impres¬ 
sion from the American mind. 2 

A variety of things have led to this state of mind, for at the 
outset of discussion along these lines, American opinion was not 
generally aware of the facts nor was it alive to any special connection 
between “disarmament” and the Far Eastern question of which the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance is only an element, though an important 
element. Any attempt to show that this feeling against the alliance 
is mistaken is another matter, to which objection must be taken later; 
at present we have to deal only with the genesis and fact of that hostile 
opinion. It is a comparatively fresh view in any case; it is negative 
rather than positive; and, except for blatant anti-British propaganda, 
such as we have learned to expect from certain papers, it has not been 
the result of any long campaign of education. In short, this suspicion 
fas to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has had little cultivation but it 
\has spread very quickly. Under the circumstances the tempta¬ 
tion is to assume a fertile soil or to cling to the idea that it is due 
to mere ignorance. Both may be partially correct, but in a sense 
different from that employed by the defenders of the treaty. 

Undoubtedly any person with pro-German or pro-Sinn Fein and 
therefore with anti-British views might be unreasoningly opposed to 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance per se. Yet he would be much more 
concerned in agitation regarding its renewal, and perhaps favor its 
renewal, if thereby friendly Anglo-American relations might be en¬ 
dangered. So far no defense of the treaty has come from these ranks. 


2 New Yorlt Times, October 19, 1921 (quoting London Times). 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


57 


and no special propaganda on the subject. Rather from the friends 
of England in America, from people who, perhaps mistakenly, look 
to an Anglo-American alliance, has come the clearest expression of 
regret at the possibility of the continuance of the Japanese alliance. 

It is a curious comment on supposedly well informed foreign 
opinion that there should be serious proposal of a triple political and/ 
military alliance of England, Japan, and the United States, as thoughj 
the addition of America would give sanctity to results and possibilities 
of the present combination. Fortunately the United States has at 
present no desire to enter into any such formal political and military 
alliance; and there is small question that a renewal of the treaty of 
1911, especially if in unmodified language, would be harmful to the 
continued growth of firm and friendly understanding and association 
between the United States and Great Britain. The alliance is impor¬ 
tant enough in Far Eastern affairs; it is also at present an obstinate 
factor in Anglo-American relations. Some people in the heat of their 
feeling against Japan declare in short-sighted and fanatical fashion 
that England must now choose whether she wishes to be friendly * 
to America or to Japan. This of course is not exactly the case nor 
is it the way to approach the issue. Nevertheless, the feeling exists 
and a student of the whole matter must see that conditions and views \ 
have greatly changed since 1902, and indeed since the close of the 
World War. The question of the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, with all that that combination means or may mean, has 
today an influence much bevond the exact terms of anv treatv. 

The explanation of such facts is a more difficult matter than its 
appreciation. Even Lord Bryce seems to imply that this view is 
based on an American misconception of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
and that it is unwarranted by the facts in the case, for, in his recent 
statement as to the critical attitude in America toward the alliance^ 
he continues: 

It remains even when Englishmen point out their own interests in 
securing not only the open door for commerce in China and the politi¬ 
cal independence of China—both of which things Japan is supposed 
to threaten—are exactly the same as the interest of America. Again, 
if it be suggested that Japanese ascendancy in Manchuria and the 
regions northward as far as the River Amur and Lake Baikal would 
be injurious to American interests, such advance, if injurious to 
America, would be no less injurious to British interests. There is 
really no reason whatever for any divergence between the British and 


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University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


American policy as regards China and the possible action of Japan 
there. An attempt by Japan to dominate and exploit China—this is a 
possible eventuality on which Americans frequently dwell—is, of 
course, an imaginable danger. 

Lord Bryce, in this analysis, is undoubtedly correct, but he omits to 
state that, while British and American interests and views are in a 
large way similar, nevertheless, we in America have strong reason 
to believe that they have been equally opposed by Japanese policies. 
This very belief makes many Americans wonder more and more why 
England remains in alliance with a country whose spirit and practice 
as to Chinese affairs in particular and Far Eastern matters in general 
seem so contrary to the language of the treaties of alliance and so 
incompatible with the essence of American traditional policies. 
Furthermore, what is spoken of as an “imaginable danger” has in 
American eyes become imminent; for the history of the last few 
years has not been a closed book, and Japan has been attempting 
not merely to exploit China but to extend Japanese political power 
in China; in order to do so she has on occasion adopted methods of 
threat and duress; and she has frequently disregarded treaty pledges. 
Such things are repugnant to American policies; they are also ex¬ 
cluded by the professed spirit and the alleged purposes of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance. In other words, American attention has been 
directed more to the violation or neglect of the principles of the 
alliance than to its mere existence. 

2. Great Britain and War with United States 

The United States is not a partner to the alliance. We have 
nothing to say or do with its provisions or its continuance except 
in so far as the practice and results as distinguished from the terms 
of the alliance may involve or possiblv affect in unfriendlv wavs 
the interests and policies of the United States. Otherwise, unless 
this contract between England and Japan becomes a danger and a 
public nuisance to America, we have no legal ground to dispute it or 
to object to its renewal. There is, however, one other aspect of this 
matter; it is to be found in Article IV of the present treaty of 1911. 
This has already been quoted—it provided that the existence of a 
treaty of general arbitration between either England or Japan and 
a third state should free either of the two allies from the clearlv 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


59 


belligerent obligations of the alliance in case the other ally was 
engaged in war with the third power. The intention of this article, 
in the light of known events, was to bar a war with the United States 
in which otherwise England might be involved as an ally of Japan. 
This intent was nullified by the failure of such an arbitration treaty 
between England and the United States to secure the ratification of 
the United States. Since 1911, therefore, there has not been any 
provision in the text of the Anglo-Japanese treaty to prevent the I 
possibility that the United States might be opposed by both England 
and Japan. On this point there has not been any official public state¬ 
ment to the contrary by the government of either England or 
Japan except in two instances. On March 1, 1921, in reply 
to a question in the House of Commons as to the alliance and 
the position of England in the event of war between the United 
States and Japan, the Foreign Office, after reviewing the cir¬ 
cumstances as to Article IV, said: “Our relations with Japan are 
so arranged as not to involve us in the possibility of conflict with the 
United States of America”; with reference to this and naval matters, 
the answer continued—“no official communication has been made to 
the United States of America as there is no reason to believe that 
the responsible authorities are in any doubt as to the true position. ’ ’ 3 
We find also that on February 4, 1921, before the budget committee 
of the Japanese House of Representatives, Viscount Uchida said: 
“Looking at the matter [i.e., Anglo-Japanese Alliance] from a broad 
point of view we can safely' say that at the time of the conclusion 
of the treaty [i.e., 1911] it was understood that there should be no 
application to the United States.” Of course that is correct for, in 
1911, it was supposed that the United States would be automatically 
excluded by the terms of Article IV of the treaty of alliance. If the 
United States has received any official notification that anything has 
taken place between the two allies which would be the equivalent of 
or be a substitute for Article IV as it was written in 1911, no public 
statement to that effect has been made; in fact the British Foreign 
Office said on March 1 that no such official communication had been 
made. 

3 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, March 1. Cf. London Times, 
March 2, 1921. * 



60 University of California Publications, International Relations [Yol. 1 

Nevertheless, we have other sources and statements which cast 
additional light on the situation, for on December 5, 1920, the London 
Times said editorially: 

It is material to observe that the provision in the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance (Article IY) was made after the fullest consultation with 
the respective ministers of the British Dominions who were then at¬ 
tending the sitting of the Defence Committee in London. Because 
of the failure of the Arbitration Treaty recourse was had to the 
Peace Commission Treaty of Sept. 1914. It is not indeed technically 
“a treaty of general arbitration” but it is near akin to such a treaty. 
It obliges England and the United States to refer “all disputes of 
every nature whatsoever ’ ’ other than disputes the settlement of which 
are provided for under existing agreements, to a Permanent Interna¬ 
tional Commission for Investigating and Reporting, though it reserves 
to the governments the right to independent action after the report 
has been submitted. But so anxious were the British Government to 
make their attitude in the contingency of any eventual controversy 
between the United States and Japan clear, that upon the signature 
of this peace commission treaty they proceeded immediately to notify 
Japan that they would regard it as a “general treaty of arbitration” 
within the meaning of the exemption clause of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. 

On December 30, 1920, and again on May 3, 1921, Lord Northcliffe 
said much the same thing. Commenting on Lord Northcliffe’s first 
interview, Baron G. Hayashi, the present Japanese ambassador in 
London, said: 

I welcome the statement as a timely and wise warning to both 
Japan and United States. ... It was, therefore, never in the 
mind of the Japanese Government to fight the United States at all, 
and moreover in the most improbable eventuality of such war, to 
which I refer merely for the sake of argument, Japan would not 
expect England to come to her help. Hence, the Japanese and British 
Governments agreed to insert in the Agreement of Alliance Article 
IY, which would absolve Great Britain from an obligation to join 
Japan in a war against America. Only a general phraseology was 
selected in the Alliance Agreement for the reasons of diplomatic 
nicety, but what the negotiators of the agreement had in mind, is 
obvious. ... In these circumstances I can assure you with all 
the emphasis at my command that the Alliance will never stand in 
the way of the good understanding and friendly relations between 
Great Britain and the United States of America. Nor is it in the 
least the intention of Japan to use the Alliance as a means to direct 
pressiire in any degree upon an old friend, the United States of 
America. 4 


4 London Times, January 4, 1921. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


61 


Then Lord Grey of Falloden (who as Sir Edward Grey was British 
Foreign Secretary both in 1911 and 1914) is reported as saying in a 
public speech on February 22, 1921: 

They did not dispose of the question of war between the United 
States and this country by calling it unthinkable and inconceivable. 
It was unthinkable and inconceivable, but that did not make it certain 
that it might not happen. Infinity and eternity were unthinkable 
and inconceivable, but most people believed that they happened. He 
would much rather have people, especially in the United States, where 
they had been discussing this question as unthinkable and incon¬ 
ceivable, bringing out the plain fact that we had a Peace Treaty with 
the United States which, if it were observed, would make w r ar im¬ 
possible. We had a Peace Treaty under which if the two governments 
could not agree they resorted to a commission which would investigate 
and report and recommend a settlement and which, if the Treaty was 
observed, would give at least one year’s time for reflection before a 
breach of the peace took place on that particular quarrel. He did not 
believe two great democracies would ever go to war if they observed 
that Treatv. He regretted that in the United States thev seemed to 
be very conscious of the effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to 
be discussing the possibilities of its involving their own country and 
ours in war, but they did not seem to be so much aware of the existence 
of the Treaty made with the United States Government and ratified 
by the Senate. If treaties were to be observed it was a good thing 
to keep them continually in mind, so that public opinion assumed 
they were going to be put into operation. Care had been taken that 
there should be no conflict between the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and 
our Treaty with the United States. It had been so obvious the two 
might conflict that when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
was discussed the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (i.e., 
Sir Edward Grey) had approached the Japanese Government on the 
subject and had been met in a spirit of fairness and of true states¬ 
manship by the Japanese Government, and especially by the Japanese 
Ambassador then in London. They had agreed readily to a clause 
being put into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which would make it clear 
that, in the event of a quarrel between Japan and any other country 
with which we had a Treaty of Arbitration, there was no obligation 
on us to do other than carry out that Treaty. We had an under¬ 
standing with Japan that that clause in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
applied to the particular Treaty afterwards made with the United. 

States. 5 

The explanation of these unofficial statements by Lord Northcliffe 
and by Lord Grey is, therefore, that on the conclusion of the so-called 
Bryan Peace Commission Treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain on September 15, 1914, Great Britain took occasion privately 

5 London Times, February 23, 1921. 



62 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


to propose to Japan or to notify Japan that, for the purposes of the 
alliance, Great Britain would regard the Anglo-American treaty of 
September, 1914, as a substitute for an arbitration treaty as men¬ 
tioned in Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. From a purely 
legal point of view the Bryan treaty was of course by no means the 
same as a treaty of general arbitration as contemplated in 1911. But 
for political reasons and under the circumstances a British note, 
which has never been published, was apparently drawn up to the 
above effect. If these unauthorized statements are correct, Great 
\ Britain took steps in 1914 to restore the United States to the exclusive 
position intended by both allies in 1911 by the language of Article IV. 
Furthermore, aside from these somewhat devious diplomatic steps, 
which are not officially known to the United States, the fact remains 
that the overwhelming sentiment of the British Empire would have 
been and still is opposed to the possibility of war between Great 
Britain and the United States. It has seemed wise to enter into this 
entire matter of Article IV only because there has been so much dis¬ 
cussion and false inference regarding it. At all events, whatever 
future research may show, it is plain that the purpose and intent of 
the present Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not and does not include 
the possibility of a war in which the United States would face the 
British Empire as well as Japan. 

3. The Allliance and Opinion in China 

China was never consulted in the negotiation of any of the three 
treaties of alliance. Today the representatives of the government at 
Peking come to Washington with full international status, but they 
leave behind them a welter of confusion. The southern leaders who 
were beaten in 1913 returned to start another civil war at the end of 
1916 which still smolders; there are, therefore, two governments in 
China—one at Canton, under Sun Yat-Sen, and one at Peking with 
which foreign governments continue to negotiate. Both Canton and 
Peking, however, are to a considerable extent at the mercy of provincial 
governors and restless military chieftains. The result is that the great 
mass of the'Chinese people have no coherent national organization 
which could defend them against foreign aggression, secure domestic 
reform, or adequately voice national desires. This chaotic condition 
is of itself sufficient to invite foreign intervention and to provoke 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


63 


discussion of varied remedies. Under the circumstances Chinese opin¬ 
ion as to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is at best fragmentary and 
often misleading. Yet underlying nearly all views on the subject is 
the dread lest, relying on the vague virtues of the alliance, Japan 
may secure even greater influence in China than she now possesses. 

Following the Treaty of Versailles there was a temporary boycott 
of Japanese goods in China; there has also been considerable talk of a 
proposed boycott against British goods in case the treaty of 1911 
is renewed. Whether this is more than a rumor or no, there is little 
doubt that the British in China are now looked upon with deep suspi¬ 
cion in many quarters because of their ally’s policies. Almost ludi¬ 
crous evidence of a pathetic but earnest attempt to maintain national 
self-respect and to express opposition to the renewal of the alliance 
is seen in a belated Chinese protest against the mere mention of China 
in any new treaty between Great Britain and Japan. This protest 
the British Government refused to publish. 6 But the feelings which 
lie back of that protest find voice in the Far East. Thus the Peking 
and Tientsin Times of July 13, 1921, excoriates Japan’s mere “lip- 
service to most of the Far Eastern policies of Great Britain and the 
United States” and points out that “there is wide divergence between 
her (Japan’s) professions and her practice.” Likewise the North 
China Daily News of frequent dates in last June wages war against 
the renewal of the alliance and finally, on June 18, advocates the 
calling of an international conference on Pacific questions with the 
hope of consequent delay in the signature of a new agreement between 
England and Japan. 

The position of British residents in China and the Far East has 
been especially difficult during the past few years. Often attempts 
have been made to show them as favoring the combination with Japan. 
This, however, is contrary to the bulk of the evidence and when of 
late there has been a less critical view of the alliance taken in the 
local British press, it has been of such a uniform type as to suggest 
that a hint had been given from high quarters to step more carefully 
in such delicate matters. The root of British dissatisfaction with 
the alliance has lain in the increasing competition of Japanese com¬ 
merce in China; this has alarmed British mercantile and financial 
interests to a considerable degree. They also object to the notion 


6 London Times, June 11, 1920. 



64 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


that they may suffer in their business relations with the Chinese be¬ 
cause of their apparent approval of Japanese methods. This idea 
comes at a particularly inconvenient time when British post-war 
trade plans include the development of an important British-Chinese 
holding corporation which would provide for cooperation with Chinese 
commercial interests for business to be done outside of the treaty 
ports. Such general feeling of opposition to the alliance appeared, 
however, as early as 1918 in the protests of various British chambers 
of commerce in China. By the beginning of 1921 it had taken such 
definite form that an analysis of the Far Eastern press shows the 
main British reasons for opposing the alliance to be: (1) it no longer 
has any object; (2) Japanese policies in China are opposed to the 
alliance and to British interests in China; (3) British and Japanese 
interests in China are incompatible; (4) Chinese resentment is in¬ 
creasing against Japan and hence indirectly against the British; and 
(5) opposition exists in Australasia and in Canada to certain features 
of the alliance. During 1921 such feelings have, perhaps, somewhat 
abated but important articles by prominent Englishmen connected 
with Far Eastern affairs still continue to appear. Thus Robert Young, 
editor of The Japan Chronicle concludes: “The agreement is wholly 
against the real interests of the British and Japanese peoples, which 
consist in the establishment of good relations and friendship with all 
nations. ’ ’ 7 

4. Japan and the Alliance 

Japanese opinion regarding the alliance has varied a great deal 
during the past ten years. Prior to the renewal of the treaty in 
1911 the verdict in favor of the British connection was almost unani¬ 
mous. Since that date, on the occasion of the first Chinese revolution, 
in connection with the secret treaties with Russia, and more recently 
at the height of the war in 1916, there have been bitter anti-British 
outbreaks in the Japanese press. There is therefore under the surface 
plenty of combustible material; but it awaits an official order to 
flame out against the alliance. Of course, the great majority of the 
Japanese people are comparatively indifferent to the provisions of 
the treaty. They are so accustomed to the leadership of the small 
group of men who are in control of the major national policies of Japan 

7 Young, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance’’ in Contemporary Review (July, 
1921), p. 19. Cf. also Macartney, “China and the Washington Conference,” 
idem. (September, 1921), p. 308. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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that the decision as to the treaty, whatever its character may be, can 
scarcely arise from any wave of wholly popular sentiment or convic¬ 
tion. Englishmen are not on the whole preeminent favorites in 
Japan; and the alliance in itself has not given them any very definite 
position of priority as compared with other foreigners. On the other 
hand, the alliance is not an unpopular connection in Japan; there is 
no general prejudice against it and a failure to continue it would 
require far more explanation than would its renewal even in an 
amended form. Furthermore, the alliance was originally a sort of 
ticket of admission to the great international game; its value may 
have altered or decreased; but even today it is more than an interest¬ 
ing souvenir. To abolish the connection with England would probably 
offend Japan's amour propre. 

Moreover, among the more educated classes the alliance is dis¬ 
tinctly popular and the intellectuals generally are in favor of its 
continuance and renewal. In business circles much the same feeling 
exists with the added idea that under cover of the alliance, with the 
political connection secure, Japanese economic advance in China and 
perhaps in Siberia will have less to fear from any British aggressive 
commercial policy in the Far East. Furthermore, the alliance has 
been useful in time past and to the Japanese there does not seem 
at present any vital reason for its abandonment. The military and 
naval groups also are much of this mind, though during the war the 
army in particular was by no means pro-British. Underlying such 
views, however, there is always the proviso that the British connec¬ 
tion should not become a drag on Japanese policies. On more than 
one occasion these have been pressed without regard to the principles 
which are embodied in the treaties. One real test for the treaty is 
therefore in the observance of its professed purposes; but a large 
element in the support which it receives from the military and political 
directors of the fortunes of Japan depends on the success with which 
the alliance can be used to further the direct desires and designs of 
Japan today and tomorrow. Russia and Germany have, at least 
temporarily, ceased to be possible effective opponents to Japan and 
Great Britain in the Far East. To renew the alliance against either 
would, as far as Japan is concerned, be of small use; the interpreta¬ 
tion already given to Article IV of the present treaty would seem 
to rule out the United States as a power against whom the alliance 
could be operative. A new treaty, therefore, would have its basis 


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University of California Publications, International Belations [Vol. 1 


in general contingencies, and in the internal condition of China and 

» 

of Siberia, rather than in the existence of particular rivals or op¬ 
ponents. 

With this in mind Japan naturally extols its own excellent services 
as a faithful ally in the recent war and maintains the claim that con¬ 
ditions, already recognized by its ally or which hitherto have not 
met with British opposition, cannot now be subject to review at 
Washington or elsewhere. At the same time, during the recent nego¬ 
tiations regarding the financial consortium to assist the needs of 
China, there was evident, on the part of Japan, a tendency to lay 
the emphasis on a particularistic policy in China, to revert to the 
idea of spheres of influence as distinguished from the idea of the Open 
Door. The problem of Japanese diplomacy, therefore, is how to use 
the issues of armaments, of immigration, and of commercial treaties 
in such fashion as to preserve for Japan what has been secured during 
the period of the alliance and, at the same time, in any new agreement, 
how to keep the way open for the pursuit of her previous and present 
policies. One suggestion has already been made, namely, to enlarge 
the Anglo-Japanese connection by the inclusion of the United States. 
Such a development would be in line with the Lansing-Ishii policy; 
its purpose would be to warp a new treaty so as to secure implied 
approval or at least apparent acquiescence as to Japanese forward 
policies. This indeed has been the chief utility of the British treaty 
of 1911; for to the Oriental world it has given the impression at 
least of British indifference to the outcome of Japanese military and 
political methods. The Japanese are frank enough in the statement 
of their immediate desires and necessities—they need access to the 
raw materials which they lack and which are abundant in China 
and in Siberia; they wish to find in China and in all the ports of 
southern Asia a retail market for their manufactured exports; and 
they have shown that to secure these ends and to protect themselves 
against hostility and undue rivalry in China they feel that they 
must thrust themselves into the direction of affairs. In so far as the 

A 

British alliance can help Japan along these lines, there is a natural 
desire for its continuance. 

The official view and consequently the general view on the renewal 
of the treaty appears in the press of 1920-21. Thus in May and June, 
1920, many Japanese newspapers at first took the line that the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance was not vital to Japan; but at the same time they 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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gave prominence to interviews with many leading men who spoke 
strongly in favor of its renewal. The present Japanese Ambassador 
at London, Baron G. Hayashi, ridiculed at Tokyo the idea of raising 
the question “at this late hour’’ declaring that the renewal had been 
under consideration for two years and that no apprehension need be 
felt on the matter. Tokio Asahi in a special article on the alliance 
said that the continuance of the treaty was the “chief pillar of 
Japan’s foreign policy” and pointed also to the value of the Lansing- 
Ishii agreement as supplementary to the alliance in conceding Japan¬ 
ese rights in southern Manchuria. The conclusion was, furthermore, 
that “these are natural rights by the creation of geographical pro¬ 
pinquity and not of treaties.” Similarly Japanese railway interests 
in Manchuria “cannot be destroyed by the stroke of a pen.” It is 
worth noting that these are the views of a paper which is by no means 
a military organ. s Again Baron Hayashi said that the situation in 
China and in Siberia required the exercise of a protective influence 
from the outside which was possessed only by the alliance and spoke of 
the vital effect of the debacle of Russia and Germany and of the rise 
of Bolshevist power “against which the alliance is the only barrier.” 8 9 

A further general but very important argument in favor of the 
renewal of the treaty in some form or other is to be found in the 
sense of national self-esteem which the history of the last twenty 
years has so strongly fostered in Japan. At the outset, as we have 
seen, the treaty of 1902 met with overwhelming Japanese approval. 
It gave international prestige when such an element was far more 
important than is perhaps realized by those who today take for 
granted the fact that Japan is unquestionably a power of the first 
rank. The existence of the British alliance is interwoven with the 
entire history of Japan’s national rise during the past twenty years. 
We must continue to bear in mind that any brusque or hasty abandon¬ 
ment of the agreement by Great Britain would undoubtedly arouse 
resentment in the minds of Japanese of all classes. It would appear 

to Japan as an attempt to block essential national aims and, if the 

* 

United States were involved in such a step, the result would un¬ 
doubtedly be to foster Japanese opposition to American views and 
interests. The importance of such contingencies might well depend 

8 Quoted in the London Times, June 8, 1920. 

9 London Times, June 11, 1920. Cf. also Times, July 14, and Dec. 24, 1920; 
Jan. 5, and April 9, 1921. 



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University of California Publications, International Pelations [Vol. 1 


on the methods used and on the purposes and character of any future 
settlement which might be regarded as a general substitute for the 
present Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

Certainly any western power with large Asiatic interests might 
prefer the good-will of Japan in Asia rather than face the danger of 
an even covert hostility on her part. This would be more important 
if the cry of Asia for the Asiatics should prevail to any extent. The 
so-called pan-Asiatic idea with Japan as the head and champion of 
such a movement has not made any great headway as yet; but that it 
may become a rallying point of unrest and disturbance in Asia is 
quite possible. There are even Chinese who frankly favor the exten¬ 
sion of Japanese control in China at present because they prefer the 
reorganization of China under Asiatic guidance rather than at the 
hands of rival western powers. 

5. The British Empire in Asia and the Alliance 

The existence of British interests in Asia was well in the minds of 
those who committed England to the Japanese agreements of 1902 and 
1905. Even in the treaty of 1911 India figures in the preamble; and 
today the state of affairs in the Indian Empire, in central Asia, and 
in the Near East gives pause to the best friends of England. It is 
impossible here to assign praise or blame for present conditions or to 
attempt even to review them. Our only concern is the possible rela¬ 
tion of such matters to the fact of the British alliance with Japan. 
During the negotiations of 1901 the British tried to secure the in¬ 
clusion of India as a field for the operation of the proposed alliance. 
They failed; but in 1905 there was specific mention of the Indian 
frontier. Both of these moves were directed by British apprehension 
of the Russian menace in central Asia. In 1907, however, came the 
“swadeshi” movement in India. A boycott against British goods, 
due to native unrest and opposition to the partition of the province 
of Bengal, had spread, chiefly among the educated Bengali, who were 
Hindus by religion. This movement extended to students and agita¬ 
tors who had hitherto looked chiefly to England and to western Europe 
for their intellectual stimulus. Now, however, there was apprecia¬ 
tion in India of the remarkable development of Japan; the results of 
the Russian War were in the minds of Asiatics generally; and Japan 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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loomed up as an Oriental leader. 10 The tendency was for Indian 
critics of British policies to turn eastward and for the time the 
number of Indian students in Japanese institutions increased rapidly. 
Later, Indian political conspirators fled to Japan and, even during 
the war, a group of them found asylum there and, certainly for a 
time, they defied the efforts of the British to secure their arrest or 
expulsion. This could scarcely have been the case without the conni¬ 
vance of Japanese who were not above taking a special interest in 
such inflammable material. 

As the Indian nationalist movement spread and took on revived 
strength at the close of the late war, conditions in India became much 
more serious. The Hindu nationalists, however, are not sympathetic 
with Japanese governmental methods and ideals. Japan is too im¬ 
perial, too autocratic and militaristic to arouse enthusiasm among such 
radical elements in India. If the native choice as to foreign rulers in 
India lay between the English and the Japanese it is quite possible 
that the preference would be for the Japanese because they are 
Asiatic. Such a preference, however, would, to the ardent Indian 
patriot, be merely a choice between evils. On the other hand, a break 
between England and Japan would, in all probability, open wider the 
door for intrigue against the British in India and, in the event of a po¬ 
litical conflagration in India, the attitude and policy of Japan might 
very well be of importance to the British. The “Russian menace’’ap¬ 
pears now in somewhat different form than in 1902. Thus General Bruce 
writes: * ‘ Whether a new Russian Bolshevist menace, not only to 

India but also Afghanistan, to Persia and possibly to Mesopotamia 
is not about to take the place of the old menace, time alone will show. ’ ’ 
He then queries the usefulness of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance unless 
that Bolshevist menace lasts. * 11 Such military and political considera¬ 
tions seem, however, to be less immediate than the domestic and eco¬ 
nomic factors in India and Malaya. 

The business connections of Japan and India are becoming in¬ 
creasingly close. The war gave special opportunity for this and, in 
spite of a natural reduction in the volume and extent of Japanese 
trade with India since the conclusion of peace, the competition of 

10 Dennis, “The Indian Problem and Imperial Politics ,” in Journal of Eace 
Development, I, 187 et seq. 

11 Bruce, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,“ Asiatic Eeview (July, 1921), 
p. 383. 



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University of California Publications, International Relations 


[Vol. 1 


Japan for Indian trade is now far keener than before the war. Thus 
Japan has been supplanting Germany in the cheap trade of bangles 
and bottles and knicknacks of all sorts; Japanese textile industries 
have provided an increasing market for Indian dyes; and, of the raw 
cotton exports of India, Japan has been taking about 40 per cent or 
more than four times as much as the United Kingdom. The return 
has been in the marketing in India of Japanese manufactured cotton 
goods of the cheaper grades. This has given rise in India to com¬ 
plaint at the governmental assistance given to Japanese textile indus¬ 
tries. 12 The development of Japanese business houses in India, the 
founding of new Japanese banks, and the presence of trade commis¬ 
sions have all aroused British commercial interests in India. The 
growth of Japanese shipping and the establishment of direct lines 
to India with their influence on the volume of trade has gone on 
apace till, today, Japanese imports into India are larger than those 
of any other foreign country and are second only to those of the 
British Empire. There are complaints as to the quality of some of 
these goods but the Japanese Government is doing much to foster the 
Indian trade. 

Such competition does not make for cordial relations between the 
British and Japanese; at Singapore and in Malaya generally the feel¬ 
ing is if anything more bitter than in India; and there is a deep- 
seated prejudice against the so-called “Japanese invasion.” 13 During 
the war Japanese trade in the Straits Settlements more than doubled. 
Steps were therefore taken to restrict Japanese rubber holdings in 
the Malay Peninsula; and on all hands and in various ways the gen¬ 
eral fear of Japanese competition is manifest. Thus with regard to 
present conditions in the mercantile marine comes the British opinion: 
“Our shipping interests in the Far East are threatened to a very 
great degree. Japanese shipbuilding is reaching a point that it may 
before long become the most serious world competitor with our own. 
Japanese shipping is advancing by leaps and bounds.” 14 It is only 
natural in view of the close connection between Japanese business 
interests and national policies that such economic circumstances should 
have a political bearing when the question of the renewal of the alli- 

n Madras Times, April 26, 1917. 

13 Singapore Free Press, March 27, 1919. 

14 McKenzie, “Imperial Aspects of the Far Eastern Problem,” Asiatic Re¬ 
view (July, 1921), p. 422. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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ance again comes up. Almost any bargain which might be struck 
would find its reaction in the regulation of commerce and navigation. 
When the alliance was first made and for many years after, Japan had 
chiefly her military strength to trade with; now she also has her 
commercial interests in the Pacific and Indian oceans to consider 
and to foster. These reach out under the protection of her navy to 
the British Dominions—to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even 
to South Africa. To the representatives of these Dominions and of 
India as well, the whole problem of the alliance was presented in 
June, 1921. 

6. The ‘‘Imperial Conference” of 1921 and the Washington 

Conference 

Strictly speaking the conference which met in London during last 
June, July, and August was not an Imperial conference, as that term 
has been used in time past; but popular usage and the importance 
attached to the meeting of the Dominion premiers this year have 
warranted the use of that title. Originally such a conference or con¬ 
vention was planned for 1922; but the course of international politics 
and the importance of consultation with the self-governing parts of 
the British Empire led to the call for a conference this year. At first, 
in view of the organization and functions of the Imperial War Cabi¬ 
net of 1917-19, and because of the special standing accorded the 
Dominion premiers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 there was 
an inclination to describe the meeting of 1921 as an Imperial Cabinet. 
Thus Mr. Churchill (the Secretary for the Colonies) said that the 
coming conference would “not be like the old Imperial Conferences, 
which were occasional and periodical institutions but a meeting of 
the regular Imperial Cabinet of the Empire.” There was prompt 
opposition to this statement in some of the Dominions, particularly 
in Canada; Mr. Meighen, at Ottawa, said the use of the term was 
quite wrong and that the meeting in June was to be merely a con¬ 
ference of the premiers of the Empire. Fear was expressed lest this 
session in 1921 should in some way serve unduly to bind or limit the 
governments of the Dominions and thus to increase and strengthen 
in more formal ways the connection between the self-governing parts 
of the empire and the central authorities in London. In view of this 
opposition and the polemics which it aroused the use of the term 


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University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


Imperial Cabinet was generally dropped in the London press. 1- ’ In 
the House of Commons the government, on April 28, in response to a 
question, said that no meeting of the Imperial Conference was con¬ 
templated this year, but a meeting on the lines of the Imperial War 
Cabinet meetings would come in June. The most important sub¬ 
jects to be discussed were the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
defense questions, arrangements for securing common Imperial policy 
in foreign affairs, and plans for a Constitutional Conference to be held 
presumably in 1922. 

The official title of the meeting, therefore, became: ‘ ‘ Conference 
of the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, 
the Dominions, and India.” The press adopted the term “Imperial 
Conference”; Mr. Lloyd George on at least one occasion in the House 
of Commons used the words “Imperial Cabinet”; and Mr. Hughes 
for Australia and Mr. Massey for New Zealand in their farewell inter¬ 
views in August both implied that they felt they had been attending 
meetings of the “Imperial Cabinet.” Of course the significance of 
this lies in the fact that the action of such a cabinet must depend, as 
far as any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty is concerned, on 
approval and support by the respective Dominion parliaments. Gen¬ 
eral usage has, however, seemed to justify the use here of the more pop¬ 
ular term Imperial Conference; though we must not forget that in point 
of fact the discussion of 1911 regarding the renewal of the present 
alliance was before the defense committee of the conference of 1911 
and not the Imperial Conference as a whole. The difference be¬ 
tween 1911 and 1921 lies furthermore in the progress of Dominion 
status as to foreign affairs during these years, for in 1911 there was 

15 Cf. London Times, April 28, 29, May 3, 1921. In the parliamentary debate 
at Ottawa Sir Robert Borden pointed out that Great Britain would hesitate to 
engage in war against strong opinion in Canada and Australia. As for the 
Dominions, they were faced with two alternatives: Either they had to exercise 
their influence to seek prevention of wars, or, in case of Avar (unless they with¬ 
drew from the Empire altogether), to participate in a conflict to which they 
might concehmbly be opposed, and which their voice and influence properly 
directed might have prevented. 

Mr. Mackenzie King, the Liberal leader, said that no steps should be taken 
involving any change in relations between Canada and other parts of the 
Empire and nothing done involving Canada in new expenditure for naA r al or 
military defense. \ 

Mr. Meighen, the prime minister, made rather a noncommittal speech, but 
said nothing would be done to bind Canada until ratified by the Parliament of 
Canada, the Conference being merely consultative. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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no question of submission of the Anglo-Japanese treaty to the Domin¬ 
ion parliaments. Thus during the last decade the unwritten con¬ 
stitution of the British Empire has been changing in our very presence. 

A second point with reference to the Conference in London is its/ 
relation to the proposal for the Washington Conference. As far back 
as June 24, 1920, the Peking and Tientsin Times, which has waged a 
consistent war against the renewal of the alliance, prophesied that 
the treaty would not be renewed in July, 1921, and that a laissez faire 
policy would be adopted. This was at a time when the London Times 
correspondent in Tokyo was saying that it was taken for granted that 
the alliance would be renewed. In London, during the winter of 
1920-21, there was comparatively little in the press regarding this 
aspect of the matter and undoubtedly the attitude of overworked offi¬ 
cials was that, with European questions pressing for settlement, and 
with Ireland in turmoil, the Japanese treaty could wait for a time. 
Nevertheless, there was a marked endeavor both in public and by 
private conversation to impress Americans in London with the asser¬ 
tion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in no way a menace to the 
United States. The writer recalls many occasions when that view 
was urged, particularly at the time of the visit of the Crown Prince 
of Japan. Then the Times had said: “We have found Japan a faith¬ 
ful and loyal ally, honorable in the fulfillment of her obligations and 
unfaltering in the confidence she has bestowed upon us” and con¬ 
cluded : ‘ ‘ The British Government are necessarily debarred from 

making any definite statement about the future of the alliance until 
after the Dominion Premiers have met in London next month.” 16 
By this time the debate on the whole subject had begun in Canada. 
Mr. Hughes in Australia had spoken in favor of renewal with the 
rider that the United States should join the alliance or that the new 
treaty should not offend America. Later Mr. Meighen followed Gen¬ 
eral Smuts in taking a more definite stand against the treaty. 

In the House of Commons an important debate took place on June 
17. This definitely linked the question of competition in armaments 
with an adequate review of the whole situation in the Far East. Until 
the Imperial Conference had had opportunity to accomplish this the 
Japanese treaty should be extended. With this as a starting point 


16 London Times, May 7, 1921. 



74 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


the next topic was a “common Imperial foreign policy.” It was 
impossible for England to ignore European problems or to “get 
loose from Europe” but Anglo-American friendship must be the 
basis of a British Imperial world policy. This was probably in part a 
comment on an earlier speech at Cape Town by General Smuts who 
had said: “It was impossible to continue entangled in the embroil¬ 
ments of Europe and the Empire should revert to the traditional 
policy of having no European entanglements. ’ ’ Regarding the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance he had continued: “Our paramount aim should 
be to secure a complete understanding with the United States and no 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty should take place unless we 
could satisfy the United States that no jeopardy to American inter¬ 
ests could follow from that agreement. Imperial defence was largely 
a Pacific question; South African interests were only indirect. ’ ’ South 
African policy was to be one of independence but not of isolation. 17 
In the House of Commons this second part of General Smuts’s speech 
received special endorsement, for Sir Samuel Hoare took up the 
matter saying that no Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be renewed 
which was likely to “embitter our relations with any one of the six 
commonwealths or with the United States. ... If the Alliance is 
to be renewed it must be modified to meet the just demands of China. ” 
Such speeches put the entire matter clearly before the government. 

In London, Mr. Chamberlain, for the Cabinet, closed the debate in 
the House of Commons, saying that— 

He would welcome a closer association of the Dominions with us 
in all matters concerning the foreign policy of the Empire. He re¬ 
called that it was at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence to 
which the Prime Ministers of the Dominions then in this countrv were 

V 

summoned that Lord Grey of Falloden gave to an assembly of the 
Prime Ministers of the Empire the first exposition of the facts and 
principles upon which the foreign policy of the country was based. 
. . . The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement was pre¬ 

eminently a matter in which all parts of the Empire were interested. 
. . . It must always be a cardinal feature of British policy, to 

remove any misapprehension that, stood in the path of our good 
relations with the United States and to cultivate those good relations 
to the utmost of our power. . . . We should be no party to any 


17 London Times, May 23, 1921. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


75 


alliance directed against America or in which we could be called upon 
to act against America. lie did not therefore say that any continu¬ 
ation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in a modified form was not 
possible. He thought it might be possible to reconcile our desire for 
a perfect understanding and the closest cooperation possible with the 
United States with a continuation of our close and intimate friend¬ 
ship with an ally who acted loyally when the occasion of the Alliance 
arose and he gave invaluable support, of which not we in Great Bri¬ 
tain, though we too shared, but other parts of the British Empire 
reaped greatest benefit during the War. 18 

The Times commented editorially three days later that the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance “cannot be lightly abandoned by the signatories 
in the absence of a more comprehensive arrangement which would 
secure to both of them benefits at least which would be equally 
great/’ 19 On the same day Mr. Lloyd George in his opening speech 
before the Imperial Conference said: “I should like to refer very 
briefly to one of the most urgent and important of foreign questions— 
the relations of the Empire with the United States and Japan. There 
is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to maintain 
peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competition of arma¬ 
ments than in the Pacific and in the Far East.” 20 He continued that 
with friendship for the United States as a “ cardinal principle . . . 

we are ready to discuss with any American statesmen any proposal 
for the limitation of armaments which they may wish to set out.” 

These remarks referred particularly to the initiative which had 
been taken by President Harding during May; then he had inde¬ 
pendently directed informal inquiries among the great powers as to 
their attitude concerning a discussion on limitation of armaments. 
These inquiries, through the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in 
Europe., had begun before the United States Senate passed unani¬ 
mously a resolution authorizing and requesting the President to call a 
conference to discuss reduction of naval armaments. The entire sub¬ 
ject was therefore before the public in one way or another in various 
parts of the world, and the United States by these informal inquiries 

18 London Times, June 18, 1921. 

19 London Times, June 20, 1921. 

20 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc. Summary of Proceedings and Docu¬ 
ments (Pari. Pap. cd. No. 1474), London, 1921, p. 13. 



76 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


in May cleared the way for the later and concrete proposals of July 
for a much broader discussion at Washingtdn. 21 

Returning to the meeting of the Imperial Conference w T e find that 
Mr. Hughes, of Australia, on June 21, followed the opening remarks 
of Mr. Lloyd George by suggesting that, with reference to the Japan¬ 
ese treaty, a conference of Great Britain, America, and Japan might 
be invoked “to ascertain what might be mutually acceptable.” He 
then added the proposal for another conference on the limitation of 
armaments to which the British Government in connection with the 
Dominions should invite the United States, Japan, and France. 22 In 
the course of his speech Mr. Hughes showed clearly the laudable 
ambition that to the Dominions should come credit for a solution of 
problems of such world magnitude. 

A few days later, on July 7, in the House of Commons, Mr. Lloyd 
George said that he would prefer to wait until Monday, July 11, for 
replies from the United States, Japan, and China before making any 
statement on the Anglo-Japanese treaty. 23 And on the following 
Sunday, July 10, at the Prime Minister’s country house, where were 
gathered representatives of the Dominions, the expected information 
from the United States was received at the hands of Mr. Harvev. This 

21 A resolution had been introduced by Senator Borah in the Senate of the 
United States on January 25, 1921, calling for information as to the possibility 
of temporary suspension of the American naval building program; reference 
was also made to 11 any possible agreement between naval powers providing for 
the reduction of armaments.” Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 3 sess., LX, pt. 2, 
p. 1996. This resolution had followed an earlier joint resolution proposed by him 
that the United States should take up the question of disarmament with Great 
Britain and Japan with a view to a reciprocal agreement that each of the 
three powers should at once cut in half their annual naval appropriations for 
the next five years (ibid., pt. 1, p. 310, Dec. 14, 1920). On April 13, 1921, 
Senator Borah proposed a joint conference with Great Britain and Japan which 
was to be called by the United States in order to enter “into an understand¬ 
ing or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of 
each of the three powers shall be substantially reduced annually during the 
next five years.” (Idem, 67 Cong. 1 sess., p. 115, Senate Joint Resolution, 18.) 
Again on May 4 this resolution reappeared in the form of a proposed amend¬ 
ment to the annual Navy Bill; as such it was passed and became law on July 
12. (Ibid., p. 966. Cf.' Public—No. 35, 67 Cong., H. R. No. 4803; Sec. 9.) 
“That the President is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of 
Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall 
be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agree¬ 
ment by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of said 
governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, shall be 
substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent 
and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agree¬ 
ment is to be reported to the respective governments for approval.” In this 
form it had already passed the Senate by a vote of 74-0. 

22 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc., pp. 20-21. 

23 London Times, July 8, 1921. The official report in Parliamentary Debates 
omits the reference to the foreign powers; but there can be no question as to 
what the Prime Minister actually said at the time. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


77 


as gi\ en to the press in the form of an announcement of the plan for 
a conference to be held at Washington on limitation of armament 
and Pacific and Par Eastern problems: 

The President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the 
question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal 
but definite inquiries the group of powers heretofore known as the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, that is, Great Britain, France, 
Italy, and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them 
to take part in a conference on this subject, to be held in Washington 
at a time to be mutually agreed upon. If the proposal is found to be 
acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference will be issued. 

It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a 
close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President 
has suggested that the powers especially interested in these problems 
should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration 
of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a 
common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the 
Far East. This has been communicated to the powers concerned, and 
China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to 
Far Eastern problems. 24 

Thus the discussions which had taken place in the Imperial Con¬ 
ference and which had been prefaced by reference to the earlier 
American suggestions for a conference on the limitation of armaments 
were given a new orientation in the fresh action taken at Washington; 
this was due in lar ge part to neg otiations, in London and Washington! 
at the end of June and in early July. Naturally there was no mention 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the proposal of the Washington 
Conference, nor were the Dominions specifically named. To have 
included such matters in the public announcement would have been 
contra^ to usage and a gross breach of manners on the part of the 
United States, for the treaty was then before the Imperial Conference, 
and officially the United States had nothing to do with it. In like 
manner the United States could not approach the British Dominions 
and India on this occasion except through Great Britain. 

Under the circumstances matters of great importance to the British 
Empire were naturally postponed and transferred to the Washington 
Conference for further consideration. In the meantime the Imperial 
Conference continued its sessions. These were largely confidential 
and we have only the meager published summary of its proceedings, 
the records in the House of Commons, and the scanty reports of the 
press. There was less urgency in action as to the renewal or denunci¬ 
ation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as, on June 30, the Lord Chan- 


24 New YorJc Times and London Times, July 11, 1921. 





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cellor had given his opinion that the present treaty was self-extending. 
Already the Prime Ministers had listened to a review of foreign policy 
from Lord Curzon and, in more or less definite form, each had stated 
his views regarding the alliance. Thus on July 11, Mr. Lloyd George 
declared in the House of Commons that the Imperial Cabinet was 
guided by three main considerations: 

(1) In Japan we have an old and proved Ally; the Agreement of 
twenty years’ standing between us has been of great benefit not only 
to ourselves and to her, but to the peace of the Far East. 

(2) In China there is a very numerous people with great potenti¬ 
alities, who esteem our friendship highly, and whose interest we, on 
our side, desire to assist and advance; 

(3) In the United States we see today, as we have always seen, the 
people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is for us not 
merely a desire and interest, but a deeply-rooted instinct to consult 
and cooperate. 

In the course of his speech he referred to a conference on Far 
Eastern matters as a preliminary to the conference on armament at 
Washington. This was due to a natural confusion; but President 
Harding had carefully used the words “in connection with” when 
linking the two matters in his proposal for a conference at Washing¬ 
ton. The Times and the compiler of the summary of the Imperial 
Conference followed this confusion; and later there was considerable 
further discussion as to the possibility of taking up Far Eastern 
[affairs at a preliminary conference at Washington instead of at 
I London. To this idea, however, there was opposition in Canada as 
^well as in America and the plan was dropped. 25 There was much 

25 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc., p. 5. London Times, July 12, 1921. 
Cf. Montreal Star, July 14. “It is most ardently hoped that the present views 
of Mr. Massey and Mr. Hughes will not be allowed to force a preliminary con¬ 
ference on Pacific problems in London.” On the entire issue Canadian opinion, 
as voiced in an excellent editorial in the Manitoba Free Press, July 25, 1921, was 
in agreement with American policy and opinion. As far back as December 28, 
1920, the Toronto Globe said: “Canada, assuredly, treaty or no treaty, would 
feel under no obligation to come to the help of Japan against the United 
States. . . . The statesmen of the British Empire who are engaged in the 

work of safeguarding Britain’s interests in the Far East doubtless under¬ 
stand that Canada can be no party to any international agreement which 
involved, even remotely, a risk so great.” On July 3, 1921, the Globe said: 
“In opposing the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Mr. Meighen ex¬ 
presses the deliberate opinion of this country.” The Toronto Star and the Win¬ 
nipeg Express also supported him. The Manitoba Free Press said that diplomats 
“must justify their work not merely to their colleagues at the Foreign Office, 
but to the peoples and Parliaments of five British nations.” The Toronto 
Telegram had criticized the anti-Japanese policy of General Smuts and Mr. 
Meighen as a menace to Great Britain’s safety in Asia and to peace in the 
Pacific; and the London Times of June 20 warned the Telegram that, however 
willing some Dominion statesmen might be to accept renewal of the Alliance, 
the treaty must still come up before Dominion Parliaments. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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disappointment in England and particularly among some of the 
Dominion premiers at this decision. It was nevertheless consistent 
with the ideas first expressed in June and voiced in the American 
announcement on July 10 of the proposed conference at Washing¬ 
ton. 2G It is manifest that the expedient of a preliminary conference 
on Far Eastern affairs could scarcely have been adopted in fairness 
to Japan and to China, who would have had in any case, barely time to 
prepare for a conference in November; and there were other factors 
to be considered beside the natural desires of Mr. Hughes and Mr. 
Massey to attend a preliminary conference before returning to Austra¬ 
lasia. It is also obvious that it was important to avoid creating the 
unfortunate impression which would have resulted from the calling of 
an exclusive and limited preliminary conference before the delegates 
of other nations had arrived. In this respect the lesson of Paris 
was plain. Lastly, in case an earlier and smaller meeting could not 
come to a satisfactory settlement of principles, the fate of the larger 
conference would be prejudiced. 

With reference to the renewal of the alliance the position of the 
Dominions was made plain by remarks inside or outside the Imperial 
Conference; Australia, New Zealand, and India as a general principle 
favored renewal; Canada was opposed; South Africa was opposed to 
any “exclusive alliances,” and General Smuts added: “To my mind 
it seems clear that the only path of safety for the British Empire is a i 
path on which she can walk together with America.” 2T Mr. Lloyd 
George, in the House of Commons, on August 18, gave a notable 
exposition of the Imperial Conference. Already he had declared 
“there was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; 
today the Empire is in charge of Downing Street.” This he capped 
by saying: “You are defining life itself when you are defining the 
unity of the Empire”; hence it was a mistake to attempt rules and 
definitions as to what the British Empire meant. With reference to 
Japan he continued: “Is it to be suggested that we should now turn 
around and say you stood by us in trouble but we do not need you 
any longer, so, goodbye? Would any one behave like that in business? 
The British Empire must behave like a gentleman. It would not 
be becoming of the Empire so to treat a faithful ally. He then 

28 London Times, August 4, 5, and 6, 1921. Conference of the Prime Ministers, 

etc., p. 5. 

27 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc., p. 24. 



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suggested a new combination of England, Japan, and the United 
States, emphasizing particularly the importance of friendly Anglo- 
American relations. In the meantime the Imperial Conference had 
closed on August 5, and President Harding had issued on August 11, 
the formal invitations for the conference at Washington. 


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CHAPTER V 

THE UNITED STATES, (TREAT BRITAIN, 

AND JAPAN 

1. The Alliance and the Problem of the Pacific 

The idea of a triple alliance or entente between the United States, 
Great Britain, and Japan, has been frequently voiced in the British 
press, in the House of Commons, and in the discussions of the Im¬ 
perial Conference. We find it in the Japanese press as early as 
1920; and today it is common in the talk of influential unofficial 
Englishmen in Washington. The reason is plain for, in so far as 
England may be embarrassed by the opposition to the renewal of 
the present Anglo-Japanese treaty, the adhesion of the United States 
would, in the minds of many, give that alliance new life and effect. 
This idea was probably at the root of the British proposal for a 
preliminary conference on Far Eastern affairs. Certainly it would 
dispose of any opposition in the Dominions to the renewal of the 
treaty and, instead of involving any awkward denunciation of the 
present alliance, it really would enlarge it. Another special reason 
for this proposal lies in the actual situation in the Pacific. 

General Smuts in his first speech before the Imperial Conference 
supported the ideas of many students of world politics when he said: 

Undoubtedly the scene has shifted away from Europe to the Far East 
and to the Pacific. The problems of the Pacific are to my mind the 
world problems of the next fifty years or more. In these problems 
we are as an Empire very vitally interested. Three of the Dominions 
border on the Pacific; India is next door; there too are the United 
States and Japan. There, also, is China, the fate of the greatest 
human population on earth will have to be decided. There Europe, 
Asia and America are meeting, and there, I believe, the next great 
chapter in human history will be enacted. 1 


1 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc., p. 25. 



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l 


t 

l 


It is not only in China that Japanese interests are of importance 
for “ Japanese trade expansion on a huge scale in Southern Asia, 
the Far East, and the Pacific is one of the really marvelous economic 
consequences of the World War.' 72 Australia and New Zealand op¬ 
pose Japanese immigration; but at present Japanese exports of all 
sorts are coming like a deluge into Australasia and the trade relations 
of this region of the British Empire and of Japan are of increasing 
importance every year. Since the war Japanese trade with the 
Philippines has doubled, and with the Dutch East Indies it is five 
times as large as in 1914. 

Such facts are of particular interest to those who formerly took 
the equator as the southern boundary of possible Japanese expansion 
in the Pacific, for Japan is now copying German methods in trade as 
well as in military and political affairs and more and more she is 
resorting to economic penetration. As a method of extending her 
influence, as a means of legitimate business enterprise, this in itself 
does not concern us at present; but as a factor in the possible expansion 
of Japanese military and political control, economic penetration may 
become a totally different matter. It is from this latter point of view 
that this economic advance is stirring current opinion in the Far 
East and in Australasia; and we must not forget the older and under¬ 
lying element of racial prejudice as contributing materially to general 
unrest in the regions of the Pacific whenever the problem of Japanese 
immigration comes to the front. The official figures of the Japanese 
census and the actual records of Japanese emigration and colonization 
go far to show that too much attention has been paid to the alleged 
problem of over-population in Japan. On the one hand, Japanese 
authorities have talked and written much of the need of finding an 
outlet for a rapidly increasing population and, on the other hand, 
we have in the United States and within the British Empire a vigor¬ 
ous domestic determination to prevent increasing Japanese immi¬ 
gration. The further facts are that the birth rate in Japan is now 
declining rapidly and that in the very regions in Asia to which Japan 
has devoted particular attention, Japanese colonization is but a rela¬ 
tively .small affair. The main reasons for this last condition lie in 
the inability of the Japanese laborer to compete with the Chinese 
laborer, and in the dislike of the Japanese colonist for a cold climate. 


2 Bowman, The New World (New York, 1921), p. 495 and also p. 498. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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Because of these acknowledged elements in the situation, the tempta¬ 
tion is to ^ iew the possibilities of the future with particular attention 
to legions where there is no industrious Chinese competitor and where 
the climate is warmer or more temperate. To those who argue in 
such fashion the contingency of a struggle for power in the Pacific 
appears as naturally involving an attempt on the part of Japan 
to secure the Philippines and then by stages to reach the coast 
of northern Australia, which, except for a remote British fleet, lies 
almost defenseless today. 

Opinion to this effect is current in the Far East; men envisage a 
time when Japan will be at war with the United States; they assume 
that, by virtue of an exempting article in a renewed Anglo-Japanese 
treaty, Great Britain will not be a belligerent against the United 
States; but they also suppose that, as a neutral, Great Britain may 
play the part that France took during the Russo-Japanese War when 
she was of considerable assistance to her ally, Russia. As the war 
between the United States and Japan progressed, friction as to the 
rights of neutrals would inevitably develop and it would be a tempta¬ 
tion for England to intervene, in a diplomatic way, to secure peace. 
If such a peace came at the end of the first year of war, before 
America could begin to wear down Japan, it is again assumed that 
Japan would already be in possession of Guam and the Philippines; 
and these islands Japan would hope to retain at the peace. The next 
stage, after a period of consolidation and recuperation, would be 
marked by the virtual command of the western Pacific by Japan and 
by a Japanese advance southward by trade and immigration, or even 
by war, to the domination of Australasia as well. 3 

3 Cf. Bywater, Sea-Power in the Pacific, pp. 288 et seq. The daily press at 
the end of October publishes reports that a decided change in British naval 
plans for the Far East and the Pacific is impending. Without further knowl¬ 
edge it is possible only to note a question in the House of Commons on October 
27, 1921. Mr. Lloyd George stated that the Imperial Conference had agreed 
with the Admiralty that, for the better security of Great Britain’s outlying 
possessions certain naval bases, including those in the Pacific, needed modern¬ 
izing and in special cases, extending. This remark, taken in connection with 
press reports, suggests that a rearrangement of British naval strength is under 
consideration. One of the direct results of the last Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
was the reduction in strength of the Brtish China squadron. This enabled 
concentration of naval forces in home waters and was part of the revolution 
in the distribution of the British navy which preceded the Great War. This 
was the genesis of the establishment of the grand fleet in the North Sea. Any 
changes in the fleet today which involve a return to earlier policies and 
strategy may therefore have a political aspect and deserve consideration even 
if only hypothetical at present. The situation in India and the general unrest 



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University of California Publications , International Relations [Vol. 1 


Such a hypothetical program would involve the use of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance in the first instance, and in the second instance its 
rupture or previous termination. Whatever we may imagine as to the 
possibility of Japanese success in the first stage of this grandiose 
scheme, there is nothing in the present Anglo-Japanese treaty to pre¬ 
vent it. Indeed the treaty provides that, short of belligerency, of 
actual participation in war, and up to the start of hostilities, the 
allies are to consult frankly and fully with each other in respect to 
measures necessary for the protection of interests which may be 
threatened. Furthermore, by Article V either ally is to profit, before 
war breaks out, by full and free consultation with the naval and mili¬ 
tary authorities of the other ally. This arrangement, if the treaty 
were observed by Great Britain and if war should ensue between the 
United States and Japan, would involve exchange of advice, informa¬ 
tion, and intelligence work in general up to the outbreak of war. 
So much for a rough sketch of the sort of talk that lies back of the 
anxiety in the Pacific regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

In more concrete fashion, however, appear some of the reasons 
why Australia and New Zealand are directly concerned in the present 
situation. The tendency is at present to regard the alliance as a 
protection against Japanese expansion; for the Japanese understand 
that the agreement would not stand the strain of a vigorous immigra¬ 
tion policy in the southern Pacific. Such an attempt by Japan would 
threaten to force Australia and New Zealand and even Canada away 
from Great Britain as a partner of Japan. On the other hand, 
neither Australia nor New Zealand is anxious to contribute heavily 
to the maintenance of naval and military forces which would be suffi- 

in Asia, when taken in connection with the fact that since 1914 the British 
flag has not been much in evidence in the Far East, would point to the wisdom 
of using an increase in naval forces in those waters as a political gesture to 
show that British naval power is still in being. Beports fly fast in Asia today; 
and the effect on public opinion of such a possible move is worth noting. In 
the second place, such a redistribution would always be in connection with 
naval policies as to the Dominions; the development of naval bases, perhaps at 
Singapore, as well as in Australia and New Zealand, would be part of an 
Imperial policy already long considered and partially effective today. A 
third political and naval aspect would be seen in the present discussions as to 
the Japanese treaty. If the alliance is to be ended it would be only natural 
for the British Empire to strengthen its naval position in the Far East. If a 
substitute for the treaty is to be produced the actual ratio of naval forces 
maintained in those waters would be subject to negotiation. In any case the 
development of naval bases should precede the movement of ships. Aside from 
such factors, in the event of war in the Pacific, Great Britain would wish to 
be sufficiently represented in the Pacific whether to protect her own neutrality 
or to maintain her rights. 



1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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cient to protect them completely against a possible Japanese advance. 
A successful war by Japan against the United States would be a 
serious blow to the safety of the Dominions, but to antagonize Japan 
at present would be to expose Australasia to the revival of the immi¬ 
gration question and would thus compel plans for the military and 
naval defense of the “White Australia’’ program. The better policy, 
therefore, from the point of view of these two Dominions is, on the 
one hand, to support the renewal of the alliance in such fashion as to j 
avoid friction with the United States, and, on the other hand, to ^ 
prevent the race question from rising in any awkward or provocative 
way. Thus the renewed treaty might become a sort of insurance 
against war in the Pacific. Naturally if the treaty were not renewed, 
the two Dominions would ask those responsible for such a result what 
guaranty could be offered as a substitute for the treatv. 

On these lines Mr. Massey of New Zealand said on May 26, 1921, 
that so long as New Zealand maintains the right to determine who 
shall be its fellow-citizens “we have much to gain, and nothing to 
lose by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.” 4 The general 
view was that: 

So far at least as New Zealand is concerned, the old dread of vellow 
immigration, though still as real and deep-seated as ever, is for the 
present rather latent than active. Though the proposed renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance raises issues of the profoundest possible 
concern to Australasia, it can not be said that the people of New 
Zealand are at all seriously exercised about it. . . . New 
Zealand has no objection whatever to the renewal of the Japanese 
treaty in its present form, nor is she in the least excited by the alleged 
endeavors of Japan to remove the bar against Asiatic immigration 
into Australasia. 5 

During the Imperial Conference, Mr. Massey also made it plain 
that he feared that the “next naval war will be fought in the Pacific” < 
and that he had “lively and grateful remembrance of Japanese naval 
convoys during the last war.” 6 Later he added: “Personally, I am i 
very strongly of opinion that an understanding between America, 
Japan and the British Empire would be more likely to lead to the 
solution of the Pacific problem than anything else that I can think • 
of.” This, he concluded, was an indispensable preliminary to dis-p? 
armament. 7 

4 Interview in London Times on May 27, 1921. 

6 London Times — Supplement—Empire Number, May 24, 1921. 

6 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc., pp. 26—31. 

7 London Times, August 24, 1921. 



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University of California Publications, International delations [Vol. 1 


For Australia, Mr. Hughes was naturally more emphatic on the 
subject of a “White Australia,” and declared that naval defense 
was a “question of life and death” for Australia. 

Now here is our dilemma. Our safety lies in a renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty. America has said she must have the greatest 
navy in the world; that she must have a navy sufficiently strong to 
defend herself. To defend herself against whom? She has left the 
world in no doubt as to whom. We not only have no quarrel with 
America, we have no quarrel with Japan. We have our ideals; Japan 
has hers. There is room in the world for both of us. . . . Our 

ideal at the Conference is, as I see it, a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty in some such form, and modified if it should be deemed proper, 
as will be acceptable to Britain, to America, to Japan and our¬ 
selves. . . . 8 

In the conference the idea was more fully developed as he said: 

The attitude of Australia towards it (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) 
has been quite clearly stated. We have not a clean slate before us. 
If we had to consider for the first time whether we should have a 
treaty with Japan, the position might be very different. We have 
not. For many years a treaty has existed between Japan and Britain. 
Its terms have been modified, but in substance the existing treaty 
has been in force for a long time. No doubt it cannot be renewed 
precisely in its present form. It must conform to the requirements of 
the League of Nations. But the case for renewal is very strong, if 
not indeed overwhelming. To Australia, as you will quite understand, 
this treaty with Japan has special significance. Speaking broadly, 
we are in favor of its renewal. . . . That (disarmament) applies, 

too, to the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but 
in any case we must have such naval defence as is necessary for our 
security. The War and the Panama Canal have shifted the world’s 
stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The 
stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the future 
is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters. Peace 
in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world. 9 

The Times, reviewing the entire matter on August 19, concluded that 
without an understanding as to the preservation of peace on the 
Pacific the conference at Washington could not have any real success; 
and Mr. Hughes on his departure from England once more spoke of 
the importance of the Pacific and in favor of the alliance. 10 

8 London Times — Supplement—Umpire Number, May 24, 1921, quoting from 
a speech made by Mr. Hughes in Australia during April. 

9 Conference of Prime Ministers, etc., pp. 19, 21. 

10 London Times, August 22, 1921. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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2. The Alliance and England 

Mr. Hughes spoke of an Australian dilemma, and Mr. Sastri of 
India has recently favored the renewal of the treaty in order “to 
make India safe. 7 7 What of British opinion at home ? Has not Great 
Britain an even greater dilemma? Do not the problems which the 
British Empire faces affect the United States and also the safety of 
Anglo-American relations? Mr. Lloyd George has already exposed 
the difficulty which perplexes the British Foreign Office. To be sure 
it is not so serious as would have been the case in 1905 or in 1910, 
if the United States had then opposed the expansion of Japan in 
Korea; for by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as they 
stood at that time, Great Britain would have been obliged to go to 
war with the United States in support of Japanese claims and policies 
as to Korea. Today matters have changed somewhat; not only has 
there been an alteration in the terms and the interpretation of the 
present treaty but there has also developed a sense of comradeship in 
arms between the British Empire and the United States and better \ 
understanding between England and America. Nevertheless the j 
dilemma still exists for England. During the past few months she 
has also found that within the empire there is considerable difference 
of opinion regarding the proper British foreign policy to be observed 
in this definite and important matter. As the Times pointed out it 
was fortunate that the Dominion premiers were in London when the j 
invitation for the Washington Conference came; but that invitation 
did not reconcile those differences. For this reason the affairs and 
problems of the British Empire travel across the Atlantic and the 
Pacific to Washington for assistance and action which may simplify* 
the solution of such internal questions. Thus the Mantral Star asks 
whether the Dominions are * ‘ millston es or j eystones 7 7 to the British 
Empire and adds that they “must determine whether they are to be a 
strength or a stumbling block to British foreign policy. 77 The Times, 
with a better horizon than is common in the English press, says: 

Before the war the British Government could act for the Dominions 
in foreign affairs without any great risk of misrepresenting them in 
anv serious way. Now that risk is inherent in almost any action which 
the British Government may take without recent knowledge of the 
views on international affairs of the Dominion Governments. But peace 
problems since the war have revealed a difference in grain between 
the Downing Street view of many international questions and the 
view which Is natural in Ottawa or in Melbourne or in Pretoria: 11 


11 Quoted in the London Times, August 5, 1921. 




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University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


and it is important that the London tradition of preoccupation in 
Europe and “its fevered Eastern frontiers” should be corrected by 
Dominion ideas regarding the importance of the world outside of 
Europe. 12 Such views, however, do not obscure the fact that there 
has been division of opinion among the Dominions as to the renewal 
of the Japanese treaty. The invitation to Washington entirely altered 
the angle from which the prime ministers approached the matter; the 
alliance continued and “its future obviously depends very largely 
upon the result of the Washington Conference.” 13 Thus an even 
larger dilemma is still with us. There are differences within the 
Empire but the wider issue is as to the external problem—the rela¬ 
tions of Great Britain to Japan and to the United States. The choice 
is still to be made as to treaty renewal, with or without modifications, 
as to treaty denunciation, or as to the birth of a substitute for the 
treaty in some agreement to be produced at Washington. And over 
the whole matter lies the transcendant interest of Anglo-American 
relations. 

The approach to such matters at the conclusion of such a small 
historical review starts from the first fact that the alliance is alreadv 
in being; it was first concluded in 1902 and has been renewed twice; 
it has therefore almost attained its majority. The burden of argu¬ 
ment, from the British point of view, rests with those who oppose its 
continuance or renewal. 

Add to this the second fact that in common with other governments 
Great Britain has a foreign office where precedent has its due weight ; 
the natural inertia which affects a great department of public affairs 
in any state is a factor for conservatism, for unwillingness to alter a 
condition already established. The British Foreign Office is no ex¬ 
ception, and, though there may be differences of personal opinion 

within the staff, there is a general weight of experience and of caution 

■ 

in favor of the present treaty. This certainly has been shown in the 
failure definitely to settle the matter long before. Nevertheless the 
importance of cordial relations with America is also a deep conviction 
and an ever active factor in the determination of British policies. 
Of that there can be no doubt. 

12 London Times, August 4, 1921. 

13 London Times, August 5, 1921. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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American affairs and policies, however, are not the only considera¬ 
tion ; the vast commitments of the British nation in every continent 
and particularly the varied political and economic interests of England 
in Asia have a vital place in British policy especially at this time. 
These interests are due, in part, to the recent war and to the stater 
of unrest which afflicts us all; they are also, in part, ancient, and 
historically wrapped with the very existence of the Empire. To these 
complicated and dangerous matters the American public is in large 
part a stranger. Nevertheless, the general condition of British affairs 
in Asia, the peril of revolt in India, the instability of the Near East, 
the menace of Russian intrigue in central Asia and even on the very 
frontiers of India are all lively, present elements in the British world. 
Consequently, in the third place, in so far as the Japanese alliance has 
been of assistance to England, inasmuch as it has added to a sense 
of security in the Far East during these years of stress and strain, 
the feeling is naturally against a change without sufficient reason. 
Therefore the British diplomat who sees the situation through anxious, 
Indian and Afghan glasses says—why should we run the risk of 
additional difficulties by throwing over a connection which has been of 
some use to us in time past? Even if the Japanese alliance has been 
negative in value why should we now prefer the possibility of a posi¬ 
tive risk by incurring the resentment of a sensitive people and of a first- 
class power which is proud of the strongest navy and army in Asia? 

A fourth element exists in the apparent fact that India and New 
Zealand are frankly in favor of the treaty, that Australasia generally 
supports it with only two reservations, to both of which England is 
already agreed, viz., that war with the United States under the 
terms of the treaty should be made plainly impossible and that the 
immigration question should not be involved. Furthermore, South 
Africa opposes the renewal only on principle, because it is an exclu¬ 
sive agreement and because of the remote possibility of war with 
America. Canada alone has taken anything like an independent stand 
against the entire treaty. It is quite possible that, with suitable and 
necessary modifications, even her objections might disappear. Since 
there is a considerable chance that England can smooth out these 
differences within the Empire, why should she now reject the proba¬ 
bility of a modified treaty ? On the other hand, if England should 
decide to denounce the agreement, would not that involve much more 


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University of California Publications , International Relations [\ol.l 


serious difficulties with the Dominions who are in favor of renewal 
and impose more serious responsibilities and heavier expenditures for 
defense on all parts of the Empire which may be exposed to possible 
Japanese enmity and resentment? 

In the fifth place, as to the League of Nations and the spirit of 
the Covenant, which is so opposed to exclusive and limiting alliances, 
both England and Japan by their joint notes of July, 1920, and July, 
1921, have shown their desire to bring the alliance into conformity 
with the provisions and rulings of the League of Nations. In any 
case, could the League of Nations at present give the two allies the 
security and support which either might need in the Far East, or 
elsewhere in Asia, or on the Pacific ? Is there anything in the League 
of Nations which would lead England to give up her association with 
Japan, a fellow-member of the league? 

Sixthly, as we recall the great differences of race, color, and relig¬ 
ion which exist within the British Empire and in view of delicate and 
thorny problems of race contact, is not the fact that England has an 
Asiatic ally in Japan an added though possibly indirect element in 
helping the British to hold an even and just hand as to racial matters 
within the empire? Certainly the fact of the alliance serves to show 
that at London there is no false pride or prejudice on such matters. 

Seventhly, since friendship for the United States is a “cardinal/ 
principle of British foreign policy” and since there is danger of 
friction between the United Stales and Japan, the position of England 
as an ally of Japan gives her a special right and opportunity, without 
danger of misunderstanding and without danger of incurring 
charges as an international meddler, to act as the friend of 
both countries and to try to prevent serious trouble between 
Japan and the United States. Is it not better for England to try to 
restrain any possible aggressive or annoying policies on the part of 
Japan? Thus while remaining Japan’s ally, England could make for 
the peace of the world. 

In the eighth place, in case the alliance were given up and no other 
satisfactory agreement were substituted for it, where would England 
look for an efficient friend capable of world-wide action? No Euro¬ 
pean power can at present exactly take the place of Japan; the United 
States lias refused to join the League of Nations and has made a 
separate peace with Germany. In any case, the United States has 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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hitherto been opposed to any alliances; and it is only an alliance with 
America that could take the place of the present British agreement 
with Japan. If, however, a suitable joint international agreement 
should appear in the course of time might not the existence of the 
Anglo-Japanese treaty be a medium, a bridge toward that sort of a 
general accord ? Such an international convention would of necessitv 
include Great Britain and Japan and their partnership might give 
added strength, and a trend toward peace, particularly if the United 
States should also become a party to such an agreement. 

Ninthly, in view of the complicated economic questions which 
center about China and which are also common to Asia, the fact of a 
political partnership with Japan is an element making for cooperation; 
it would reduce the danger of friction due to natural business com¬ 
petition. 

Lastly, Mr. Lloyd George has already pointed out the embarass- 
ment to England of merely saying “good bye” to Japan at the end 
of a war in which Japan took part as an efficient ally, and particu¬ 
larly after peace negotiations in which she loyally supported British 
contentions and diplomacy. Would not such a decision strike at 
British honor and gratitude and make for instability and uncertainty 
in the reputation as well as in the realities of British foreign policy ? 

These are some of the reasons which have been advanced or which 
might be brought forward in support of the continuance of the 
alliance. Undoubtedly there are others; but, if we consider the matter 
exclusively from the British point of view and with due regard to 
the immensity and the variety of interests involved, these reasons 
and these queries deserve consideration. 

3. Japanese Alarms and Uncertainties 

The chief reasons for the renewal or continuance of the alliance 
as seen in Japan have already appeared. 14 It is necessary only to 
recall them and to give them their place in a Japanese brief for the 
alliance. A number of these general reasons are similar to the British 
reasons, and do not need further explanation. Thus there is, in the 
first place, the historical weight and precedent of the three successive 
treaties, and, secondly, the presumption for renewal or continuance 


14 Cf. chap. I, sec. 1; chap. IV, sec. 4; and chap. V, sec. 1. 



92 


University of California Publications, International Belations [Vol. 1 


of the alliance unless new and forthcoming arguments appear on the 
negative side of the question. Thirdly, there is the unquestioned 
past usefulness of the connection; this has been shown on repeated 
occasions during the past twenty years both in political affairs and 
indirectly in a military way. Fourthly, as the economic ambitions of 
Japan, as well as her necessities, make for an active policy in con¬ 
tinental Asia and thereby rouse opposition and competition, the value 
of the political and military support of England may become greater. 
In the fifth place, the condition of China and the perils arising from 
domestic disturbances on the mainland give the treaty a special im¬ 
portance in the event of intervention in China becoming necessary or 
desirable for Japan. 

A sixth reason is that the alliance is made between two island 
powers to both of whom the problems of sea power, of birth rate, of 
the need of supply of raw materials and of markets for finished 
products are familiar and incessant. From the point of view of prac¬ 
tical experience Japan can appeal to the knowledge and sympathy of 
England. Arising from this element is a seventh query, for to whom 
would Japan turn for understanding and support in such problems 
rather than to England? The alliance has become in many ways a 
sort of touchstone of success with Japan and, if she did not have 
the British connection, she would be practically isolated. The attack 
on the alliance therefore appears as part of an attempt to encircle 
her and limit her national policies. Before the war Japan might 
with very good reason have turned to Germany or to Russia. For 
the time being such choices do not seem possible or profitable; hence 
at present the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stands without an alternative, 
unless, as has been suggested, the conference at Washington should 
provide another way of effective association. 

An eighth factor is the unrest from which the whole world seems 
now to suffer. If the vigorous campaign of Bolshevism in the Near 
East, in Persia, in the central Asian Khanates, in India, and in Mon¬ 
golia should extend more persistently to the Far East, the stability of 
Japan, her international position as well as her domestic peace, might 
be involved; consequently this is not the time to abandon a foreign 
connection which gives security and support. 

Furthermore and ninthly, the alliance has served as a useful shield 
in matters financial and public. It has helped Japan to deal as an 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


93 


s 

equal in international finance; at the same time, it has given a diplo¬ 
matic cover for action and policies, which might not have been so 
successful if seen naked before the world. Lastly, in spite of frequent 
attacks on the British alliance in the Japanese press, in spite of 
national satisfaction and self-sufficiency, there is the reason of prestige 
the value of the alliance at least as a decoration if not always as a 
tangible asset. It is one of ‘‘the imponderables’’ in the Asiatic world 
and an element of “good-will” in the international balance sheet of 
Japan. Such a rough and hasty picture may not do full justice to 
Japanese arguments; but underneath the whole matter lies the fact 
that, without regard to the exact terms of the treaty, the alliance 
presupposes the moral support of England for Japanese policies 
against the policies of any other country, whether it be China or 
the United States. That has been of greater value to Japan during 
the past few years than any military or naval assistance that England 
might have offered. It is such general acquiescence and moral support 
that Japan needs today. 

4. Criticism of the Alliance 

The movement against the renewal or continuation of the present 
Anglo-Japanese treaty is international in character and is by no 
means the result of any long agitation in America or of any formal 
stand by the United States. Many of the grounds for this opposition 
are to be found in matters which are themselves outside the exact 
terms or even the proper scope of the alliance . 15 They naturally 
extend to political and economic factors which, in turn, are vital to 
military and naval policies and preparations. As such these reasons 
against the alliance lie at the root of those ideals of international coop¬ 
eration by which peace and accord may be secured. But arguments and 
criticisms of this sort do not necessarily provide any hard and fast 
program; they are not in the least an attempt to define the precise 
ways and means by which success may be won in forthcoming negotia¬ 
tions. Those turn on many issues and questions of which the Anglo- 
Japanese treaty is only one. There is therefore at this time no proposal 
of a substitute for the treaty; that is beyond the scope of this review. 
Moreover, the exact value and weight of each of these criticisms may 
depend in part on the character of any alternatives to the alliance, for 


15 Cf. chap. Ill, secs. 5-9; chap. TV, secs. 1, 3-6; and chap. V, sec. 1. 



94 University of California Publications, International Relations [Yol. 1 

it is not impossible that substitutes for the present treaty might be 
open to objections far more serious than those advanced against the 
alliance as it now stands. 

The first criticism of the treaty naturally comes from Japan, for it 
is there that the alliance has been most bitterly attacked. The query 
is as to its usefulness and necessity. Against whom must Japan now 
defend herself and is the alliance with England best adapted to her 
national desires and policies? Does not the alliance involve sacrifices 
beyond any possible returns? As far as America is concerned, Japan 
knows that the treaty is comparatively useless, for the United States is 
outside the actual belligerent scope of the alliance in the event of 
war by America against Japan. Germany and Russia are at present 
helpless to wage an offensive war in the Far East and no other Euro¬ 
pean power can attack Japan. Does Japan need the help of England 
to face the chaotic and helpless China? In the world of real politics 
here are practical questions which have not failed to appear in the 
Japanese press. 

From a different angle, but with the same negative result, Lord 
Northcliffe has very recently said: ‘ ‘ During the past two years I 
have been gradually coming to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance has outrun its usefulness .” 16 The British Government has 
already discovered that the question of the renewal of the treaty has 
provoked division of opinion within the Empire. In the text of the 
treaty England has expressed‘adherence to principles of American 
policy as regards China; and no one supposes, unless those principles 
are deliberately violated by Great Britain, that an Asiatic alliance 
would be useful to England as against America. These are ideas 
which have also affected American opinion so that men are frankly 
asking—what is the need of the alliance ? This is only natural as we 
read, alongside of Lord Northcliffe’s, resolutions of the British trade 
unions directed against the alliance, and find the radical press in 
England equally frank: 

. . . The first essential is to end the Japanese Alliance. Brit¬ 

ish public opinion has been culpably slow to understand this issue. 
Everyone realizes, of course, that we must not promise to back the 
Japanese in the event of war with America. But the real issue is 
whether we are going to continue to back Japan in her reckless career 
of expansion. The Alliance has served to cover and protect the 
annexation of Korea, the occupation of Manchuria, the push into 


ie JS T ew YorTc Times, Oct. 27, 1921. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


95 


Mongolia, the seizure of Vladivostok, the grabbing of Shantung, and 
much else of a less startling but equally objectionable kind. As Allies 
we cannot oppose, and must give at least moral, which might easily 
become material support. . . , 17 

From very different points of view General Bruce and now Mr. By¬ 
water, as a*naval expert, query the efficiency of the connection, thus: 

It is very true, as her (Japanese) publicists said in 1916, and have 
repeated many times since, that Japan must face the Pacific problem 
alone and solve it unaided. ’ ,1S This is plain British talk and the 
Japanese, in this respect and to this extent, are also right. 

A second point against the alliance arises from the fact that both 
partners are members of the League of Nations. As we have seen 
they have both shown their desire to submit their private and exclusive 
alliance to the judgment of the league; for they question whether it 
is “entirely consistent with the spirit of the League Covenant.” This 
action may result in internment, if not interment, for the league has 
not given any opinion. In the meantime, the alliance continues in 
effect subject to possible revision in order to avoid conflict between 
the treaty of alliance of 1911 and the Treaty of Versailles, which both 
England and Japan signed in 1919. Certainly the intention of those 
responsible for the Covenant and for Section X of the treaty of 1919 
was to offer the shield of the league as a substitute for private de¬ 
fensive alliances in preventing war. If that intention is upheld 
effectively the Anglo-Japanese treaty may become from an interna¬ 
tional point of view an unnecessary document. Its continuance would 
in that case be an open assertion of disbelief in the League of Nations 
and certainly would show a disregard of its spirit. Against that 
contingency the allies took an initial step in their note of July, 1921. 
There is, however, in the field of political opinion another aspect of 
the matter; for, generally speaking, the organization of the league 
was supposed to mark a break with the traditions and policies of the 
older diplomacy which is so well illustrated in the origin, provisions, 
and history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The fact of this con¬ 
troversy as to its continuance and renewal is, from an international 
point of view and from the point of view of members of the league, a 
stimulant to the revival of a debate which only recently seriously 
affected the progress of peace. The United States is not a member 

17 London Nation, XXX, no. 2, October 8, 1921, pp. 42-3. 

18 Bywater, Sea-Power in the Pacific, p. 311. Cf. also chap. XI; and for 
Bruce, Asiatic Review (July, 1921), p. 383. 



96 University of California Publications, International Relations [A ol. 1 

of the League of Nations; but American opinion, in so far as it is 
suspicious of the treaty of alliance as a symptom of unhealthy inter¬ 
national conditions, is in line with British and Japanese suspicions 
regarding the wisdom and validity of the provisions of the treaty as 
compared with the Covenant of the League of Nations. 

Thirdly, as we recall the political struggle in the United States 
over the Treaty of Versailles, it is plain that, outside as well as inside 
Congress, the results of the Peace Conference at Paris which aroused 
the bitterest American criticism were those affecting the settlement 
in the Far East. They were opposed because of their character and 
because by their origin, in the exchange of secret notes between Japan 
and the Allies in February, 1917, these provisions as to Shantung 
and the Pacific islands savored of the very methods and principles 
which had long been foreign to American diplomacy. The support 
given to Japan at Paris by these secret notes of 1917 naturally made 
a section of American opinion doubtful of the professions of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The general result was to strengthen im¬ 
measurably the feeling that the United States did not wish to have 
anything to do with that sort of European diplomacy. If such settle¬ 
ments were possible under the aegis of the Anglo-Japanese agree¬ 
ment, or as an indirect and supplementary effect of that connection, 
the inclination was strong to cry “a plague on both your houses,” 
withdraw from participation in European affairs as far as possible, 
and view the Asiatic situation with special attention and concern. 

A fourth ground of opposition to the alliance is the attitude of 
China. Instead of cordial and friendly relations between China and 
the two allies we find suspicion and fear on the part of Chinese who 
were formerly friendly to both governments. In the Far East the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance has become anathema to intelligent and 
patriotic Chinese whether they are supporters of the Peking or of the 
Canton governments. The British interests in China also see this 
fact with increasing uneasiness; they have made it plain by resolu¬ 
tions of chambers of commerce, and in the British press, that they 
are opposed to the renewal of the treaty, at least in its present form. 19 

Fifthly, the alliance has, from the first, been an elastic insurance 
policy for Japan. In the event of trouble she felt she could count 
either on the active assistance of England or, at least, on a benevolent 
British neutrality; at all events England would not be against her in 


19 Cf. chap. TV, secs. 3 and 5. 



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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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the Far East. Such a feeling has acted as a stimulant to Japanese 
forward policies. To some of these, whether protected by the terms 
of the alliance or outside of its provisions, there is no reason to object; 
to other achievements and plans there has been and still is decided 
opposition in various quarters. The feeling is that Japan would not 
have disregarded certain general lines of American policy with regard 
to China if it had not been for the encouragement given her by the 
existence of her alliance with England. It is unnecessary and im¬ 
possible to enter into details at present; but the net result is the 
strong feeling that, under cover of the alliance, the peace of the world 
is being threatened. Unfortunately there is an absolutely unfounded 
belief in certain circles in Japan that the United States is aggressive 
and that we have imperialistic designs on China. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The attempt by some Japanese to make use 
of such an idea as a defense for their own military and political ex¬ 
pansion shows blindness to the realities of world politics and of Ameri¬ 
can policies today. The alliance remains, however, a dangerous factor 
in the situation. 

A sixth point comes from the attempted violations of the spirit of 
the agreement as suggested by its provisions. When the statement 
is made that the Twenty-one Demands, as first presented to China, 
are not in opposition to the general intent of the Anglo-Japanese 
treaty the question at once arises as to whether the agreement is itself 
hypocritical and misleading or whether in such matters the connec¬ 
tion has been already damaged beyond repair. The preambles of the 
three treaties stated their purposes; the history and events of the last 
twenty years are in some respects directly in contravention of those 
provisions. It is therefore the uncertainty which exists with regard 
to the real meaning as distinguished from the textual provisions of 
the treaty that makes for criticism, suspicion, and misunderstanding. 

Such considerations lead directly to a seventh factor, viz., that no 
alliance can stand motionless. To live and to remain effective it must 
march with events and be quick to catch new currents of air in inter¬ 
national life and thought. Thus the circumstances which produced 
the treaty of 1902 and which provided for its renewals belong in 
large part to another period. Today the alliance is too old; it has 
served its purpose. If its provisions remain essentially unchanged 
and if the observance of its precepts continue as doubtful as hitherto, 


98 


University of California Publications, International Relations [\ ol. 1 


the Anglo-Japanese treaty will no longer be in harmony with the 
circumstances of the present. In America there is a tendency toward 
benevolent optimism when new and liberal forces make their appear¬ 
ance. We are often too easily moved to believe that the new world is 
at our doors; thus there was a wave of enthusiasm in America when 
the Chinese Republic was proclaimed ten years ago. The events of 
the last decade have given us pause as we realize some of the unchang¬ 
ing qualities of Asiatic politics. The lessons and inevitable disillu- 
sionments of Paris are still with us as we look about the world today. 
Nevertheless a change has taken place in some respects and the oppor¬ 
tunity has again come to Americans, as well as to others, to reaffirm 
their belief in the friendly association of nations, in the principle of 
international cooperation, and to declare their opposition to particular 
and exclusive combinations and alliances. The weight of progressive 
liberal thought in world politics today is directed against the very 
conditions and ideas which are interwoven in the actual life history 
of the alliance. 

This strong opinion can find support today among liberal groups 
the world over, in Japan as well as in South Africa. We have, how¬ 
ever, to deal with realities while we cherish our ideals. One of the 
highest of our ideals is the promotion of Anglo-American friendship j 
and understanding, and the reality today is that, by forces not of our t 
choosing, the efficiency of that association and partnership between 
the two nations comes once more to the stage of discussion and nego¬ 
tiation. The last ground of criticism of the alliance therefore rests 
in the fear lest, in the present state of affairs, the treaty and the 
arguments about it might affect the opportunity which is now open* 
to both America and the British Empire to strike hands. It is a 
serious matter to raise such a question or doubt; it would be worse to 
ignore it. The real test today depends on the community of thought 
and purpose, the common international morality, and the character 
and effect of actual cooperation which both states can establish and 
maintain. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has unfortunately become arj 
possible stumbling block in a march along the same road. That fact 
is in itself sufficient to cause anxiety and to give additional weight 
to all the other objections which have been stated or might have been 
offered against it. The balance for and against the treaty is now 
familiar; the way out of the difficulty must be found by the decisions 
taken in the Conference at Washington. 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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APPENDIX I 

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATIES 

A. Treaty of 1902 1 

The governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a 
desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the Extreme 
East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the inde¬ 
pendence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the 
Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those 
countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree 
as follows: 

Article I. The High Contracting Parties having mutually recog¬ 
nized the independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to 
be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. 
Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of 
Great Britain relate pricipally to China, while Japan, in addition to 
the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar 
degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, 
the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for 
either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order 
to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive 
action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or 
Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Con¬ 
tracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its 
subjects. 

Art. II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their 
respective interests as above described, should become involved in war 
with another power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain 
a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from 
joining in hostilities against its ally. 

1 MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919, 
(New York, 1921), I, 324-25. 2 vols. 



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University of California Publications, International delations [Vol. 1 


Art. III. If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should 
join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party 
will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and 
make peace in mutual agreement with it. 

Art. IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of 
them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrange¬ 
ments with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above 
described. 

Art. V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or 
Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Govern¬ 
ments will communicate with one another fully and frankly. 

Art. VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immedi¬ 
ately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years 
from that date. 

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have noti¬ 
fied twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the 
intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expira¬ 
tion of one year from the day on which either of the High Contract¬ 
ing Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for 
its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the 
alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded. 

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respec¬ 
tive Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto 
their seals. 

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of January, 1902. 

(L. S.) (Signed) Lansdowne, 

His Britannic Majesty’s Principal 
Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(L. S.) (Signed) Hayashi, 

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan at the Court of 
St. James. 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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B. Treaty of 1905 2 
Preamble 

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of 
replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th Janu¬ 
ary, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following 
articles, which have for their object: 

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in 
the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; 

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in 
China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese 
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China; 

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Con¬ 
tracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the 
defence of their special interests in the said regions: 

Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either 
Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in 
the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments 
will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will con¬ 
sider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard 
those menaced rights or interests. 

Art. II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, 
wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either 
Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its terri¬ 
torial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this 
Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the 
assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make 
peace in mutual agreement with it. 

Art. III. Japan possessing paramount political, military, and 
economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of 
Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in 
Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and ad¬ 
vance those interests, provided always that such measures are not 
contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and 
industry of all nations. 

Art. IV. Great Britain having a special interest in all that con¬ 
cerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right 

2 MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919, 
I, 516-18. 



102 


TJniversity of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may 
find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions. 

Art. V. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them 
will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements 
with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the 
preamble of this Agreement. 

Art. VI. As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, 
Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some 
other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in 
which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and 
will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agree¬ 
ment with Japan. 

Art. VII. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be 
afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned 
in the present Agreement-, and the means by which such assistance 
is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military 
authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time 
consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual 
interest. 

Art. VIII. The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions 
of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its 
signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. 

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have noti¬ 
fied twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the 
intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expira¬ 
tion of one year from the day on which either of the High Contract¬ 
ing Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for 
its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the 
alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded. 

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respec¬ 
tive Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto 


their Seals. 

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905. 

(L. S.) Lansdowne, 

His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State' for Foreign 
Affairs. 

(L. S.) Tadasu Hayashi, 

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty 
The Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James. 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


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C. Treaty of 1911 3 
Preamble 

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, 
having in view the important changes which have taken place in the 
situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 
the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agree¬ 
ment responding to such changes would contribute to general stability 
and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace 
the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same 
object as the said Agreement, namely; 

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the 
regions of Eastern Asia and of India; 

( b ) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in 
China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese 
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and 
industry of all nations in China; 

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Con¬ 
tracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the 
defence of their special interests in the said regions: 

Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either 
, Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in 
the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments 
will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will con¬ 
sider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard 
those menaced rights or interests. 

Art. II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, 
wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High 
Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its terri¬ 
torial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this 
Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to 
the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and 
make peace in mutual agreement with it. 

Art. III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of 
them will without consulting the other, enter into separate arrange¬ 
ments with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in 
the preamble of this Agreement. 

3 MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919, 
I, 900-901. 



104 


University of California Publications, International Eelations [\ ol. 1 


Art. IV. Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty 
of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in 
this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obliga¬ 
tion to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitra¬ 
tion is in force. 

Art. V. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be 
afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned 
in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is 
to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military 
authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to 
time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual 
interest. 

Art. VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immedi¬ 
ately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years 
from that date. 

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have noti¬ 
fied twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the 
intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expira¬ 
tion of one year from the day on which either of the High Contract¬ 
ing Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date for its 
expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance 
shall, ipso facto , continue until peace is concluded. 

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respec¬ 
tive Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed 
thereto their Seals. 

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911. 

E. Grey, 

His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. 

Takaaki Kato, 

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the 
Court of St. James. 


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Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


105 


APPENDIX II 
THE FOUR POWER PACT 

A treaty between the United States of America, the British Em¬ 
pire, France, and Japan, sign^dHJecember 13, 1921, relating to their 
insular possessions andJ#Sular dominions in the Pacific Ocean. 

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and 
Japan, -with a view to the preservation of the general peace and 
the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular 
possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific 
Ocean, have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect and 
have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: 

The President of the United States of America, Charles Evans 
Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge, Oscar W. Underwood and Elihu 
Root, citizens of the United States; 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, 
Emperor of India: The Right Honorable Arthur James Bal¬ 
four, O.M., M.P., Lord President of His Privy Council; The 
Right Honorable Baron Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First 
Lord of His Admiralty; The Right Honorable Sir Auckland 
Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., His Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary to the United States of America; and 

For the Dominion of Canada: The Right Honorable Robert Laird 
Borden, G.C.M.G., K.C.; 

For the Commonwealth of Australia: The Honorable George 
Foster Pearce, Minister of Defence; 

For the Dominion of New Zealand: Sir John William Salmond, 
K.C., Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand; 

For the Union of South Africa: The Right Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O.M., M.P.; 


106 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


For India: The Right Honorable Valingman Sankaranarayana 
Srinivasa Sastri, Member of the Indian Council of State; 

The President of the French Republic: Mr. Rene Viviani, Deputy, 
Former President of the Council of Ministers; Mr. Albert 
Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies; Mr. Jules J. Jus- 
serand, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the 
United States of America, Grand Cross of the National Order 
of the Legion of Honour; 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Minister of the Navy, Junii, a member of the First Class of the 
Imperial Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with 
the Paulownia Flower; Baron Kijuro Shidehara, His Ambassa¬ 
dor Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington, Joshii, 
a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising 
Sun; Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, Junii, a member of the First 
Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun; Mr. Masanao 
Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jushii, a mem¬ 
ber of the Second Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising 
Sun; 

Who, having comunicated their Full Powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed as follows: 


I. 

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to 
respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular 
dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. 

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting 
Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involv¬ 
ing their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy 
and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting 
between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties 
to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for 
consideration and adjustment. 


II. 

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any 
other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with 


1923] Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 107 

one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding 
as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to 
meet the exigencies of the particular situation. 

III. 

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it 
shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall con¬ 
tinue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting 
Parties to terminate it upon twelve months’ notice. 

IV. 

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with 
the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall 
take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at 
Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and 
Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall ter¬ 
minate. The Government of the United States will transmit to all 
the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the 
deposit of ratifications. 

The present Treatj r , in French and in English, shall remain de¬ 
posited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and 
duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government 
to each of the Signatory Powers. 

In faith whereof the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the present Treaty. 

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of December, 
One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-one. 

Signed by all the Plenipotentiaries named above. 


DECLARATION ACCOMPANYING THE ABOVE FOUR- 

POWER TREATY 

In signing the Treaty this day between The United States of 
America, The British Empire, France and Japan, it is declared to be 
the understanding and intent of the Signatory Powers: 

1. That the Treaty shall apply to the Mandated Islands in the 
Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty shall 
not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of 


108 


University of California Publications , International Relations [Vol. 1 


America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between 
The United States of America and the Mandatory Powers respectively 
in relation to the mandated islands. 

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article 
I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to 
principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the respective Powers. 

Washington, D. C., December 13, 1921. 

Signed by all the Plenipotentiaries named above. 


A TREATY BETWEEN THE SAME FOUR POWERS, SUPPLE¬ 
MENTARY TO THE ABOVE, SIGNED FEBRUARY 6, 1922 

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and 
Japan have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon 
the following stipulations supplementary to the Quadruple Treaty 
signed at Washington on December 13, 1921: 

The term “insular possessions and insular dominions” used in the 
aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only 
Karafuto (or the Southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), For¬ 
mosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan. 

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect as the 
said Treaty to which it is supplementary. 

The provisions of Article IV of the aforesaid Treaty of December 
13, 1921, relating to ratification shall be applicable to the present 
agreement, which in French and English shall remain deposited in 
the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certi¬ 
fied copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to each 
of the other Contracting Powers. 

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present agreement. 

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-two. 

Signed by all the Plenipotentiaries named above, except Viviani 
and Tokugawa, absent. 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


109 


SENATE RESERVATION 

At the end of the resolution of ratification of the Supplementary 
Treaty above, passed by the United States Senate by a vote of 73-0 
on March 27, 1922, the following reservation was added to said resolu¬ 
tion of ratification: 

Subject to the following reservation and understanding, which 
is hereby made a part of and condition of this resolution of ratifi¬ 
cation and which repeats the declaration of intent and understand¬ 
ing made by the representatives of the powers signatories of the 
four power treaty relating to their insular possessions and insular 
dominions in the Pacific Ocean: 

1. That the four-power treaty relating to Pacific possessions 
shall apply to the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean: pro¬ 
vided, however, that the making of this treaty shall not be 
deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of 
America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements 
between the United States of America and the mandatory 
powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands. 

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of 
Article I of the four-power treaty relating to Pacific posses¬ 
sions refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which ac¬ 
cording to principles of international law lie exclusively within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers.” 

From the Congressional Record for March 28, 1922. 


110 


University of California Publications, International Relations [Vol. 1 


APPENDIX III 
READING LIST 

This is not a bibliography; nor a list of books used in the prepara¬ 
tion of this pamphlet. It is merely a selection of convenient books 
which, by way of content or comment, bear particularly on questions 
touched upon in this historical sketch of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
Articles in periodicals have not been included. There are many of 
great value in publications such as Asia, the Asiatic Review, the Round 
Table, the Atlantic Monthly, the Contemporary Review, the Fort¬ 
nightly Review, the Neiv Republic, etc. 

MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 
1894-1919 (New York, 1921), is now the standard collection of essen¬ 
tial documentary material for the recent diplomatic history of the 
Far East. 2 vols. 

J Abbott, James F., Japanese Expansion and American Policies. New 
York, 1916. 

Bland, J. 0. P., China, Japan and Korea. New York, 1921. 

Bowman, I., The World Today. New York, 1921. 

i Brown, Arthur Judson, The Mastery of the Far East. New York, 

1919. 

i Bywater, Hector C., Sea Power in the Pacific. Boston and New York, 
1921. 

Cheng, Sih-Gung, Modern China, a Political Study. Oxford, 1919. 

Chung, Henry, The Oriental Policy of the United States. New York, 
etc., 1919. 

} Fletcher, C. Brunsdon, The Problem of the Pacific. New York, 1919. 

Gibbons, Herbert A., New Map of Asia. New York, 1921. 

.} Gleason, George, What Shall I Think of Japan? New York, 1921. 

Hall, H. Duncan, The British Commonwealth of Nations. London, 

1920. 

Hornbeck, Stanley K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East. New 
York, 1916. 


1923] 


Dennis: The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 


111 


I3 enaga, P., and. Kenoske Sato, Japan and the California Problem . 
New York, etc., 1921. 

Kawakami K. K., Japan and World Peace. New York, 1919. 

--. Japan and World Politics. New York, 1917. 

Iveith, Arthur B., Responsible Government in the Dominions. Oxford,. 
1912. 

War Governments in the Dominions. Oxford, 1921. 
Latourette, Kenneth S., Development of Japan. New York, 1918. 
McGovern, W. M., Modern Japan. New York, Chicago, 1920. 

Millard, Thomas F., Democracy and the Eastern Question. New York,, 

1919. 

Mousley, Edward 0., An Empire View of an Empire Tangle. London, 

1921. 

Murray, Gilbert, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey. Oxford, 
1915. 

Osborne, Sidney, The New Japanese Peril. New York, 1921. 

Pitkin, W. B.fMust We Fight Japan? New York, 1921. 

Pooley, A. M., Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi. London, 

1915. 

' r 

Reventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik, 1888-1914. Berlin, 1916. 

Scholefield, Guy H., The Pacific, Its Past and Future, and the Policy 
of the Great Powers from the Eighteenth Century. London, 

1919. 

Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914. 
New Haven, 1914. 

Smith, C. A. M., The British in China and Far Eastern Trade. Lon¬ 
don, 1920. 

Tardieu, Andre, France and the Alliances. New York, 1908. 

Treat, Payson J., Japan and the United States. Boston, 1921. 
Vinacke, Harold M., Modern Constitutional Development in China. 
Princeton, 1920. 

Weale, B. L. Putnam, The Truth about China and Japan. New York, 

1919. 

Willoughby, Westel W., Foreign Rights and Interests in China. Balti¬ 
more, 1920. 
























































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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS—(Continued) 
Volume 9. 1919; 

Cunningham —The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as 


Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila (1583-1800). 
v + lx + 463 pages. Cloth. 4.00 

Volume 10. 1920. 

Brown —Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase. 

xii + 248 pages. Cloth. 2.50 

Volume 11. 1921. 

Albright— Official Explorations for Pacific Railroads. 

vii + 187 pages . 1.50 

Volume 12. 1921. 


Williams —The San Francisco Committee of Vigilance. A 
Study of Social Control on the California Frontier in the 
Days of the Gold Rush, xii + 543 pages, 4 illustrations. 


Cloth . 5.00 

OTHER HISTORICAL WORKS 

McCormac —James K. Polk: A Political Biography, x + 746 

pages, 2 illustrations. Cloth. 6.00 

Moses —Spain’s Declining Power in South America. 

xx + 440 pages. Cloth. 4.00 

Petersson —Cicero: a Biography. 699 pages. Cloth. 5.00 









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